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This chapter discusses a mechanism linking revolutionary terrorism and interwar development paths. The mechanism relates to the constraints imposed by the community of support on the terrorist groups. According to the argument, in those places in which the radical Left was stronger (as revealed by a powerful anarchist and/or communist movement), the likelihood of a segment of the Left supporting armed struggle was higher. This was typically the case in countries with a non-liberal past. To show this, evidence about negative cases is examined in depth. Negative cases refer to armed groups that had the capacity to kill but refrained from doing so. Almost all of the negative cases (such as the Weather Underground Organization) are concentrated in countries that had a liberal past throughout the twentieth century. In countries with a non-liberal past, repression of the protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s was interpreted by the radical Left as evidence of the persistence of an authoritarian state operating under a democratic facade; this deficit of state legitimacy was crucial for radical activists to support revolutionary terrorism.
This chapter presents first the historical context under which revolutionary terrorism emerged and then summarizes the general argument of the book. Regarding the historical context, the 1950s and 1960s were years of economic convergence, with developing countries catching up with those that were more advanced. Despite this economic convergence, the countries responded very differently to the shock of the radical protests of the late 1960s. In some countries lethal violence emerged, in some others it did not. It is argued that this variation matches the variation between liberal and non-liberal developments in the interwar years. The reasons why the relevant comparison is with the interwar period are analyzed and discussed.
The introduction presents the research question on the cross-national variation in revolutionary terrorism; it justifies its historical and political relevance; it criticizes the existing quantitative literature (that is too focused on contemporary explanatory variables); it presents the research design (an intermediate-N design with a historical-comparative approach); it discusses methodological issues on historical causation; and it analyzes previous work on revolutionary terrorism; and it explains the structure of the book.
This chapter presents the phenomenon to be studied, revolutionary terrorism. The chapter has three parts. In the first, the ideology of this form of terrorism and its historical precedents are discussed. The basic tenet of the revolutionary terrorists was that violence was necessary to provoke insurrection among the broad working class and its allies against capitalism and liberal, bourgeois democracy. The different mechanisms through which terrorist violence may be linked to mobilization are analyzed, paying special attention to the anarchist doctrine of “propaganda by the deed” developed at the end of nineteenth century. The second part explores revolutionary terrorism as a late and deviant branch of the revolutionary activity that starts with the success of Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara in the Cuban revolution. In more advanced Latin American countries, Uruguay and Argentina, rural guerrilla groups of the Cuban type evolved into urban, underground groups; and this is the form of violence that traveled to affluent countries in the early 1970s. The third part of the chapter provides detailed data about the characteristics of terrorist revolutionary violence (levels of lethality, evolution, target selection, selectivity of violence, and mode of organization) based on an original data set.
This chapter examines the contemporary or background conditions that are associated with the occurrence of revolutionary terrorism. The production of violence is constrained by state repression and fostered by social support. It is argued that social support is more important than state capacity, which, in general, was similar across the countries. Several indicators of potential social support are included in the analysis: participation in demonstrations and strikes, support for communist parties, levels of inequality, and size of the public sector. Additionally, several controls are included: level of economic development, economic growth, population size, and youth bulges. The main conclusion of this preliminary analysis is that revolutionary terrorism was more intense in highly populated countries with strong communist parties, a high degree of protest, and mobilization. Moreover, these were the countries that in the late 1960s had relatively backward economies, smaller states, and higher rates of growth.
This study analyses congruence across various issues in 16 European democracies. Making use of public opinion and expert survey data, our analyses show that congruence between the policy preferences of citizens and the stances of governments is much more complex than what is revealed by studies focusing on ideology solely. Size and directions of incongruence are larger and more systematic on specific issues than on the left–right scale. On redistribution, citizens are more to the left than their governments, while popular support for European integration is systematically lower among citizens than among their representatives. Moreover, the relatively poor are particularly underrepresented on redistribution, while the preferences of the relatively lower educated are not well reflected in government preferences in relation to European integration. We interpret these results as being partly linked to a representation gap with privileged social groups enjoying higher levels of congruence with their government.
