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In 1969 a small group of US scholars began discussing the possibility of starting a consortium of Western European Studies programmes. Europe was increasingly becoming an object of study and it was felt that greater coordination of the intellectual effort would help avoid duplication and further the acceleration of research. So began the Council for European Studies.
In commemoration of the founding of the Council fifty years ago, this volume brings together some of the most influential Europeanists writing today to take stock of the subject and to consider the most fruitful avenues for future research. With European democracy seemingly under threat from populism on the left and the right, the economies of countries still struggling to emerge from a decade of recession and stagnating growth, environmental concerns paramount and the quest for social cohesion a distant goal, the contributors to this volume bring their insight to bear on the fertile ground that the EU and the continent more broadly offer researchers.
The contributors - drawn from 52 institutions across the globe - present a wide range of perspectives on Europe's past and present, and the key challenges facing its future, such as immigration, multiculturalism, nationalism and integration. Although it remains to be seen whether Europeans will continue to promote the dream of union or whether they will retreat back into their nation states, these essays offer valuable insights into how Europe might respond and the changing nature of what it means to be a European.
Seven decades after the liberation of Europe, the strongmen of global politics are back. With a style and strategy of leadership that is anathema to liberal democratic norms and practices, the strongman challenges the principles of consensus and collaboration, willingly tears up trade agreements, invades territory and seeks to provoke and disrupt the status quo in order to achieve advantage.
In this fascinating study of strongman power, Hans Kribbe draws on a range of political ideas to provide insight into the strongman's seemingly irrational and idiosyncratic behaviour to better understand how he (it is always 'he') wields power and to what end.
Although the strongman's behaviour confounds and frustrates his counterparts abroad, Kribbe's analysis offers hope that it can be understood, anticipated and even neutralized. The implication of Kribbe's study is unequivocal: with the world's largest economies, as well as strategic neighbouring states controlled by strongmen, Europe must learn to speak their language if it is to beat them at their own game.
Bringing together political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and contemporary history, this book explores why and how European integration came to pass. It tells a fascinating story of ideals and realpolitik, political dreams and geographical realities, and planning and chaos. Mathieu Segers reveals that the roots of today's European Union lie deep in Europe's past and encompass more than war and peace, or diplomacy and economics. Based on original archival and primary source research, Segers provides an integrated history of the beginnings of European integration and the emergence of post-war Western Europe and today's European Union. The Origins of European Integration offers a broad perspective on the genealogy of post-war Western Europe, providing readers with a deeper understanding of contemporary European history and the history of transatlantic relations.
The changes triggered by the global financial crisis in 2008, the immigration flows and the COVID-19 pandemic in contemporary societies have transformed the way individuals communicate, create content, and 'consume' publicly available information. Consequently, political, societal, and financial pressures have led to alternative forms of media practice and representations and disrupted the core relationships and dynamics between politics, journalism, and society.
This edited book examines the key challenges in political discourse and journalistic practice in times of crises. It focuses on European paradigms and links political rhetoric and media challenges with the societal, political, and financial crises from 2008 until the present.
In Western European welfare states, research shows that support for welfare chauvinism, or the notion that welfare benefits for immigrants should be restricted, is highest among white, blue-collar working-class voters. On the other hand, higher-educated, middle-class voters are more likely to reject welfare chauvinism and support the inclusion of immigrants into the welfare state. For social democratic parties, this might pose an electoral dilemma between generous welfare states and open borders: They rely on both middle- and working-class constituencies and are ideologically tied both to a universal welfare state and the protection of (national) workers. To what extent does such an electoral dilemma between classes exist for social democratic parties? How do social democratic parties solve this dilemma when in government? In this paper, we postulate that a class divide around welfare chauvinism exists within the electorate for social democratic parties and that these parties’ policies in government reflect these divides: If the social democratic electorate has a high share of working-class voters, they should act more welfare chauvinist than if their electorate is mostly middle class. We test these hypotheses by combining survey and macro-level policy data in 14 Western European countries from 1980 to 2018. We find consistent evidence of the existence of a working-class/middle-class divide regarding welfare chauvinism, even within social democratic electorates. On the macro-level, we find partial evidence that social democratic parties in power respond to the class demands of their electorate: They are less welfare chauvinist when they have a higher proportion of middle-class voters, whereas their working-class vote share does not significantly condition their policies at all, contrary to assumptions in the literature. We therefore conclude that as social democratic parties become parties of the middle classes, the likelihood that they will retrench immigrant welfare rights reduces.
The epilogue to this book zooms in on a telling and difficult conversation between two highly influential friends at the transatlantic Anglo-Saxon epicentre of the extraordinary period in the history of the West, Europe, and European integration which this book is about (George Kennan and Isaiah Berlin). In doing so, the epilogue, in a more essayistic way, reconnects to the prologue and reflects upon the conclusion of this book and its deeper meaning for present-day Europe.
