Recently a number of scholars have examined guanxi (connections/social relationships) and its role in the structure of Chinese society as the economic transition progresses. While many China scholars view guanxi as a deep-seated cultural fact of Chinese society, I view guanxi as an institutionally defined system – i.e. a system that depends on the institutional structure of society rather than on culture – that is changing in stride with the institutional changes of the reform era. Some scholars have argued that social networks and the use of these networks to exchange gifts and favours (guanxi xue or guanxi practice) are increasing in imnnrtanre. in China's transition.

Nowadays, when one mentions the word xiaopin in China, everybody understands it as meaning “theatrical skits performed on stage or television,” although the term itself indicates a number of different things. The term “xiaopin” is said to have first appeared in the Jin Dynasty; it referred to the simplified or abridged versions of Buddhist scriptures. Later, the term meant, in a broad sense, “a literary or artistic creation, short in length or small in size and simple in style.” “Xiao” the first Chinese character of the term, means “little,” and the second character can be understood as “a product of good quality” or as a verb meaning “to savour.” When this term is followed by other terms denoting various literary or artistic genres, the meaning becomes more definite. For example, “xiaopin wen” is understood as “short, familiar essays”; “guangbo xiaopin” means “short pieces for broadcasting”; “meishu xiaopin” denotes “artistic sketches.” Since the mid-1980s, however, the popularity of theatrical skits has caused the term to be understood by most Chinese people as simply “short and comic theatrical performances.”

The year 1936 was a fateful one in the annals of modern China. Japan's steady encroachment, dating back to the 1931 Mukden Incident, had begun to spill over beyond the Great Wall. A sense of national crisis pervaded the country and calls for unity against Japanese aggression were heard even within the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) of Chiang Kai-shek, whose policy insisted on first eliminating its arch-rival the Communist Party. As for the Communist Party, the successful arrival of its Central Red Army in northern Shaanxi province in late 1935 following the epochal Long March had enabled it to claim readiness to take on the Japanese threat directly, and its persistent demands for a National United Front in which the Communist Party would be included were meeting with approval from a wide segment of the population.

The pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. Yet in the 1990s, politicians in the West and the U.S. have criticized the Chinese government for its allegedly narrow-minded, backward view, especially on issues concerning human rights and irredentist claims. Many scholarly analyses in North America also point to a “hard-core,” well-entrenched Chinese realpolitik “worldview” with little ingrained liberal thinking. The conclusion seems to be that, in the Chinese worldview, the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power. China's foreign policy is based on an outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in a world where state sovereignty is being eroded and the traditional notion of national interests is under increasing challenge, thanks to unprecedentedly “dense interdependence.” The blunt policy criticisms and subtle scholarly analyses point to a problematic Chinese definition of national interests.

The first comprehensive effort to estimate household income and its distribution in China according to standard international definitions was made for the year 1988 by an international group of economists working with members of the host institution, the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The sample survey designed by this team produced estimates of household income that were substantially different from those of the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), based on its annual surveys, with different implications for both the average standard of living and the degree of inequality of income distribution. The study, first reported in the pages of this journal in December 1992, found that per capita household income was both substantially higher and more unequally distributed than suggested by the SSB estimates. It also provided insights into sources of inequality in China that were unobtainable from the published official data on income and its distribution.