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Chapter 5 considers how Western countries engaged with the Sino-Indian frontier leading up to 1962. The first two sections describe Britain's Far East policy and its perspectives on the “Tibet problem.” Section three shows that Australia and New Zealand did not aid Tibetan rebels because they accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Section four describes the United States’ using Tibet to antagonize Beijing not only by aiding Tibetan rebels, but also by referring to it as a “an autonomous country.” The next two sections deal with British and U.S. assessments of the Himalayan kingdoms and their role in Sino-Indian relations. The last sections trace the relationships that the Commonwealth and the United States had with Burma during the 1950s and 1960s.
Keywords: Tibet problem, Sino-Indian relations, Far East policy, Commonwealth
It was not only India and China that engaged with their shared frontier prior to 1962. Although far from their main concern, English-speaking Western countries analyzed developments in that region and at times offered support to India, Tibetans, the Himalayan kingdoms, and Burma. The West's historical relations with political entities along the Sino-Indian frontier informed Cold War policies. The United Kingdom's relations with Tibet date back to the eighteenth century when British officials viewed it as both a curiosity and a potential trading partner. These views evolved during the nineteenth century as Britain came to regard Tibet as an important pawn in the Great Game. Britain specifically promoted Tibetan suzerainty to establish it as a buffer zone, as first exemplified by the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty. International relations scholar Dibyesh Anand argues that Britain used the ambiguous terms “Chinese suzerainty” and “Tibetan autonomy” to “deal with Tibet as a de facto independent buffer state without having to offend China and other Western powers.” By the mid-1940s, this need evaporated and Britain in practice recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet—thereby revealing its desire to strengthen Sino-British relations.
Britain's interest in Nepal stemmed from its enlistment of Gurkhas (i.e., Nepalese soldiers for hire), who served throughout the British Empire since the nineteenth century.
Several studies concentrate on the representation of minority groups and the policy goals that members of these groups highlight when becoming candidates for public offices. However, we do not know much about the degree of parliamentary representation of sexual minorities and what ideological profile politicians with an LGB+ identity adopt. We aim at filling this gap by analysing the ideological stances of LGB+ candidates on key policy dimensions. Using data from the 2021 German candidate study, we find that the self-identification as LGB+ contributes significantly to adopting progressive stances on the socio-cultural dimension and more favourable positions on welfare state expansion, regardless of further important factors like party affiliation. Moreover, candidates who consider themselves LGB+ do take on significantly less traditional positions on the socio-cultural dimension compared to the position of their party, indicating that increasing descriptive representation of LGB+ individuals in parliament leads to a strengthening of more progressive voices in parliament and a stronger substantive representation of LGB+ interests.
In recent decades, representation of ethnic minorities increased significantly across Europe, while concurrently many political parties moved to the right on multiculturalism and immigration, a seeming paradox. We explain it by arguing that often it is the same parties that move to the right and simultaneously increase representation. They use this dual strategy in an attempt to positionally converge to the median voter, where the increased minority representation acts as a reputational shield to prevent allegations of intolerance. Looking at parliaments of eight European countries between 1990 and 2015, we find that parties that shifted to the right in response to a public mood swing to the right are indeed significantly more likely to bring more ethnic minority politicians into parliament. This has important implications for the literature on descriptive representation and party platform change.
Contextualizing the regulation of human mobility in a new security framework, this book offers an original perspective on the dominant mode of politics and evolving norms shaping the immigration policies of contemporary liberal states. In doing so, the authors challenge existing paradigms that privilege economic and cultural factors over new security ones in explaining the critical institutional and normative changes in migration management, from the early post-WWII through the post-Cold War era. Drawing on evidence from multiple sources, including media and elite discourse, policy tracking, party manifesto data and public opinion across Europe and the US, the book exposes the restrictive nature of immigration politics and policies when immigration is framed as a security threat, and considers its implications for civil liberties. Informed by a rich breadth of scholarly sub-disciplines, the findings contribute both empirically and theoretically to the literatures on international migration, security and public opinion.
• The emphasis on cultural connectivity in China’s growing presence and involvement in Southeast Asia highlights the importance China places on people-to-people exchanges as part of its global engagement strategy.
