The topics of focus in this chapter are three issues of profound importance in the context of Swedish security policy; thus, they constitute vital issues in the estimates, discussed in Chapters 8–11. Although the goal of the intelligence service is to be value neutral and strive for objectivity, the three issues were constructed on assumptions that were not defined or reflected upon, creating a normative interpretive framework suggesting an intelligence discourse as a consequence of a specific textual discursive practice founded in a ‘style of thought’.

This intelligence discourse may be uncovered by searching for traces of assumptions appearing before the analytical conclusions and based on arguments and facts, in the form of value statements and rationalisations. The traces of assumptions can also found in the character of the language practice used in the concepts, terms and adjectives that frame the issues. Informed by the understanding that a discourse is ‘a structure of a meaning in use’, the empirical study of the language practice in the estimates will be investigated through the analytical method called predicate analysis (see Chapter 2 above). To recapitulate, predicate analysis is suitable for analysing the construction of subjects found in representations in texts. Predicate analysis usually focuses on verbs, adjectives and adverbs (hereafter, these are referred to as qualifiers).

LANGUAGE PRACTICE

The overall language practice in the estimates has relatively few qualifiers in relation to the topics in focus (in this case NATO, Russia and terrorism). However, the ones used are value statements, indicating that there is a distinct ‘style of thought’ in regard to the issues. The frequent use of valuations as qualifiers rather than the use of descriptive or factual qualifiers creates a general character for the text that is based on implicit assumptions and value statements instead of on factual arguments.

The qualifiers used are distinctly different in the assessments of the different issues. There is a distinct coherence of the positive connotation in the descriptive language used for NATO. Throughout the estimates, the qualifiers used in the representation of NATO are positive and/or affirmative. On the other hand, there is a distinct coherence of negatively connoted qualifiers in relation to Russia.

IN SEARCH OF THEORY

At present intelligence-related research is an area in progress. James Der Derian argues that ‘[Intelligence is the] least understood and “undertheorized” area of international relations.’ I agree with Der Derian and suggest that the under-theorisation extends far beyond the intelligence role within international relations, and is valid in the social sciences for all research concerning intelligence. Although the research area is under-theorised, there are theories and theoretical concepts that may be productively used to better understand and bring new perspectives to intelligence in general and to intelligence analysis in particular. It is argued in this book that intelligence should not be viewed as sui generis, as is often done within intelligence research. Instead, established social theoretical concepts will be used to bring new insights to and investigate intelligence knowledge.

As discussed, the perspective of critical policy analysis emphasises that the knowledge (produced by the actors) within the policy process is influenced by ideas and assumptions formed within a discourse or paradigm. This implies that although knowledge in the policy process may be argued through factual arguments, additional approaches are needed. Hence, the critical policy analysis position emphasises the need to pay attention to how policy knowledge is produced, the assumptions and presuppositions on which it is based and the social context within which it is constructed.

In this chapter, I propose a theoretical framework for investigating intelligence knowledge production and the social context within which it is produced. In addition to the critical policy analytical perspective drawn upon in the introductory chapter, the theoretical framework is founded on ideas from New Institutionalism, socialised knowledge and critical discourse analysis.

A VIEW ON INSTITUTIONALISM

Since all knowledge is produced by individuals within a social context, we need to (theoretically) understand this social context. In a sense, all collective action is structured and ordered according to a set of accepted rules and practices within a social context. (An example of this is individuals coming together within an organisation such as the MUST with the aim of producing intelligence.) This situating of action in a structured social context may be conceptualised as an institution.

The institutional setting and the formal social practice within which intelligence is produced is characterised by two sets of features. The production process is formally ordered and hierarchically structured in a way that identifies and directs various actions and interactions within the MUST and in the MUST's external relations with intelligence consumers. The roles, routines and procedures for the analytical process within the MUST (structuring the actions of analysts and managers) are characterised by a set of informal social and textual discursive practices. These informal practices imply a disregard for discussing, reflecting on and critically reviewing vital aspects of the analytical process. The intelligence social discursive practices at the least discourage a reflective and critical perspective on the analytical foundations and conduct of the intelligence analysis. The intelligence knowledge is created, upheld and affirmed within a specific intelligence ‘collective of thought’ and an intelligence ‘style of thought’.

