Chapter Four focuses on US compliance with international law. The perception of former officials was that US compliance with international law was robust. When asked about the reasons that the United States complies or does not comply with international law, the former officials’ responses tracked many of the factors they listed for states in general. The chapter then explores the interplay between law and policy, exploring how policymakers balance these competing concerns. Former officials were clear that while international law was generally followed, it was not always dispositive. Legal issues were considered as one factor among a variety of factors, essentially involving a cost–benefit analysis. The salient considerations driving compliance or noncompliance, as revealed in the interviews, appeared to be the nature of the national interest or policy at stake; the nature and significance of the international legal rule involved ethical considerations; the views of allies; the ambiguity or precision of the legal obligation; and the weight of domestic political and bureaucratic concerns. The chapter next examines factors that may affect policymaker perceptions, including party affiliation, and concludes with a description of instances where the United States either bent international law or complied scrupulously.

Chapter Five examines the role of international law in State Department policymaking. It describes the formal and informal decision-making processes within the State Department, focusing on the influential role of the Legal Adviser and the Legal Adviser’s Office. The chapter then examines closely the weight given by policymakers to legal advice and the nature of the interaction between policymakers and lawyers. Policymakers, at least at higher levels, generally have final decision-making authority, but the views of the Legal Adviser’s Office can be determinative in the relatively rare instances when the lawyers deem a course of action conclusively illegal. Otherwise, the lawyers’ advice is influential, but its weight may vary depending on the circumstances, including the nature of the national interest involved. Many former officials indicated that the development of policy was often a collaborative and constructive process. The lawyers were usually willing to work with policymakers, and they were often willing to find alternative courses of action within the law, though they would not usually budge on an interpretation of the law. Some former officials indicated that their relationship involved greater contestation, resembling a negotiation. When international law conflicted with significant policy interests, policymakers could sometimes seek to overcome those obstacles.

The introductory chapter argues that the near universal rise of the radical Right is more than a series of national coincidences and that despite differences in their ideas and policies, a globally connected Right is emerging. One indication of this is the emergence of global networks and events such as the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), the NatCon Conferences, and the Madrid Forum. However, the globality of today’s radical Right goes beyond mere transnational networks, and requires a wider rethinking of its relationship to the global in two ways. First, the radical Right is constituted by transnational interactions operating at multiple scales. Second, it defines itself and is co-constituted by its relation to the global, not just to the national. The chapter also discusses the vexed issue of defining the Right and the difficulties of studying the Right.

The chapter examines how the radical Right’s counter-hegemonic struggle relates to other struggles for power in contemporary world politics and attacks on the so-called liberal international order (LIO). Drawing on recent literature on struggles for recognition, we show how the radical Right has built powerful transversal, global alliances based on a logic and discourse of difference and diversity rather than claims to Western superiority. We illustrate this through an analysis of an emerging global alliance in defence of the ‘natural family’. The radical Right’s civilisationalism and calls for multipolarity also enable complex, strategic convergences with illiberal states such as China and Russia, as well as states and people in the Global South. The multi-polar, civilisational world order envisioned by the radical Right is not anti-hierarchical and inclusive, but legitimises new differences and new forms of exclusion through its claims to cultural diversity. It is a more sovereigntist vision of the world in which exclusionary illiberal forces would be able to operate with fewer international constraints.

This chapter extends the analysis of the origins and consequences of China’s national security institutions into the post-Mao era. It first discusses the political reasons why fragmented institutions persisted after Mao’s death and why Chinese leaders subsequently opted for siloed, rather than integrated, institutions. It then presents a medium-n analysis exploring the differences in crisis performance between fragmented and siloed institutions. The decision-making processes leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the 2001 EP-3 Crisis demonstrate the distinct pathways by which fragmented and siloed institutions cause leaders to miscalculate. Whereas Chinese leaders received incomplete information prior to the Sino-Vietnamese War because bureaucrats feared speaking truth to power, Chinese leaders received inaccurate information prior to the onset of the 2001 EP-3 Crisis because bureaucrats were dissuaded from contesting one another’s reporting. Both cases advance the book’s argument regarding the importance of information quality as opposed to political accountability.

