The prologue to this book zooms in on the inherent tensions and harmonies in the transatlantic relations that evolved in the first half of the twentieth century and laid the practical, ideational, and emotional foundations for the take-off of European integration as of 1950. In doing so, the prologue, in a more essayistic way, critically reflects upon the reconstruction of the history of the origins of European integration as presented in this book and the history of European integration in general, and the deeper meaning of both for our understanding of present-day Europe and the unique phenomenon of European integration. The prologue also introduces some key concepts and figures in the historical reconstruction that follows in the chapters, such as the the policies and politics of planning, the functionalism of David Mitrany, and the analysis of the vicissitudes of transatlantic relations by Isaiah Berlin.

This chapter is the second building bloc of a wider reconstruction of the main economic, (geo)political, and ideational forces that enabled European integration to take off as of the spring of 1950. It describes the practical unfolding of European integration after the Second World War. This part of the book tries to uncover deeper layers (of psychology and belief) in this history through three crucial sub-histories. This chapter deals with the second of these sub-histories. It traces how the coming about and the workings of the Marshall Plan gradually illuminated an institutional, economic, and political pathway for integration in Western Europe. This second sub-history shows how the gradual (self-)outmanoeuvring of the United Kingdom in matters of European cooperation happened to that country and the West, and how this worked as a catalyst for regional European integration and ‘the emergence of a continental West’.

This chapter assesses the enduring relationship between the military role of the United States in Europe, through its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European integration from the Cold War to the present. It argues that, during the Cold War, western European security cooperation was conceived as part of a wider endeavour, which also included the United States and Canada. Also after the end of the East--West division, diverging priorities among the European countries and their preference for intergovernmental rather than supranational cooperation, together with US determination to preserve the transatlantic alliance, bolstered NATO’s role as the bedrock of European defence, while confining the role of European institutions to the range of peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. After reviewing the current state of the art of research on European security and defence, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section focuses on the relationship between transatlantic and European security in the late 1940s, showing how western Europe’s security initiatives, such as the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), endeavoured to secure a US pledge against the Soviet threat rather than to foster defence integration in Europe. The second section debates the project of a European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, emphasising diverging west European perceptions of the EDC and of West German rearmament. More specifically, France viewed the EDC mostly as an intergovernmental toolbox to control the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), rather than a truly supranational organisation. This section also argues that the British declined to participate, dreading the prospect of undermining NATO. After the EDC’s failure in 1954, the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) unequivocally left west European defence under the US umbrella.

The treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) contained, from their very beginning, the possibility of enlarging the initial number of six member states. Article 98 ECSC provided that ‘[a]ny European State may request to accede to the present Treaty’ and laid down the enlargement procedure. When the EEC and Euratom Treaties were concluded in 1958, no ECSC enlargements had occurred. The main elements of the enlargement procedure of Article 98 ECSC would not only remain the principal features of the accession provision in the EEC Treaty (Article 237) and Euratom Treaty (Article 205), but also continue to be the key references in the unique accession provision in later versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

It is tempting to interpret the convoluted narrative that led to Brexit as a story of British exceptionalism. The fit between European integration and the United Kingdom (UK) had never been easy – much less natural, it would appear, than for any other country in Europe. It was for this reason that the British initially stood aside from the process, spurning repeated chances to join the institutional precursors to the European Union (EU). When they did belatedly change their mind and join the European Economic Community (EEC), moreover, they did so amid sustained domestic controversy. The deep-seated mismatch between Britain and its European partners was to become a leitmotiv of the country’s forty-six years as an EC/EU member state. The UK was never at ease within the EC/EU, but instead at odds with important aspects of the process, divided internally on the necessity of membership and liable to see itself as an ‘awkward partner’, the malcontent within.

The constitutional dimension of the European Union (EU) has to account for the fact that the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE) seems to have failed in 2005 in the Dutch and French referenda. Thus we are unlikely to have a legal document officially called a ‘constitution’ in the foreseeable future. Yet, the designation is not decisive on its own (cf. the German Grundgesetz or the Hungarian Basic Law). Treaties can also be constitutions, as the examples of Cyprus (1960, Treaty of Establishment),1 the Constitution of Württemberg (1819), the Constitution of Saxony (1831)2 and the Norddeutsche Bund (1867) show.

Development policy is currently one of the pillars of external action of the European Union (EU). The volume of official development assistance disbursed by the EU and its member states makes the EU one of the world’s largest donors. Despite its significance today, development assistance was not discussed in the meetings of the Spaak Committee in 1955–6 and was only later placed on the table during negotiations for the EEC Treaty.

The principal theories of European integration (neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and social constructivism) have been rather silent about the presence and role of the religious factor in the process of unification of Europe. Such an approach, based on a certain underestimation of religion, seems to be unjustifiable nowadays, since it has become evident that the religious component of European integration appears in various forms and formats. For instance, some Protestants regard this integration as a religious ‘plot’, usually of the Roman Catholic Church, aiming at the construction of a new European Catholic empire and the undermining of Protestantism. Also, the religious dimension was one of the most controversial and fiercely debated issues at the time of drafting the European Constitution, namely the inclusion in the text of the reference to the Christian inheritance of Europe, or the reference to God. The religious or religion-related arguments played an important role in the debates on the EU membership of the largest ‘newcomer’ of the 2004 enlargement (Poland), and in the discussion in Ireland on the referendums on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and 2009. Finally, the importance of religion has been confirmed in the referendums on EU membership, including the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum in the United Kingdom.

It is therefore pertinent to claim that the presence of religion, or, to be more precise, Christian Churches, in the process of European integration is not disputable; we can only discuss how this presence has been seen, analysed and interpreted. This is addressed in chapter 26, in accordance with the following structure. First I discuss how the role of Churches in European integration has been described in the relevant literature. Then I analyse the role of Churches at the beginning of integration, in terms of their role as non-state actors and identity formers, as well as the Churches’ influence and their presence at supranational level. The final pages of this chapter have been devoted to the discussion of the practical cooperation of the Churches and EU institutions.

European integration is not the result of a preconceived plan. It rather consists of messy procedures and heated discussions. Ad hoc decision-making, crises and even utter chaos have been constants in the history of the European Union (EU). This complex reality has induced scholars to zoom in on its infamous ‘muddling through’ to better understand what is going on in European integration. Consequently, the primary focus of research has been on ways, means and outcomes: inter-state bargaining, and the resulting treaties and European institutions. However, this focus on institutional ways and means, and on the outcomes of inter-state bargaining, has implied that ideas about Europe’s future mostly have been treated as proxies of specific, rather one-dimensional, state, or institutional, interests. This leads to distorted images of history. If the recent crisis years made one thing very clear, it is this: that it proves quite complex to adequately analyse the multilevel, multipolicy and demoi-cracy muddling through that characterises the EU’s laborious management of crises and day-to-day politics and policies, let alone that a mere focus on institutional interests would be sufficient.