The intelligence ‘style of thought’ is founded within a worldview corresponding to political realism, which defines what the intelligence holds as being important objects of knowledge. Hence, the worldview becomes primarily state-centric, arguing and interpreting world events through a (undefined) concept of power, and becomes inattentive to factors such as non-state actors, ideology and ideas. However, the analysts do not consciously recognise that realism is the frame of interpretation. Hence, the assumptions underlying the intelligence analysis are not argued, discussed or defined; rather they might be conceived as complying with an established way of thought – a tradition of conceptualising.

Rather than an explicit reliance on a defined worldview, it is the emphasis on seeking consistency and continuity within the established ‘style of thought’ (and the traits of the ‘collective of thought’ to cohere with the social and textual practices) that directs the approaches used for problematising, articulating issues and drawing conclusions. The search for continuity and consistency with accepted approaches to issues and to how conclusions have been argued and substantiated constitute an intelligence knowledge discourse. The drive for continuity and consistency in the intelligence knowledge discourse dominates the analytical distinction between assumptions, arguments and conclusions. The arguments and facts used for substantiating the analysis are not distinctly separated from assumptions and valuations. Hence, the intelligence knowledge discourse suggests a reproducing of knowledge rather than a creation of new insights.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the growth of the organisation from its formation until today. It includes details of the organisational structure and the institutional structure within which it is situated. The aim is to provide sufficient information for readers to orientate themselves in the context of the MUST.

BEFORE 1945

The history of the intelligence service in a Swedish context dates as far back as the fifteenth century, although intelligence and more specifically military intelligence appeared in an organised form in the early years of the previous century. In the early years of 1900 an intelligence department was created in both the army headquarters and the navy headquarters. During the period between the First and Second World War interest for intelligence decreased and it was not until 1937 that interest in intelligence surfaced again. The intelligence function within the Defence Staff grew during the early years of the Second World War. The primary task for the intelligence function during the Second World War was to detect any signs of German (or other) preparations for hostile action toward Sweden.

FROM 1945 UNTIL 1989

After the end of the Second World War the intelligence department was reorganised and renamed T-Bureau (Tekniska Kontoret – T-kontoret). The scope of its primary task changed somewhat and the focus became a ‘near-abroad perspective’, although with a clear emphasis on the Soviet bloc and the Warsaw Pact. Its organisation and the institutional position remained more or less static until the mid-1960s, when the intelligence organisation, the Information Bureau (Informations Byrån - IB), was formed.

The IB era has significantly influenced the institutional arrangements for the intelligence as well as the public recollection of Swedish intelligence. The IB became known to the public through a series of articles revealing that the IB had been used for collecting information on the political opposition within Sweden and conducting operational work, which was in sharp contrast with the Swedish government's official political agenda. The government had to investigate the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the intelligence services, and in 1974 formed the intelligence committee to do it. The committee presented its results in a public inquiry in 1976.

THE SPECIFICITIES OF SWEDISH POLITICAL CULTURE

As stated above, intelligence literature tends to centre on states with extensive intelligence presence throughout the political establishment (for example the US and the UK). In contrast, this case study of intelligence is situated within a small state, where intelligence holds a more modest institutional position. Intelligence in general, and the MUST in particular, is a rather unusual topic within both contemporary Swedish political debate and research in the social sciences. Correspondingly, the specific traits of the Swedish political culture and political institutional arrangement for intelligence cannot be assumed to be common knowledge. Therefore, this chapter begins with a brief reflection on the particularities of the Swedish political culture that effect the intelligence community itself, and the role of the intelligence community within the institutional setting. It merely serves as general overview of a selection of specificities in the political culture – a background for the following chapters describing the intelligence responsibilities and directions within the institutional setting, and a brief overview of the MUST.

A CULTURE OF COMPROMISE AND CONSENSUS

The function of and role for intelligence has a reclusive existence in societal and political life in Sweden. The character of societal and political life – like in any state – has a number of specificities, thus constituting the unique Swedish political culture. Drawing on such a wide and contested concept as political culture should be seen as a most humble attempt to create some sort of flavour for the Swedish political context, rather than intending a thorough analysis of the same. First, the political system is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Even though the latest thoroughgoing constitutional amendments date as late as 1976, the roots of the Swedish democracy go back as far as the seventeenth century. However, this chapter aims at displaying the culture within that system.