This chapter sets the scene for the history of plan-making in the Western hemisphere before, during, and after the Second World War. It delves into four great ideational projects of this period: (1) human rights, (2) the invention of a Christian-inspired liberalism, (3) solving the ‘social question’, and (4) the why and how of ‘mixed economies’. During the period 1937-47, these projects were gradually taken on by the leading politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals of the ‘free world’, as they were considered key for the creation of a more stable and just order, both in the national and in the international sphere. These four projects, moreover, were not only interlinked, but they also shared the overarching outlook of anti-totalitarianism and aimed for what could be called ‘ideational reconciliation’: the merging of the universal and the personal in the UDHR, a transatlantic-inspired ecumene, a combination of the ideologies and economic theories of socialism and liberalism. This produced a myriad of plans and counterplans for institutional structures, (federal) organisations, and policies for post-war Europe.
Chapter 4 reconstruct how the zeitgeist, the political and economic practices, and the geopolitical and societal circumstances of the war times guided Western Europe to a path of deeper international and regional cooperation focused on free trade and valuta convertibility. During exile and occupation, European governments fleshed out plans and schemes for post-war cooperation, primordially in the domains of socio-economic and the financial-economic planning, in greater (practical) detail. Initially, however, the step from grand designs and lofty models for a post-war Western order that could ‘win the peace’ to the practices of policies of cooperation was taken via the institutional engineering in the Atlantic world, most prominently through the ‘system’ envisioned in Bretton Woods. However, the original ideas behind Bretton Woods soon proved a bridge too far in practice, which complicated global ambitions as well as the proper build-up of Atlantic-wide institutions—and pushed Western Europe to think and act ‘beyond Americanisation’.
As of this chapter the book turns to the period from the run-up to the take-off of European integration, the years 1947 to 1951. Against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War, the Americans, the British, and the Western Europeans get their hands dirty in actions of institution-building aimed at making a more stable and just post-war European order, centred around new and deeper forms of European and international cooperation. In fact, this was what one could call the unfolding of European integration. Moreover, this second part of the book tries to uncover deeper layers (of psychology and belief) in this history through three crucial sub-histories. This chapter deals with the first of these sub-histories. It traces how the coming about and the workings of the Marshall Plan gradually illuminated an institutional, economic, and political pathway for integration in Western Europe.
The concluding chapter of the book summarises the main findings of the present study and puts these in the conceptual and historiographical framework of the introduction of the book. This chapter reconnects to the central question of the present study and shows how and why the developments in the transatlantic management of economic and monetary affairs created decisive political momentum for bold Franco-German (supranational) initiatives in European integration, but also which transatlantic and European ideational and emotional undercurrents co-steered this development. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the increasingly central role of Western Germany in this history.
This introductory chapter deals with the positioning of post-war Western Europe in the ‘Atlantic Century’. During this period of emerging American leadership in international affairs—starting roughly around the time of the American intervention in the First World War—the United States not only gradually accepted the leadership of the free world, it also offered Western Europe protection under the umbrella of an ‘Atlantic Community’. These transatlantic realities offered material and moral comfort, which were indispensable for the reconstruction and resurrection of Europe. Moreover, this new community offered a world of rational policies and democratic politics that was immediately familiar to Europeans. These shared mores fortified the two most resilient beacons of freedom: capitalism and democracy. As such, this transatlantic community transcended national borders while at the same time respecting the concept of the nation-state as the basic model for a new world of cooperation aimed at peace, stability, and prosperity for all. This community of ‘liberal’ states and societies was perceived from the outset as ‘the progeny of Western Christendom’.
This chapter is the third and final building bloc of a wider reconstruction of the main economic, (geo)political, and ideational forces that enabled European integration to take off as of the spring of 1950, It describes the practical unfolding of European integration after the Second World War. This part of the book tries to uncover deeper layers (of psychology and belief) in this history through three crucial sub-histories. This chapter deals with the third of these sub-histories. It explains how—against the background of the beginnings of the Cold War and growing British aloofness in European affairs— ‘the (West) German re-entry’ became the driving force in the process of emerging European integration. This development crystallised first in the OEEC, subsequently through the EPU, and finally in the launch of the ECSC. This process was not only political and economic in nature, but also to a great extent intellectual via the deep influence of (German) ordoliberalism in the politics of the FRG and Christian Democracy in Western Europe.
Chapter 3 reconstruct how the (collective) emotions, the political and economic practices, and the geopolitical and societal circumstances of the war times guided Western Europe to a path of deeper international and regional cooperation focused on free trade and valuta convertibility. During exile and occupation, European governments fleshed out plans and schemes for post-war cooperation, primordially in the domains of socio-economic and the financial-economic planning, in greater (practical) detail. These exercises were emotionally charged and driven by the lessons of the war against the Nazis and the post-war period after the First World War—a learning from history in which the churches played a leading role and co-prepared the political ground for the popularity of a new and hugely influential conservative political family in Western Europe: Christian Democracy.