Like the People's Republic, India regarded control over its frontier as a fundamental part of nationhood. India fortified its border with Pakistan not long after the 1947 partition. China's advance on and infiltration of India's peripheries began to dominate Indian thinking prior to the 1962 war, however. Indian leaders posited that Beijing was chipping away at important buffer zones while diminishing India's sphere of influence. Domination of Tibet by the People's Republic as well as Beijing's overtures to the Himalayan kingdoms and Southeast Asia shaped this perspective.

Indian officials had much to consider about how to respond to China. Some adopted a realist approach early on, arguing that India needed to recognize the Chinese threat and secure the border region. Some attached great significance to Hindi-Chini bhai bhai and eschewed confrontation, while others held moderate or ambivalent views. In the end, the Indian government used military contingency plans, economic development, careful management of the frontier town of Kalimpong and Tibetan border crossers (e.g., the Dalai Lama), and high-level diplomacy to deal with an increased Chinese presence at the frontier. These measures succeeded to varying degrees.

Border Security through Military Means

Concerned Indians interpreted the October 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet as an event that foreshadowed future border problems. Poet, nationalist, and mystic Shri Aurobindo stated in November 1950 (three weeks before he died) that the People's Liberation Army had entered Tibet to extend China's frontiers and threaten India in the future.

In 2020 and 2021, Indian and Chinese troops fought in areas along their disputed border, including the Galwan Valley and Pangong Lake. In 2017, China and India had a dust-up over a frontier area called Doklam (Donglang). These confrontations were far from isolated incidents. Rather, they comprised part of a series of border disputes between India and China dating back to the 1950s.

This work explores the evolution of the Sino-Indian border conflict— broadly defined—from 1950 to 1970.1 These dates are chosen for several reasons. The year 1950 was a watershed moment in Sino-Indian relations due to the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Furthermore, beginning with this year allows us to evaluate each nation during its infancy (the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China were founded in 1947 and 1949, respectively). The book ends in 1970 since the international scene changed in 1971 with the onset of the Indo-Pakistani War and ping-pong diplomacy. These dates also mark roughly ten years before and after the Sino-Indian Border War. Using ten years before and after as markers makes sense so that we can understand what events contributed to the conflict as well as what the medium-term ramifications of it were.

I specifically examine how conflict at the frontier destabilized spheres of influence and caused the countries involved to reassess their allies and rivals. This contest was a revival of the nineteenth-century Great Game, garnering the interest of political entities both inside and outside the border region. A range of actors viewed the border conflict as an opportunity to pursue their foreign policy goals, which comprised trade, security, and prestige.

It was not only India and China that engaged with their shared frontier prior to 1962. Although far from their main concern, English-speaking Western countries analyzed developments in that region and at times offered support to India, Tibetans, the Himalayan kingdoms, and Burma. The West's historical relations with political entities along the Sino-Indian frontier informed Cold War policies. The United Kingdom's relations with Tibet date back to the eighteenth century when British officials viewed it as both a curiosity and a potential trading partner. These views evolved during the nineteenth century as Britain came to regard Tibet as an important pawn in the Great Game. Britain specifically promoted Tibetan suzerainty to establish it as a buffer zone, as first exemplified by the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty. International relations scholar Dibyesh Anand argues that Britain used the ambiguous terms “Chinese suzerainty” and “Tibetan autonomy” to “deal with Tibet as a de facto independent buffer state without having to offend China and other Western powers.” By the mid-1940s, this need evaporated and Britain in practice recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet—thereby revealing its desire to strengthen Sino-British relations.

Britain's interest in Nepal stemmed from its enlistment of Gurkhas (i.e., Nepalese soldiers for hire), who served throughout the British Empire since the nineteenth century.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The emphasis on cultural connectivity in China’s growing presence and involvement in Southeast Asia highlights the importance China places on people-to-people exchanges as part of its global engagement strategy.

