This chapter provides a brief overview of the growth of the organisation from its formation until today. It includes details of the organisational structure and the institutional structure within which it is situated. The aim is to provide sufficient information for readers to orientate themselves in the context of the MUST.

BEFORE 1945

The history of the intelligence service in a Swedish context dates as far back as the fifteenth century, although intelligence and more specifically military intelligence appeared in an organised form in the early years of the previous century. In the early years of 1900 an intelligence department was created in both the army headquarters and the navy headquarters. During the period between the First and Second World War interest for intelligence decreased and it was not until 1937 that interest in intelligence surfaced again. The intelligence function within the Defence Staff grew during the early years of the Second World War. The primary task for the intelligence function during the Second World War was to detect any signs of German (or other) preparations for hostile action toward Sweden.

FROM 1945 UNTIL 1989

After the end of the Second World War the intelligence department was reorganised and renamed T-Bureau (Tekniska Kontoret – T-kontoret). The scope of its primary task changed somewhat and the focus became a ‘near-abroad perspective’, although with a clear emphasis on the Soviet bloc and the Warsaw Pact. Its organisation and the institutional position remained more or less static until the mid-1960s, when the intelligence organisation, the Information Bureau (Informations Byrån - IB), was formed.

The IB era has significantly influenced the institutional arrangements for the intelligence as well as the public recollection of Swedish intelligence. The IB became known to the public through a series of articles revealing that the IB had been used for collecting information on the political opposition within Sweden and conducting operational work, which was in sharp contrast with the Swedish government's official political agenda. The government had to investigate the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the intelligence services, and in 1974 formed the intelligence committee to do it. The committee presented its results in a public inquiry in 1976.

THE SPECIFICITIES OF SWEDISH POLITICAL CULTURE

As stated above, intelligence literature tends to centre on states with extensive intelligence presence throughout the political establishment (for example the US and the UK). In contrast, this case study of intelligence is situated within a small state, where intelligence holds a more modest institutional position. Intelligence in general, and the MUST in particular, is a rather unusual topic within both contemporary Swedish political debate and research in the social sciences. Correspondingly, the specific traits of the Swedish political culture and political institutional arrangement for intelligence cannot be assumed to be common knowledge. Therefore, this chapter begins with a brief reflection on the particularities of the Swedish political culture that effect the intelligence community itself, and the role of the intelligence community within the institutional setting. It merely serves as general overview of a selection of specificities in the political culture – a background for the following chapters describing the intelligence responsibilities and directions within the institutional setting, and a brief overview of the MUST.

A CULTURE OF COMPROMISE AND CONSENSUS

The function of and role for intelligence has a reclusive existence in societal and political life in Sweden. The character of societal and political life – like in any state – has a number of specificities, thus constituting the unique Swedish political culture. Drawing on such a wide and contested concept as political culture should be seen as a most humble attempt to create some sort of flavour for the Swedish political context, rather than intending a thorough analysis of the same. First, the political system is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Even though the latest thoroughgoing constitutional amendments date as late as 1976, the roots of the Swedish democracy go back as far as the seventeenth century. However, this chapter aims at displaying the culture within that system.

In the Swedish political context the presence of established constitutive principles for ruling (usually found in constitutional texts) does not hold the same precedence as, for instance, the constitution in the US. Nevertheless, an institutionalised overarching idea in the Swedish political context is that of division of power.

Chapter 8 aims at uncovering the intelligence worldview, the way that worldview directs the analytical choices made by the analysts, and what that worldview implies for the framing of concepts, terms and that which it is important to create knowledge about. In this chapter I argue that the intelligence worldview is rooted within the ontological position of political realism. Therefore the first section of the chapter provides a short overview of the general characteristics of a political realism. Thereafter the following sections of the chapter provide argue and expose that the realist perspective is imbued in the estimates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what the intelligence realist position implies for intelligence knowledge – what is viewed as problematic, what it implies for the process of articulation, and what this position implies for how the knowledge should be argued and proved.

