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This article analyses the relationship between populist attitudes and political participation. We argue that populist attitudes can be a motivation for participation through their identity, emotional, and moral components, and that they have the potential to narrow socioeconomic gaps in participation. Using survey data from nine European countries, our results show that populist attitudes are positively related to expressive non-institutionalized modes of participation (petition signing, online participation and, in some contexts, demonstrating), but not to turnout. In addition, populist attitudes are found to reduce education-based gaps and even reverse income-based inequalities in political participation. The implications of these findings are discussed.
This chapter looks at how far the EU decision making process can meet the first criterion and satisfy the normative requirements of a two level game among the governments and the demoi of the different member states. It starts by exploring the concept of representation and notes that while decision making in the Commission and EP rests on an ontology of solidarism and that between states on that of singularity, both prove problematic. Instead, we need to encourage apolitical ontology of civicity. It is argued one way to achieve this result is through the involvement of national parliaments.
This chater explores the third criterion whereby a republican union of states must be voluntary. This has been the hardest to chieve whilst satisfying the first two criteria. However, it is argued that considerations of fairness, impartiality and equity require that there be some differentiated integration among member states. The first part of the chapter discusses which policy areas might be legitimately differentiated, the second part explores the implications of such DI for the legitimacy of majority rule and the constitutionalisation of the Treaties by the ECJ, applying the argument to the euro.
This chapter provides an overview of the main themes of the book, and outlines the key approaches of cosmopolitan statism and republican intergovernmentalism as offering a realistic utopia whereby the EU and other international organisations might achieve democratic legitimacy.
This chapter adresses the second criterionof ensuring all citizens are treated with equal concern and respect. It disputes that Union citizenship can be considered either as supra-, post-, or transnational, and instead argues that it is rightly linked to membership of a member state but allows for a system of equal concern and respect BETWEEN different national citizenships within the EU. As such there are justifable linits to union citizenship, with mobile citizens having duties to maintain the sustainability of the citizenship regiumes to which they move.
This chapter defends the need for a cosmopolitan statismas the best way to meet the moral and functional demands of cosmopolitanism in ways consistent with the need for a credible form of popular soveregnty and civic community to support rights and equlaity
Here I argue thatt republican legitimacy is intimately tied to soveregnty as both Rousseau and Kant argued. I then turn to how non-domination might be best realised in a condition of interdependence. Some republicans have argued for scaling upo soveregnty to the EU oir even global level. Others argue for post-sovergn schemes that disperse soveregnty transnationally. I reject both these views as unable to sustain the form of democratic politics needed to secure non-domination and instead advocate a version of demoi-cracy as republican intergovernmentalism. I offer 4 criteria for such a set up and propose in Part 2 to discuss how the EU might be so structered as to meet them.
This chapter defends the republican notion of non-domination as a crierion of democratic legitimacy and argues for its necessary primacy over considerations of justice per se. Rather, it offers an account of political justice that answers what Bernard Williams calls the 'basic legitimacy demand' that any political settlement must meet. I also discuss the internal and external requirements of republican legitimacy that any policial system must meet.
Combining international political theory and EU studies, Richard Bellamy provides an original account of the democratic legitimacy of international organisations. He proposes a new interpretation of the EU's democratic failings and how they might be addressed. Drawing on the republican theory of freedom as non-domination, Bellamy proposes a way to combine national popular sovereignty with the pursuit of fair and equitable relations of non-domination among states and their citizens. Applying this approach to the EU, Bellamy shows that its democratic failings lie not with the democratic deficit at the EU level but with a democratic disconnect at the member state level. Rather than shifting democratic authority to the European Parliament, this book argues that the EU needs to reconnect with the different 'demoi' of the member states by empowering national parliaments in the EU policy-making process.