Ahmed engages recent works that have sought to harness the lessons of Weimar to offer guidance to ailing democracies around the globe. Utilizing a Weberian evaluation of ideal types, it examines the model of democracy and democratic defense employed within these accounts. The chapter demonstrates that what they offer as a general or universal model of democracy defense, comes to reflect in its construction a very particular model that emerged in the postwar context of Cold War competition. This model, Ahmed argues, misconstrues the terrain of political conflict and misses opportunities to open up space for a revisioning of democracy that would serve as the basis of a more robust democratic defense.

The chapter provides a detailed analysis of global managerialism, the core ideological content of the radical Right’s understanding of the world. In this view, the essence of contemporary world politics is not the age-old story of realist power politics, the liberal tale of progress through institutions, or the corrosive spread of neoliberal capitalism. It is instead the rise to power of a global liberal managerial elite, the so-called New Class of experts and bureaucrats. Detached and unmoored from their national identities and cultures, the interests of this elite lie in yet further globalisation and liberalisation that erodes traditional national values and local communities. This managerialist sociology provides the radical Right and its supporters with a common enemy – the global liberal elite – which may have different faces in different geographical locations, but that nevertheless facilitates powerful equivalences and transversal alliances that spans nations and regions.

This chapter examines the unparalleled influence that the Court’s decisions have had on the Commission’s codification and progressive development of areas of the law under its consideration. It illustrates not only the great extent to which many of the Commission’s propositions have borrowed their authority from the pronouncements of the Court, but also the significant impact of the latter on the Commission’s choices concerning terminology and programme of work. The chapter further demonstrates the Commission’s conscious efforts to support the Court’s cause more broadly, including by encouraging the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction and by promoting the doctrine of the sources of international law enshrined in its Statute.

Peripheral-patronage states have several ways in which they can respond to the bind outlined in Chapter 2. These strategies – recruiting, concealing and insulating – are usually selected according to the state’s possession or lack of domestic capacity and autonomy from outside interference. Some states fail to strategize, finding themselves in the unusual position of being granted autonomy, but lacking the capacity to use the space it provides. Concealing, which involves an invitation of outside scrutiny with the intent to manage the process that follows, is the most interesting strategy because, when successful, it can erode the international norms its users invoke. Successful concealing is possible when the concealing state is both illegible to outsiders and capitalizes on an asymmetrically interdependent relationship with its larger partner in which each has the capacity to harm the other’s reputation. As a result, the concealing state receives the larger actor’s seal of approval for conduct that actually undermines the latter’s chosen norm.

As the three primary cases do not show every configuration of independent variables that should lead to failed concealing, this chapter begins with two more circumscribed explorations of failed concealing in Tanzania and Honduras. It then explores the other strategies and examines their long-term effects. Although concealing is intrinsically risky since a ruler cannot know their own state’s legibility and presence of a strong enough asymmetrically interdependent relationship until these are tested in action, these other strategies may carry even bigger risks. As such, we should expect to see rulers, especially those with reasonable patronage-based capacity but little autonomy from outsiders’ interests and interference in their domestic affairs to try to conceal unsavoury domestic practices. It is therefore important to remain mindful of the effects successful concealing can have on global norms of human rights and good governance.

This chapter examines security and Australian foreign policy during 2016–2020 using two strands. It shows that Australia confronted both the ‘high politics’ issues that are the stuff of traditional foreign policy, as well as the unconventional security challenges to which Australia had to adapt. We begin by considering Australia’s conventional security politics, and the three consistent strands in Australia’s security thinking: how Australia fits into a world of super powers and the balancing act it must conduct to do so; relatedly, its alliance with the Unitd States; and Australia’s role in multilateral organisations. We then assess the so-called ‘unconventional’ security issues and their impact on Australian national security. Our analysis reveals that Australia’s responses to unconventional threats were increasingly conventional and relied on domestic tools to solve international problems. Some new threats seemed to bring international tools, like the military, to bear on domestic problems. Moreover, we demonstrate that the security environment was increasingly defined by the ‘grey zone’ – acts that reside between war and peace and take on unconventional forms.

This chapter describes the re-emergence of great-power competition between the United States and China, discusses how it reshaped the external environment and strategic space for Australia’s foreign policy, and examines how Canberra responded to it between 2016 and 2020.