POLITICAL REALISM

It is widely accepted that intelligence analysis is located within an overall frame of international political realism. I agree with this position, and argue that realism is the general frame of reference for intelligence analysis. The theoretical tradition of realism is perhaps the most influential theory in international relations and over its long and rich history has come to encompass a variety of theoretical variations and positions. The early ideas of realism originate in what is referred to as ‘classical realism’, dating as far back as the ancient Greek, Thucydides. Since then, realism has been challenged and refined (with new approaches through structural realism, modern realism and neo-realism), although for the purpose of this study it is sufficient to outline the core assumptions of classical realism, which still remains vital to the understanding of realism today. I have no ambition to cover the overall evolution of realist thought, but merely to sketch the core assumption of it in order to be able to identify traces of realist thought in the estimates.

Statism

From classical realism and onwards, the central actor is the state. The characteristics and functions for the state are considered to differ deeply between the domestic and the international arena. Domestically, the state is considered as the supreme power in a hierarchical system.

This chapter examines MUST's general representation of NATO, covering its view of NATO's role, power and the main actors within international relations. It shows that the description of NATO consistently suggests a representation imbued with positive connotations. Bearing in mind the self-articulated intention of intelligence to present facts with the goal of being value neutral, a representation imbued with positive connotations through language practice and values imply construction of a friend.

CONSTRUCTING NATO

In the eyes of the MUST, NATO is the most influential political actor in terms of war, military action and security issues within international relations. It is suggested in the estimates that NATO has the power and influence to decide which issues are articulated as security issues in the realm of international relations. Furthermore, it is suggested in the estimates that NATO determines how these security issues should be understood and approached for the international community at large. Finally, it is suggested in the estimates that these functions of NATO are desirable and suggest a representation of NATO as an indisputable friend.

THE REPRESENTATION OF NATO

The overall representation of NATO in the estimates is as a provider of stability and security. This representation of NATO involves a concept that this role is needed, wanted and appreciated by the rest of the international community.

In addition, NATO is framed as the most important international political actor for establishing and maintaining security: ‘NATO is the most important organisation in terms of security policy cooperation in Europe.’ This characteristic of NATO is not just seen in a European context; NATO's dominant role within international security is viewed as valid globally. The assigned role for NATO as formulating norms ranges from overall general security policy to standards for praxis in military cooperation.

The dominant role of NATO is also expressed in statements like ‘NATO is the norm for interoperability’. This outlook is also expressed in regard to the European context: ‘ESDP (and to a greater extent NATO) has a particular normative role for the development of [military] capabilities but also to maintain defence spending and defence investments at an acceptable level.’

CONSTRUCTING RUSSIA

This chapter investigates the MUST's representation of Russia in the estimates. During the period being investigated, this representation of Russia entailed elements of both change and continuity, although the overall construction of Russia is that of a hereditary enemy of the West and, thereby, also of Sweden. Consequently, the text regarding Russia is imbued with negative connotations. The language practice is imbued with negative qualifiers and valuations and presuppositions of Russia's motive for action.

THE REPRESENTATION OF RUSSIA

In the representation of Russia specific attributes and characteristics are ascribed to Russian politics and society. Russian politics are viewed as being largely unpredictable and the notion of unpredictability is evident throughout the representation in the estimates and considered valid for Russia, both for domestic and international politics.

A statement that refers to Russia as a political actor within the international political scene suggests that Russian foreign policy lacks a founding idea or consistent political agenda, saying it is, instead, characterised by ‘reactive ad-hoc-like actions’. ‘In essence, the pattern of Russian foreign policy was characterised by ad-hoc reactive actions. This pattern is expected to continue.’

Political unpredictability is a general attribute also ascribed to the Russian domestic political arena.

This quotation illustrates how Russian political life is repeatedly represented in the estimates as being unpredictable. This characterisation is mainly argued by referring to the numerous reshufflings of political appointees. The assessed unpredictability in Russian politics is not referred to or argued through unpredictability in the reforms and policies adopted and implemented, instead a close relation between politicians and political outcomes seem to be the assumption underlying the conclusion of unpredictability.

