The transformation of the Belgian party system has unfolded asymmetrically: while conservative and far-right parties have thrived in Flanders, the populist right vote has not (yet) been mobilized in Francophone Belgium. Focusing on the demand side of electoral politics, this article explores whether these disparities on the supply side mirror distinct political dimensions and cleavages in both regions. By using an innovative methodology of (class-specific) multiple correspondence analysis, we find that the Flemish and the Francophone political space are largely alike – both in terms of the composition of their political dimensions as in their cleavage structure. However, we also find that Francophones adhere to a distinctive welfare consensus, which prevents working-class embourgeoisement and likely moderates the electoral fortunes of the far right. Overall, our results challenge the common stereotypes of a ‘conservative Flanders’ and a ‘progressive Wallonia’.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine raised for many parties the question of how to position themselves in view of urgently requested arms deliveries. Since, the topic of arms trade, which has hitherto rarely been addressed, has become a heavily politicized and divisive issue and partly even polarized public opinion. A major prerequisite for parties’ position-taking is to anticipate how voters react to such arms transfers and, more specifically, whether their respective attitudes are structured along the predominant left-right axis. Based on a large-scale survey experiment with French and German voters ($N = 6617$) in the year before the Russian invasion, we are able to focus on the relationship between ideological predispositions, vote intentions, and issue attitudes in a non-politicized period. Using both vignette and conjoint experiments, we demonstrate that voters’ attitudes on military transfers can be subsumed remarkably well under the left-right scale. Differentiating the impact of normative and economic considerations, the former is stronger among the left, while the latter also affects the attitudes of rightist citizens. However, normative considerations are the most important concern along the whole political spectrum. The turn of the German Green Party in 2022 to assist countries that are being aggressively attacked (because of the Responsibility to Protect), was not reflected in our data.

I investigate why some countries were more successful in containing the death toll than others during the COVID-19 pandemic. I focus on the role of socialism and on the existence of long-term regime-driven legacies that may have had an impact on the containment of COVID-related deaths. I claim that countries that went through successful socialist revolutions have specific features that equip them with better resources to cope with public challenges such as pandemics. Furthermore, these features remain even after the demise of the socialist regime. I find a positive effect of socialist revolutions over COVID-19 containment at the country level. I investigate three possible causal mechanisms for this relationship: authoritarianism, state capacity, and mass mobilization. Through mediation analysis, I find the socialist legacy seems to be channeled through higher levels of mobilization and also more authoritarian institutions.

Control over the legislative messaging agenda has important political, electoral and policy consequences. Existing models of congressional agenda-setting suggest that national polarization drives the agenda. At the same time, models of home style and formal models of leadership hypothesize that legislators shift their messaging as they balance coordination and information problems. We say the coordination problem dominates when conditions incentivize legislators to agree on the same message rather than fail to reach consensus. Conversely, the information problem is said to dominate in circumstances where legislators prefer to say nothing at all rather than reach consensus on the wrong political message. Formal theories predict that when coordination problems are pressing, legislative members follow the policy positions of party leaders. When their party’s information problem is acute, party members instead rely on the wisdom of the caucus to set the party’s agenda. To test these theories, we analyze the Twitter accounts of U.S. House members with a Joint Sentiment Topic model, generating a new understanding of House leadership power. Our analyses reveal complex leader-follower relationships. Party leaders possess the power to substantially affect the propensity of rank-and-file members to discuss topics, especially when the coordination problem dominates; these effects are pronounced even when coordination problems are pressing. That said, when the underlying politics are unclear, rank-and-file members exert influence on the discussion of a topic because the information problem is more acute. At the same time and for these uncertain topics, leadership influence decreases, consistent with theory. We show these results are robust to the underlying dynamics of contemporary political discussion and context, including leading explanations for party leadership power, such as national polarization.

In this paper, we develop a framework for studying the role of group identities in contemporary cleavage formation. Identities, we suggest, hold the key to a central conundrum of current political sociology: the fact that today’s electoral realignments appear to be rooted in the social structure of post-industrial societies, while the decline of mass organizations has dissolved traditional links between politics and social structure. Bringing cleavage theory into dialog with the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, we theorize how group identities may play an important role in stabilizing a new universalism-particularism cleavage emerging in Western Europe today. We identify two key processes of cleavage identity formation: bottom-up processes of “social closure” and top-down “classification struggles” waged by political entrepreneurs. For both processes, we review empirical findings and formulate an agenda for further research.