• The remarkable ascension of China over the recent decades has precipitated a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of a “discourse war” with Western powers, as expressed in the latter’s “China threat” narrative.
• In response to such challenges, China has made substantial investments in cultural diplomacy, to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives.
• This article examines Chinese cultural diplomacy in the realm of entertainment, specifically “The Melody of Spring: Transnational Spring Festival Gala” hosted in Nanning, Guangxi, and disseminated globally each Chinese New Year.
• Against the legacy of China-Indonesia bilateral relations as well as Indonesia’s treatment of its Chinese minority, this study explores China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power in contemporary Indonesia.
• Through the case study of the “Transnational Spring Festival Gala”, this article posits that China’s cultural dissemination as an instrument of soft power has yielded little influence on the Indonesian public and has limited impact on the formation of a transnational imagined community.
What are the common causes for the rise and decline of great powers in the past? What conditions were important in sustaining their international power, and what conditions eventually eroded their primacy?
The cultural impact of China's growing presence and involvement in the region has generated significant discussion. Beijing's official narratives, particularly in the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have consistently emphasized not only physical connectivity but also cultural exchanges through people-to-people interactions (Kuah 2019). This highlights the importance China places on the deepening of cultural ties as part of its global engagement strategy. This is further demonstrated in China's recent launch of the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which purportedly features an alternative to Western modernization (Hoon and Chan 2023).
President Xi Jinping's vision of creating a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” is designed to closely intertwine with China's soft power approach, wherein cultural exchanges with partner nations and people-to-people connections play a pivotal role. The emphasis on human and cultural exchanges also extends to the discourse presented by both the Indonesian and Chinese governments when managing their bilateral relations. The overarching strategy is encapsulated in the phrase proposed by Xi Jinping to “tell China's story well” (讲好中国故事).
However, the remarkable ascension of China in recent decades has also engendered a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of the “discourse war” with Western powers (Shambaugh 2015). This frequently finds expression under the aegis of the “China threat” narrative (Pradt 2016). In response to this conundrum, China has invested substantially in cultural diplomacy and sought to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives (Chen, Colapindo, and Luo 2012).
Operating as an instrument of international relations, soft power conveys a modality of influence characterized by subtlety and allure, in contradistinction to coercion (Nye 1990). In tandem with material assistance and the China model of development paradigms, China's soft power strategy encompasses multifaceted endeavours. These include the establishment of the much-debated Confucius Institutes (CI) across the globe, the endowment of international academic exchange programmes, the instigation of international outreach endeavours and the expansion of its premier state television broadcaster, CCTV, across diverse linguistic contexts worldwide (Rawnsley 2012).
Concurrently, China's cultural diplomacy initiatives extend into the realm of entertainment as well. In the past two decades, the Chinese state has authorized the creation of patriotic and nationalistic television series, singing competitions and variety shows that coalesce artists from the broader cultural tapestry of China, spanning Taiwan, Hong Kong and the global Chinese diaspora.
Why was China’s economy stagnant during some periods of its history but grew rapidly in other periods? How and why did it and the other Asian newly industrializing countries grow so much faster than other developing countries? Why does economic growth in advanced developed countries slow down? What do these tendencies imply about shifting power and changing positions in the interstate hierarchy?
Why some groups outperform others in academic and professional achievements? Why some countries’ economies grow faster than others? Why are the fastest-growing economies located in East Asia? What role does Confucian heritage play in helping countries in this region to outperform others economically? How do culture, institutions, and policy interact to influence each other?
Technological innovation led to the creation of leading sectors such as textiles, railroads, and automobiles in past waves of economic development, and these leading sectors have in turn provided the economic dynamism buttressing the world’s leading countries’ economic, political, and military primacy in the past.
What theoretical and policy implications and lessons can be drawn from this book? The foundation for a country’s international competitiveness is to be found in its domestic sources, especially its cultural inheritance. This cultural heritage, however, is not fixed but rather evolves with changing socioeconomic environment. There is therefore a reciprocal influence relationship between culture and economic growth. Moreover, culture influences political and social institutions and is in turn influenced by them. Domestic conditions inside both China and the United States affect their governments’ capacity to cope with changing international environment, their ability to undertake innovations and grow their economy, and their relative position in international relations.