This chapter's focus is on uncovering the social discursive practice in terms of informal procedures, routines and roles that influence actions for the intelligence analyst. This social discursive practice creates a specific logic of appropriateness within the social context of the intelligence service. In this chapter, I argue that the social discursive practice contains features that suggest a specific logic of appropriateness within the ‘collective of thought’ of the intelligence collective.

MAKING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The intelligence analysts express their view on what intelligence analysis should contribute, by emphasising that the analysis should be customer friendly and easily accessible, the customer should be able to make decisions based upon it, and it should describe and draw attention to new information and/or new events. It should also contextualise the events from reality and thus bring meaning to an unorganised world and in turn make decision making easier. Although these characteristics are the normal features of any kind of analysis, the intelligence analysts underline the special features that are unique to intelligence analysis.

The quotation above underlines two commonly mentioned characteristics of intelligence analysis. First, it needs to be based on secret information. That the analysis should be based on, or at least contain secret information, is a common feature for defining intelligence analysis as something specific and something different from other kinds of analysis. Second, that the nature of intelligence analysis requires an element of indecipherable analytic tradecraft mostly referred to as ‘gut feeling’ or ‘intuitive feeling’. The need for this intuitive feeling is argued by the analysts partly because of the intention of intelligence analysis to make predictions, and partly because the analysis most often is made on scarce information.

This chapter discusses the legal framework within which the MUST conducts its activities. This framework partly defines the formal context within which the MUST operates. The legal framework and formal instructions from the political level define the responsibilities and constraints of the MUST and define the MUST's formal external relations with other government agencies. The institutional setting also constitutes the overall structure of the MUST and specifies its functions. Thus, the institutional setting structures the overall processes and thereby the MUST's actions and through that what constitutes social practice for the MUST.

TASK AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Swedish government directs the MUST and the overall focus of the military intelligence. The government uses different kinds of policy instruments to direct and control the activities of the MUST. These policy instruments provide, among other things, the legal framework, budgetary means and the ability to direct the focus of the MUST through annual appropriation directions. There are several legal paragraphs concerned with intelligence activities, although the vast majority are not directly concerned with the task and focus for the MUST. The primary legal paragraph concerned with an overall focus for the MUST is expressed in the Defence Intelligence Act (Försvarsunderrättelselagen). One paragraph of the Defence Intelligence Act describes the responsibility of the MUST:

Military Intelligence will be conducted in support of the Swedish foreign, security, and defence policy, with the aim of identifying external threats to the nation. Activities include participation in international security cooperation. Military Intelligence is only to be concerned with foreign relations. The Government will direct the activities of military intelligence. Within the framework of this direction, authorities appointed by the Government may give more detailed instructions.

The Defence Intelligence Act states that the intelligence objectives are to serve decision making in regard to issues of relevance to foreign and security policy and to external military threats. The government further directs the efforts of the intelligence service to focus its analytical capabilities on areas that play a significant role for Swedish foreign and security policymaking. Other government decrees provide further information about the task and focus of the intelligence agencies: ‘At the policy level intelligence activities primarily serve to provide a continuous build-up of knowledge, competence and the ability to confirm or deny public information or other actors’ actions or statements.’

This chapter examines how the MUST represents terrorism in the estimates. It starts by identifying and discussing how the concept of terrorism is represented over time. The analysis pays special attention to how critical events (such as 9/11) have or have not influenced the understanding and use of the term terrorism. Further, the investigation seeks to identify how the representation of terrorism is used throughout the estimates and whether components of the representation are present in other parts of the assessment under a different name. Lastly, the chapter aims to identify and discuss gaps in relation to the representation of terrorism.

THE EARLY YEARS

In the 1998 estimate, the concept of terrorism is only mentioned on one occasion, which is in the context of the conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa. In the assessment, there is a growing concern that these conflicts might eventually influence Sweden and Swedish security: ‘through immigration and the spread of conflict related terrorism stemming from conflicts in the homeland’.