This chapter introduces the long-term explanation of political violence. There is a strikingly strong correlation between the intensity of revolutionary terrorism from 1970 to 2000 and the development paths of the interwar period. To characterize these development paths, six variables are employed: past anarchist terrorism, democratic breakdowns, civil wars, land inequality, type of capitalism, and industrial transition (the year in which the industrial labor force exceeded that of agriculture). These variables are summarized in a latent variable thanks to factor analysis. This latent variable can be interpreted as the degree of liberalism of the development path followed by countries. The historical variables are not only significant when included with contemporary variables, but they make the contemporary ones non-significant. The statistical analysis shows that in an analysis of historical variables plus population, almost all the cross-national variation in the intensity of revolutionary terrorism can be explained. This relationship is extremely robust.
This chapter presents the major cases of revolutionary terrorism in Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan; there is also a brief analysis of two intermediate cases, Greece and Portugal. In each case, the process that goes from radical student protest to the formation of underground armed groups is examined in detail. Armed groups were formed when participation in protest was declining. Due to their underground nature, these groups became isolated from social movements and often engaged in self-referential attacks, where violence was carried out not in the name of the original ideological motivation, but as a means to secure the reproduction and survival of the group.
The final chapter discusses the possible existence of an omitted variable that could explain both the development paths followed by affluent countries in the interwar period and the intensity of revolutionary terrorism from 1970 to 2000. The level of individualism as an omitted variable is explored. "Individualism" here is defined as the autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis social groups, such as the family. The general hypothesis establishes that countries with a stronger tradition of individualism were better prepared for the introduction of capitalism and liberal democracy. Due to a greater elective affinity between cultural variables and economic and political developments, countries in which individualism was stronger underwent more peaceful modernization processes. The cross-national measurements of individualism are taken into account, showing a strong association with interwar development paths and revolutionary terrorism. In order to address the standard endogeneity objection, remote indicators of individualism (grammar rules and family rules of inheritance), which emanate from medieval times, are used as “instrumental variables.” The results are robust: The hypothesis on individualism is confirmed.
A growing number of studies focus on the two-way channels connecting public opinion and interest groups, highlighting how public support affects interest groups’ mobilization, strategies, and influence, while also showing how interest groups manage to shape public opinion. We contribute to this debate, assuming that interest groups are fundamentally survival-maximizing organizations. First, we investigate whether public opinion bears on advocacy groups’ assessment of their own survival prospects. Second, we assess whether public opinion-driven mortality anxiety affects advocacy groups’ choices regarding different lobbying strategies. Empirically, we rely on data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, including over 2500 interest group respondents across six European Union (EU) countries as well as groups working at the EU level. Our analysis shows that (1) public opinion crucially influences how advocacy groups estimate their chances of survival, particularly for citizen groups and (2) public opinion-related survival concerns stimulate greater relative use of outside lobbying by citizen groups.
Studies of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy have established a connection between satisfaction and how well those citizens’ preferred parties perform in elections. Yet, the question remains whether ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ respond to the same system- and party-level factors when evaluating their political satisfaction. We build on extant literature to consider citizen satisfaction with democracy from the perspective of character valence. Using the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file and content analysis-based data on parties’ character valence, we find that both winners’ and losers’ satisfaction with the political system is affected by parties’ character valence, but in differing (and somewhat surprising) ways. We find that winners respond to improvements in the character valence of opposition parties, whereas losers demonstrate greater concern with the valence of governing parties.
Amidst the European sovereign debt crisis and soaring unemployment levels across the European Union, ambitions for European unemployment policies are high on the political agenda. However, it remains unclear what European taxpayers think about these plans and who is most supportive of European unemployment policies. To contribute to this debate, we conducted a survey experiment concerning solidarity towards European and domestic unemployed individuals in the Netherlands and Spain. Our results suggest that (1) Europeans are less inclined to show solidarity towards unemployed Europeans than towards unemployed co-nationals, (2) individuals with higher education, European attachment, and pro-immigration attitudes show more solidarity towards unemployed people from other European countries, but (3) even they discriminate against foreigners, and (4) finally, economic left-right orientations do not structure solidarity with unemployed people from abroad.