• The remarkable ascension of China over the recent decades has precipitated a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of a “discourse war” with Western powers, as expressed in the latter’s “China threat” narrative.

• In response to such challenges, China has made substantial investments in cultural diplomacy, to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives.

• This article examines Chinese cultural diplomacy in the realm of entertainment, specifically “The Melody of Spring: Transnational Spring Festival Gala” hosted in Nanning, Guangxi, and disseminated globally each Chinese New Year.

• Against the legacy of China-Indonesia bilateral relations as well as Indonesia’s treatment of its Chinese minority, this study explores China’s cultural diplomacy and soft power in contemporary Indonesia.

• Through the case study of the “Transnational Spring Festival Gala”, this article posits that China’s cultural dissemination as an instrument of soft power has yielded little influence on the Indonesian public and has limited impact on the formation of a transnational imagined community.

What are the common causes for the rise and decline of great powers in the past? What conditions were important in sustaining their international power, and what conditions eventually eroded their primacy?

INTRODUCTION

The cultural impact of China's growing presence and involvement in the region has generated significant discussion. Beijing's official narratives, particularly in the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have consistently emphasized not only physical connectivity but also cultural exchanges through people-to-people interactions (Kuah 2019). This highlights the importance China places on the deepening of cultural ties as part of its global engagement strategy. This is further demonstrated in China's recent launch of the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which purportedly features an alternative to Western modernization (Hoon and Chan 2023).

President Xi Jinping's vision of creating a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” is designed to closely intertwine with China's soft power approach, wherein cultural exchanges with partner nations and people-to-people connections play a pivotal role. The emphasis on human and cultural exchanges also extends to the discourse presented by both the Indonesian and Chinese governments when managing their bilateral relations. The overarching strategy is encapsulated in the phrase proposed by Xi Jinping to “tell China's story well” (讲好中国故事).

However, the remarkable ascension of China in recent decades has also engendered a proliferation of anti-China sentiments, particularly galvanized within the crucible of the “discourse war” with Western powers (Shambaugh 2015). This frequently finds expression under the aegis of the “China threat” narrative (Pradt 2016). In response to this conundrum, China has invested substantially in cultural diplomacy and sought to augment its soft power through orchestrated global outreach initiatives (Chen, Colapindo, and Luo 2012).

Operating as an instrument of international relations, soft power conveys a modality of influence characterized by subtlety and allure, in contradistinction to coercion (Nye 1990). In tandem with material assistance and the China model of development paradigms, China's soft power strategy encompasses multifaceted endeavours. These include the establishment of the much-debated Confucius Institutes (CI) across the globe, the endowment of international academic exchange programmes, the instigation of international outreach endeavours and the expansion of its premier state television broadcaster, CCTV, across diverse linguistic contexts worldwide (Rawnsley 2012).

Concurrently, China's cultural diplomacy initiatives extend into the realm of entertainment as well. In the past two decades, the Chinese state has authorized the creation of patriotic and nationalistic television series, singing competitions and variety shows that coalesce artists from the broader cultural tapestry of China, spanning Taiwan, Hong Kong and the global Chinese diaspora.

Why was China’s economy stagnant during some periods of its history but grew rapidly in other periods? How and why did it and the other Asian newly industrializing countries grow so much faster than other developing countries? Why does economic growth in advanced developed countries slow down? What do these tendencies imply about shifting power and changing positions in the interstate hierarchy?

Why some groups outperform others in academic and professional achievements? Why some countries’ economies grow faster than others? Why are the fastest-growing economies located in East Asia? What role does Confucian heritage play in helping countries in this region to outperform others economically? How do culture, institutions, and policy interact to influence each other?

Technological innovation led to the creation of leading sectors such as textiles, railroads, and automobiles in past waves of economic development, and these leading sectors have in turn provided the economic dynamism buttressing the world’s leading countries’ economic, political, and military primacy in the past.