This chapter deals with Germany’s position on individuals, human rights and international criminal responsibility. It is in seven parts: position of individuals; human rights; international refugee law; nationality and statelessness; international terrorism; international health law; and international criminal law. The second part covers the Federal Constitutional Court rejecting the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ interpretation of the CRPD; Germany’s criticism of Brunei’s Sharia Penal Code as violating human rights and of Saudi Arabia for violating the CRC; Germany’s concern over possible human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China; the German Federal Government adopting its thirteenth human rights report; and candidates nominated by Germany for human rights bodies. The fourth part discusses an amendment to the Nationality Act depriving members of terrorist militias with dual nationality of their German citizenship. The seventh part deals with the resignation of the German judge from the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals; Germany requesting Lebanon to extradite a Syrian official; German charges brought against Syrian officials for crimes against humanity and against a member of ‘Islamic State’ for war crimes; rulings on war crimes against property; and Germany’s view on possible crimes against humanity and war crimes and genocide in Myanmar.

This fragment’s argument draws on a range of intellectual sources in order to make the case for the value of oppositional or negative thought, the thought that says ‘no’ to orthodox ideas.

This fragment assembles a list of the resources (including inspirational models) that I mobilized in the construction of a radically alternative theoretical model to inform the practice of comparative law.

After the discussion of the powers of the Security Council in the previous chapter, this chapter considers some of the limitations on these powers, real or imagined. In particular, it examines limits deriving from the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and the norms of jus cogens. Then, it explores some checks and balances on the actions of the Council. Ultimately, our response is that states do not have the right to do this, and would be acting unlawfully if they purported to exercise such a right. But they do, of course, have the ultimate option as a matter of policy of simply disregarding binding obligations imposed by the Council, with all the consequences, political and legal, that might flow from such a course of action. That is why the Council needs to exercise self-restraint and use its undoubted powers responsibly and only where it really is necessary to do so in order to ensure prompt and effective action to maintain international peace and security. This is the most effective check on the Council’s power.

This chapter considers the interaction of the Security Council with other international organizations in relation to the use of force and the role that international organizations may play in implementing Council authorizations to use force. This is an area where the Security Council, the international organizations concerned, and member states have shown great flexibility, with the provisions of the UN Charter (both Chapter VII and Chapter VIII) and of the constituent instruments of the regional and other organizations being developed through extensive practice. A difficult question, however, arises where member states grant regional organizations the authority to carry out such interventions without the target state’s consent to the specific action and without Council authorization, in particualr in light of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. The chapter concludes that it cannot be said that Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act or similar provisions allow for the use of force without Security Council authorization. The Council remains the body vested by member states with the power to authorize ‘enforcement action’.

This chapter deals with Germany’s position on State jurisdiction and immunities. It is structured in two parts: jurisdiction of the State and State immunity. In the first part, Germany’s portrayal of US sanctions against a Russian company as extraterritorial and illegal under international law is examined. It is argued that the USA has a clear jurisdictional basis for sanctions legislation in the territoriality principle and the active personality principle, and is thereby not infringing German sovereignty. In addition to this, Germany’s claim that US sanctions against Nord Steam 2 are contrary to international law is investigated in the first part. Again, it will be put forward that US sanctions are based on the principles of territoriality and active personality having only extraterritorial effects.

This fragment’s argument is that comparative law is in thrall to a colonial mindset and must in short order emancipate itself from this epistemic predicament.

This chapter examines the history and nature of the Security Council’s relationship with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the role that this relationship may play in the exercise of the Council’s functions. It briefly recalls the drafting history pertaining to the Court, including its relationship to the Council, the UN Charter provisions governing the relationship between the two principal organs, and the relationship between them – both potentially and in practice. It concludes that a more prominent role for the Court, within the confines set by the Council itself in this context, could strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Council as an institution. Under the framework set out in the UN Charter and considering the Council’s wide discretion as to how it executes its responsibilities, the Council could and may want to consider and make use of the ICJ as a useful tool within its diverse toolbox for the maintenance of international peace and security.

This fragment’s argument advocates for comparative law’s indiscipline vis-à-vis legal positivism and claims that insights from other disciplines are crucial to the production of an enhanced interpretive yield in any foreign-law investigation.