We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This fragment’s argument rejects positivism, the leading theoretical framework informing comparative law, and introduces culturalism with a view to enhancing comparatism’s interpretive yield.
This fragment’s argument is that the designation ‘comparative law’, while epistemologically impoverished, must ultimately be retained for pragmatic reasons. Yet, it must be invested with an alternative meaning.
This fragment’s argument refutes leading theoretical assumptions informing comparative law to the effect that comparatism can be objective and access truth, on one hand, and that it must be objective and access truth, on the other. Through a biographical sketch, this argument shows that there cannot be a comparison that is not informed by the comparatist’s predispositions and predilections, themselves having much to do with the cultural world that the comparatist embodies.
This chapter introduces the approach taken in the book, which is to focus on the law, not policy. It further clarifies that the book will focus on the legal aspects of the Security Council based on the UN Charter and in the Council’s practice.
This chapter considers some legal issues that arise when analyzing some of the main provisions of Chapter VII. It first considers the binding nature of provisional measures under Article 40, whether a determination under Article 39 is a prerequisite for such a determination, and the temporary nature of provisional measures and their timing. Then it considers the legal framework of measures not involving the use of force under Article 41 and possible limitations on their scope and nature.
This chapter covers Germany’s view on international environmental law and international watercourses. In doing so, it deals with Germany’s position on decommissioning oil platforms in the context of Shell’s activities in the North Sea.
‘A text … is at the same time the condensation of a history scarcely delimitable. But this condensation of history … remains … indissociable from an event absolutely singular, a signature absolutely singular, and therefore also of a date, of a language, of an inscription autobiographical.’1 What ascertainable circumstances, then, does this exercise in amplification herald, this supplement in the sense in which Derrida understands the term, that is, a text come from within NCL even as it is written after completion of NCL and grafted on to NCL in extremis?2