Latin American governments are increasingly adopting mano dura initiatives to combat gangs, organized crime, and insecurity. While mano dura has been a concept of increasing empirical interest, there seems to be limited conceptual clarity about the wide spectrum of strategies developed to combat crime and associated fear. This article proposes a definition of mano dura that has three different dimensions, each of them containing specific elements. The form of mano dura depends on formal, informal, and rhetorical practices. Drawing on 46 scholarly works in the social sciences, we develop our definition anchored in the knowledge of Latin American policing strategies, contributions on responses to crime in the region, and the conceptual development literature. With the purpose of supplementing our effort to standardize the usage of the term with the need to retain a degree of conceptual differentiation, we also offer a stylized model to better classify policing strategies in Latin America. In our stylized model, the numerous ways policies and narratives as well as their implementation (or not) interact can be grouped into four broad categories: full mano dura, institutional mano dura, performative mano dura, and covert mano dura.

Whether fiscal austerity by governments is unpopular or not is much discussed in the literature. One line of research argues that consolidation has negative electoral effects, ranging from declines in politicians’ approval ratings to abstention by voters at elections. Another strand highlights that re-election chances are not harmed by the implementation of austerity and that some voters in fact support consolidation measures. Both sides are limited in at least two regards. First, they do not allow for the possibility that public opinion is shaped by the political discussion about government debts and budget deficits. Second, and relatedly, the literature is limited in its extent to which it considers heterogeneity in preference adaptation across income groups. This article contributes to these debates by bringing to bear insights from the literature on mass preference formation. In particular, I argue that a cross-party consensus on austerity leads voters to align their preferences with the consensus, increasingly demanding cuts to government spending. This adaptation is conditioned by income so that the preferences of those income groups that are the furthest away from the consensus adapt their fiscal preferences most. By including the discursive context of fiscal policy, this article helps explain how austerity can be made popular. Empirically, I test these expectations by matching citizen preferences with party positions on fiscal policy for 60 country years. The empirical results indeed demonstrate that even though low- and middle-income voters are least supportive of austerity, they adapt the most to the party consensus on austerity.

Can public diplomacy in times of crisis shape citizens’ attitudes towards international politics? Using a survey experiment in Italy, we evaluated whether information cues about public diplomacy efforts by the United States and China to assist the country in dealing with the COVID-19 emergency shifted the importance citizens attached to Italy’s international allies being democracies. We found that citizens who receive positive cues about USA efforts to assist Italy report a stronger preference for Italy interacting with democracies. At the same time, when they received positive cues about China’s efforts to assist Italy, they discounted the importance attached to international allies being democracies. We further found that these effects are conditional on the participants’ support for democracy at home. We argue that these findings are consistent with a cognitive dissonance framework where citizens update their attitudes to decrease dissonant cognitions when they receive information that challenges prior beliefs or expectations.

This essay reviews the following works:

The Pinochet Generation: The Chilean Military in the Twentieth Century. By John R. Bawden. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2016. Pp. x + 304. US$29.95 paperback. ISBN: 978–0817319281.

La Unidad Popular y la revolución en Chile. By Mario Garcés. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2020. Pp. 340. CL$45,000 cloth. ISBN: 978–956–00–1382–8.

Pinochet desclasificado: Los archivos secretos de Estados Unidos sobre Chile. By Peter Kornbluh. Santiago: Catalonia, 2023. Pp. 529. CL$25,900 paperback. ISBN: 978–956–415–039–0.

Historia de la Unidad Popular: Tiempos de preparación: De los orígenes al 3 de septiembre de 1970, vol. 1. By Jorge Magasich Airola. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2020. Pp. 346. CL$20,000 paperback. ISBN: 978–956–00–1367–5.

Historia de la Unidad Popular: De la elección a la asunción: Los algidos 60 días del 4 de septiembre al 3 de noviembre de 1970, vol. 2. By Jorge Magasich Airola. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2020. Pp. 201. CL$14,400 paperback. ISBN: 978–956–00–1368–2.

Historia de la Unidad Popular: La primavera de la Unidad Popular, vol. 3. By Jorge Magasich Airola. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2023. Pp. 397. CL$42,000 paperback. ISBN: 978–956–00–1725–3.

Historia de la Unidad Popular: De tres a dos bloques, vol. 4. By Jorge Magasich Airola. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2023. Pp. 257. CL$42,000 paperback. ISBN: 978–956–00–1732–1.

El proceso populista: Momento, fenómeno, régimen: El caso de Chile que no fue: Chile (1932–73). By Claudio Riveros Ferrada. Raleigh, NC: Editorial A Contracorriente, 2018. Pp. xii + 364. US$30.00 paperback. ISBN: 978–0990919193.