In the Swedish political context the presence of established constitutive principles for ruling (usually found in constitutional texts) does not hold the same precedence as, for instance, the constitution in the US. Nevertheless, an institutionalised overarching idea in the Swedish political context is that of division of power.

Chapter 8 aims at uncovering the intelligence worldview, the way that worldview directs the analytical choices made by the analysts, and what that worldview implies for the framing of concepts, terms and that which it is important to create knowledge about. In this chapter I argue that the intelligence worldview is rooted within the ontological position of political realism. Therefore the first section of the chapter provides a short overview of the general characteristics of a political realism. Thereafter the following sections of the chapter provide argue and expose that the realist perspective is imbued in the estimates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what the intelligence realist position implies for intelligence knowledge – what is viewed as problematic, what it implies for the process of articulation, and what this position implies for how the knowledge should be argued and proved.

POLITICAL REALISM

It is widely accepted that intelligence analysis is located within an overall frame of international political realism. I agree with this position, and argue that realism is the general frame of reference for intelligence analysis. The theoretical tradition of realism is perhaps the most influential theory in international relations and over its long and rich history has come to encompass a variety of theoretical variations and positions. The early ideas of realism originate in what is referred to as ‘classical realism’, dating as far back as the ancient Greek, Thucydides. Since then, realism has been challenged and refined (with new approaches through structural realism, modern realism and neo-realism), although for the purpose of this study it is sufficient to outline the core assumptions of classical realism, which still remains vital to the understanding of realism today. I have no ambition to cover the overall evolution of realist thought, but merely to sketch the core assumption of it in order to be able to identify traces of realist thought in the estimates.

Statism

From classical realism and onwards, the central actor is the state. The characteristics and functions for the state are considered to differ deeply between the domestic and the international arena. Domestically, the state is considered as the supreme power in a hierarchical system.

This chapter examines MUST's general representation of NATO, covering its view of NATO's role, power and the main actors within international relations. It shows that the description of NATO consistently suggests a representation imbued with positive connotations. Bearing in mind the self-articulated intention of intelligence to present facts with the goal of being value neutral, a representation imbued with positive connotations through language practice and values imply construction of a friend.

CONSTRUCTING NATO

In the eyes of the MUST, NATO is the most influential political actor in terms of war, military action and security issues within international relations. It is suggested in the estimates that NATO has the power and influence to decide which issues are articulated as security issues in the realm of international relations. Furthermore, it is suggested in the estimates that NATO determines how these security issues should be understood and approached for the international community at large. Finally, it is suggested in the estimates that these functions of NATO are desirable and suggest a representation of NATO as an indisputable friend.

THE REPRESENTATION OF NATO

The overall representation of NATO in the estimates is as a provider of stability and security. This representation of NATO involves a concept that this role is needed, wanted and appreciated by the rest of the international community.

In addition, NATO is framed as the most important international political actor for establishing and maintaining security: ‘NATO is the most important organisation in terms of security policy cooperation in Europe.’ This characteristic of NATO is not just seen in a European context; NATO's dominant role within international security is viewed as valid globally. The assigned role for NATO as formulating norms ranges from overall general security policy to standards for praxis in military cooperation.

The dominant role of NATO is also expressed in statements like ‘NATO is the norm for interoperability’. This outlook is also expressed in regard to the European context: ‘ESDP (and to a greater extent NATO) has a particular normative role for the development of [military] capabilities but also to maintain defence spending and defence investments at an acceptable level.’

CONSTRUCTING RUSSIA

This chapter investigates the MUST's representation of Russia in the estimates. During the period being investigated, this representation of Russia entailed elements of both change and continuity, although the overall construction of Russia is that of a hereditary enemy of the West and, thereby, also of Sweden. Consequently, the text regarding Russia is imbued with negative connotations. The language practice is imbued with negative qualifiers and valuations and presuppositions of Russia's motive for action.