The amount of text on terrorism is too limited to indicate what kind of understanding the estimate connotes to the concept of terrorism.

Under the heading ‘Crises and Conflicts’, the 1999 estimate frames terrorism within the concept of ‘New Threats’. The new threats are framed in a world where the Cold War has ended and, in the aftermath, a number of smaller conflicts have surfaced. The estimate represents the resurfacing of the phenomenon of terrorism as being a consequence of this new type of conflict. It is acknowledged in the estimate that nonstate actors are a part of these emerging conflicts and also claims that they may be categorised as terrorist or criminal organisations. Later in the 1999 estimate, international political development is discussed in respect to how that might influence the threats that might appear in Sweden or in a Swedish context, and under what circumstances Sweden might be subjected to acts of terrorism.

INTELLIGENCE – A SPECIAL KIND OF KNOWLEDGE

During my six years as an intelligence professional in the Swedish Military and Security Directorate (Militära Underrättelse och Säkerhetstjänsten – the MUST) I produced and consumed intelligence assessments of different scope and focus. During this time my curiosity about the phenomenon of knowledge within intelligence analysis grew. I tried to make sense of and categorise what the contribution of the intelligence service really was to the political policymaking process. At the same time there was (and still is) a vibrant debate among scholars and practitioners over the problems of intelligence analysis. The debate on intelligence analysis is primarily concerned with the issue of why it often comes to ‘wrong conclusions’. Additionally, the debate is concerned with the question of why intelligence services seem ineffective in providing timely intelligence to policy decisions, and what could make the analysis and input to policy more efficient.

My initial curiosity later changed to a more critical reading of intelligence and its special kind of knowledge. The intelligence service – not only in Sweden but also all over the world – produces knowledge on security issues, conflicts, war and complex political processes. The knowledge is often produced within a tight time frame, with only some of the relevant information available, which makes the intelligence analysis task more challenging and difficult. In spite of these difficulties intelligence knowledge is used to contextualise, explain and predict events in the real world. Its fundamental aim is to underpin strategic action and help security policymakers to make informed decisions; consequently it has a great impact on how security issues are understood and how security and foreign policy is shaped. Yet history shows that on numerous occasions intelligence has affected policy outcome in the wrong direction and grave consequences have followed.

In my critical reading of intelligence products, I noticed what seemed like peculiarities. For instance, the text of the assessments seemed to contain a high degree of repetitiveness in wording and substance. Furthermore, the conclusions seemed to be articulated as objective truths. They were formulated with objective truth claims and the arguments and evidence in support of the conclusions were mostly diffuse or hidden in the background of the text.

DIRECTING THE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE

The analytical work of the intelligence service is directed based on the previously accepted knowledge. Even though parts of the analytical work are directed by the need of the intelligence consumer, many of the choices of prioritising and the scope of the analysis are made by the individual analysts. The chapter examines which facts and arguments are used, how the analysts argue when conceptualising the issues in focus and how choices are made regarding what information to relay for the intelligence analysis. The information and facts used for the assessments are primarily dependent on previous analytical work and therefore are also constrained by the accepted knowledge. Additionally, the chapter examines the literary style of the estimates by investigating how conclusions are presented and substantiated in those estimates. That is, it examines how analysts relate to the possibility of objectivity and value neutrality.

Direction and Prioritisation

There are three different ways for a specific assessment to be written: first through the annually revised production plan, second as a result of something that has happened and direct tasking coming from the intelligence consumers, and third through initiation by the analysts themselves motivated by their insight into changes within their area of expertise.

The first of the ways to initiate an assessment begins with the established production plan of general issues and topics that the intelligence consumers have expressed interest in. Next follows organisa- tional decision making and prioritisation over how and when different assessments should be written. The general topics to which the intelligence service should pay attention are decided by the intelligence consumer, but prioritisation between the different needs is conducted within the intelligence service. The prioritisation choices are usually made after preparation by a specific planning management team and thereafter through a decision made at an organisation-wide weekly production board meeting at which all departmental management is represented. Following this, the question is distributed to the analyst or group of analysts.