A History of Chile 1808–2018, 3rd ed. By William F. Sater and Simon Collier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. xviii + 560. US$120.00 cloth and US$39.99 paperback. ISBN: 978–1009170215.

This article examines one of the most violent episodes in Mexico’s recent history—the Corpus Thursday massacre orchestrated by the Mexican government against young students on June 10, 1971. The event marked the beginning of a period known as the guerra sucia (dirty war), marked by the systematic repression of students and dissenting political groups by government forces. The present work advocates for “making history with photographs,” urging readers to explore the historical moment through the narratives presented by three distinct historical actors: the press, independent photographers, and the perspective of power from governmental organizations.

This essay reviews the following works:

Indigenous Struggles for Autonomy: The Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua. Edited by Luciano Baracco. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. Pp. vi + 239. $105.00 hardcover, $99.50 e-book. ISBN: 9781498558815.

Aprendizajes del movimiento zapatista: De la insurgencia armada a la autonomía popular. By Lia Pinheiro Barbosa and Peter Michael Rosset. Buenos Aires: CLACSO (Colección En Movimiento); San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Mexico: El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR), 2023. Pp. 152. Paperback, digital. ISBN: 9789878135694.

Colonialismo, comunidad, y capital: Pensar el despojo, pensar América Latina. Edited by Santiago Bastos Amigo and Edgars Martínez Navarrete. Quito: Religación Press, 2023. Pp. 419. paperback, digital. ISBN: 9789942708007.

Oaxaca Resurgent: Indigeneity, Development, and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Mexico. By A. S. Dillingham. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 254. $30.00 paperback, $90.00 hardcover. ISBN: 9781503627840.

Autonomías y autogobierno en la América diversa. Edited by Miguel González, Araceli Burguete Cal y Mayor, José Marimán, Pablo Ortiz-T., and Ritsuko Funako. Quito: Editorial Universitaria Abya-Yala, 2021. Pp. 692. Paperback, digital. ISBN: 9789978105504.

Black and Indigenous Resistance in the Americas: From Multiculturalism to Racist Backlash. By Juliet Hooker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020. Pp. x + 330. $42.99 paperback; $121.00 hardcover; $40.50 e-book. ISBN: 9781793615527.

Pensar las autonomías: Experiencias de autogestión, poder popular y autonomía. Edited by Alicia Hopkins and César Enrique Pineda. Mexico City: Bajo Tierra, 2021. Pp. 458. Paperback, digital. ISBN: 9786079675172.

Many citizens in liberal democracies are concerned about immigration and its impact on their countries. Governments often seek to address these concerns by restricting the post-entry rights of immigrants such as the right to permanent settlement or access to welfare benefits. Thereby, it is expected that immigrants with an inferior legal status are (perceived as) less threatening to natives and, as a result, make the latter more willing to accept new immigrants. Does this policy rationale indeed attenuate public opposition to immigrant admission and thus allow for the reconciliation of the economic need for immigrants with the political concerns of domestic constituents? This study advances the theoretical argument of a rights-conditionality in citizens’ immigration preferences and provides empirical evidence on the phenomenon. A factorial survey experiment among citizens in the United States and Switzerland tests the effect of residence and welfare rights on the public opposition to immigrant admission. The results show that restricting immigrants’ welfare rights does significantly decrease public opposition towards immigration across the two countries. In contrast, restricting immigrants’ residence rights does not, and in the context of Switzerland, even increases opposition to immigrant admission. Citizens critical of immigration are thus not per se more welcoming to immigrants if they receive an inferior legal status but seem to care about immigrants’ contributions and commitment to the receiving society. The findings highlight the importance of immigrants‘ post-entry rights in the view of citizens and show how the design of immigration policies may help to understand public immigration preferences.

In this study, we investigate how eco-social attitudes are interlinked with various modes of political action aimed at preventing environmental change and promoting social welfare. Using multiple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis, we explore the links between attitudes and political action, and associated socio-political characteristics, in the case of Sweden. Our results show a three-node pattern forming a political action triangle: individuals expressing joint support for social welfare and environmental concerns are most actively engaged in political action, while those supporting environmental concerns are sympathetic to take part in political action without actually participating, and those supporting social welfare or expressing low support for either set of concerns seem overly reluctant towards all types of political action. This pattern, which is also tied to distinctive socio-political characteristics, has wider implications for understanding the agency and the mobilization of support for tackling the multiple ecological and social crises contemporary societies are facing.