THE REPRESENTATION OF RUSSIA

In the representation of Russia specific attributes and characteristics are ascribed to Russian politics and society. Russian politics are viewed as being largely unpredictable and the notion of unpredictability is evident throughout the representation in the estimates and considered valid for Russia, both for domestic and international politics.

A statement that refers to Russia as a political actor within the international political scene suggests that Russian foreign policy lacks a founding idea or consistent political agenda, saying it is, instead, characterised by ‘reactive ad-hoc-like actions’. ‘In essence, the pattern of Russian foreign policy was characterised by ad-hoc reactive actions. This pattern is expected to continue.’

Political unpredictability is a general attribute also ascribed to the Russian domestic political arena.

This quotation illustrates how Russian political life is repeatedly represented in the estimates as being unpredictable. This characterisation is mainly argued by referring to the numerous reshufflings of political appointees. The assessed unpredictability in Russian politics is not referred to or argued through unpredictability in the reforms and policies adopted and implemented, instead a close relation between politicians and political outcomes seem to be the assumption underlying the conclusion of unpredictability.

This chapter's focus is on uncovering the social discursive practice in terms of informal procedures, routines and roles that influence actions for the intelligence analyst. This social discursive practice creates a specific logic of appropriateness within the social context of the intelligence service. In this chapter, I argue that the social discursive practice contains features that suggest a specific logic of appropriateness within the ‘collective of thought’ of the intelligence collective.

MAKING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

The intelligence analysts express their view on what intelligence analysis should contribute, by emphasising that the analysis should be customer friendly and easily accessible, the customer should be able to make decisions based upon it, and it should describe and draw attention to new information and/or new events. It should also contextualise the events from reality and thus bring meaning to an unorganised world and in turn make decision making easier. Although these characteristics are the normal features of any kind of analysis, the intelligence analysts underline the special features that are unique to intelligence analysis.

The quotation above underlines two commonly mentioned characteristics of intelligence analysis. First, it needs to be based on secret information. That the analysis should be based on, or at least contain secret information, is a common feature for defining intelligence analysis as something specific and something different from other kinds of analysis. Second, that the nature of intelligence analysis requires an element of indecipherable analytic tradecraft mostly referred to as ‘gut feeling’ or ‘intuitive feeling’. The need for this intuitive feeling is argued by the analysts partly because of the intention of intelligence analysis to make predictions, and partly because the analysis most often is made on scarce information.

This chapter discusses the legal framework within which the MUST conducts its activities. This framework partly defines the formal context within which the MUST operates. The legal framework and formal instructions from the political level define the responsibilities and constraints of the MUST and define the MUST's formal external relations with other government agencies. The institutional setting also constitutes the overall structure of the MUST and specifies its functions. Thus, the institutional setting structures the overall processes and thereby the MUST's actions and through that what constitutes social practice for the MUST.

TASK AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Swedish government directs the MUST and the overall focus of the military intelligence. The government uses different kinds of policy instruments to direct and control the activities of the MUST. These policy instruments provide, among other things, the legal framework, budgetary means and the ability to direct the focus of the MUST through annual appropriation directions. There are several legal paragraphs concerned with intelligence activities, although the vast majority are not directly concerned with the task and focus for the MUST. The primary legal paragraph concerned with an overall focus for the MUST is expressed in the Defence Intelligence Act (Försvarsunderrättelselagen). One paragraph of the Defence Intelligence Act describes the responsibility of the MUST:

Military Intelligence will be conducted in support of the Swedish foreign, security, and defence policy, with the aim of identifying external threats to the nation. Activities include participation in international security cooperation. Military Intelligence is only to be concerned with foreign relations. The Government will direct the activities of military intelligence. Within the framework of this direction, authorities appointed by the Government may give more detailed instructions.

The Defence Intelligence Act states that the intelligence objectives are to serve decision making in regard to issues of relevance to foreign and security policy and to external military threats. The government further directs the efforts of the intelligence service to focus its analytical capabilities on areas that play a significant role for Swedish foreign and security policymaking. Other government decrees provide further information about the task and focus of the intelligence agencies: ‘At the policy level intelligence activities primarily serve to provide a continuous build-up of knowledge, competence and the ability to confirm or deny public information or other actors’ actions or statements.’