This chapter examines how the MUST represents terrorism in the estimates. It starts by identifying and discussing how the concept of terrorism is represented over time. The analysis pays special attention to how critical events (such as 9/11) have or have not influenced the understanding and use of the term terrorism. Further, the investigation seeks to identify how the representation of terrorism is used throughout the estimates and whether components of the representation are present in other parts of the assessment under a different name. Lastly, the chapter aims to identify and discuss gaps in relation to the representation of terrorism.

THE EARLY YEARS

In the 1998 estimate, the concept of terrorism is only mentioned on one occasion, which is in the context of the conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Africa. In the assessment, there is a growing concern that these conflicts might eventually influence Sweden and Swedish security: ‘through immigration and the spread of conflict related terrorism stemming from conflicts in the homeland’.

The amount of text on terrorism is too limited to indicate what kind of understanding the estimate connotes to the concept of terrorism.

Under the heading ‘Crises and Conflicts’, the 1999 estimate frames terrorism within the concept of ‘New Threats’. The new threats are framed in a world where the Cold War has ended and, in the aftermath, a number of smaller conflicts have surfaced. The estimate represents the resurfacing of the phenomenon of terrorism as being a consequence of this new type of conflict. It is acknowledged in the estimate that nonstate actors are a part of these emerging conflicts and also claims that they may be categorised as terrorist or criminal organisations. Later in the 1999 estimate, international political development is discussed in respect to how that might influence the threats that might appear in Sweden or in a Swedish context, and under what circumstances Sweden might be subjected to acts of terrorism.

INTELLIGENCE – A SPECIAL KIND OF KNOWLEDGE

During my six years as an intelligence professional in the Swedish Military and Security Directorate (Militära Underrättelse och Säkerhetstjänsten – the MUST) I produced and consumed intelligence assessments of different scope and focus. During this time my curiosity about the phenomenon of knowledge within intelligence analysis grew. I tried to make sense of and categorise what the contribution of the intelligence service really was to the political policymaking process. At the same time there was (and still is) a vibrant debate among scholars and practitioners over the problems of intelligence analysis. The debate on intelligence analysis is primarily concerned with the issue of why it often comes to ‘wrong conclusions’. Additionally, the debate is concerned with the question of why intelligence services seem ineffective in providing timely intelligence to policy decisions, and what could make the analysis and input to policy more efficient.

My initial curiosity later changed to a more critical reading of intelligence and its special kind of knowledge. The intelligence service – not only in Sweden but also all over the world – produces knowledge on security issues, conflicts, war and complex political processes. The knowledge is often produced within a tight time frame, with only some of the relevant information available, which makes the intelligence analysis task more challenging and difficult. In spite of these difficulties intelligence knowledge is used to contextualise, explain and predict events in the real world. Its fundamental aim is to underpin strategic action and help security policymakers to make informed decisions; consequently it has a great impact on how security issues are understood and how security and foreign policy is shaped. Yet history shows that on numerous occasions intelligence has affected policy outcome in the wrong direction and grave consequences have followed.

In my critical reading of intelligence products, I noticed what seemed like peculiarities. For instance, the text of the assessments seemed to contain a high degree of repetitiveness in wording and substance. Furthermore, the conclusions seemed to be articulated as objective truths. They were formulated with objective truth claims and the arguments and evidence in support of the conclusions were mostly diffuse or hidden in the background of the text.

DIRECTING THE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE

The analytical work of the intelligence service is directed based on the previously accepted knowledge. Even though parts of the analytical work are directed by the need of the intelligence consumer, many of the choices of prioritising and the scope of the analysis are made by the individual analysts. The chapter examines which facts and arguments are used, how the analysts argue when conceptualising the issues in focus and how choices are made regarding what information to relay for the intelligence analysis. The information and facts used for the assessments are primarily dependent on previous analytical work and therefore are also constrained by the accepted knowledge. Additionally, the chapter examines the literary style of the estimates by investigating how conclusions are presented and substantiated in those estimates. That is, it examines how analysts relate to the possibility of objectivity and value neutrality.

Direction and Prioritisation

There are three different ways for a specific assessment to be written: first through the annually revised production plan, second as a result of something that has happened and direct tasking coming from the intelligence consumers, and third through initiation by the analysts themselves motivated by their insight into changes within their area of expertise.

The first of the ways to initiate an assessment begins with the established production plan of general issues and topics that the intelligence consumers have expressed interest in. Next follows organisa- tional decision making and prioritisation over how and when different assessments should be written. The general topics to which the intelligence service should pay attention are decided by the intelligence consumer, but prioritisation between the different needs is conducted within the intelligence service. The prioritisation choices are usually made after preparation by a specific planning management team and thereafter through a decision made at an organisation-wide weekly production board meeting at which all departmental management is represented. Following this, the question is distributed to the analyst or group of analysts.