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In 1980, in the first round of post-Mao county congress elections, scores of grassroots activists in universities and factories across eight provinces vied openly for popular support with bold campaign rhetoric. Although the term “independent candidate” (独立候选人, 独立参选人, 自主参选人) appears nowhere in official pronouncements, Chinese congress scholars and the mass media use it to refer to these activists and subsequent office seekers who mobilize voter support in local congress elections. By any estimate, the sum total of independent candidates is small, though, as I argue in this chapter, probably at least two orders of magnitude greater than estimates in most published accounts. In a book that focuses on the “normal politics” of congressional representation under autocratic rule, why consider the rare event of independent candidates at all?
First and not trivially, independent candidates have legal status. Indeed, as described in Chapter 1 and briefly reprised below, their campaign activities produced major changes in electoral rules in the 1980s, as authorities in Beijing worked to fashion a response to their “excessive democracy” in the first round of elections. These rule changes shaped local congressional representation because they constrained all electoral participants in subsequent rounds. Second, independent candidates are rare because of institutional obstacles reflected in the rules as well as overt (often strictly illegal) repression on the ground: in elections and localities where the authorities condoned or supported the emergence of independent candidates, more of them declared candidacy; at more repressive times and in more repressive places, fewer declared candidacy. Third, the challenge of independent candidates, reflected in both legal status and routine repression, illuminates the normal politics of congressional representation under Chinese autocracy in several ways. Independent candidates present a legitimacy challenge: by campaigning, they affirm the legitimacy of local congresses; yet, widespread repression of them by local authorities actually delegitimizes the congresses, showing the strong hand of the party in its management of candidate selection. Some independent candidates also present an ideological challenge: from activist democrats in 1980 to good governance advocates in 2011 to 2012, a large subset of independent candidates eschewed parochial problems in the voting district to take on fundamental political questions. In addition, especially in the 2011 to 2012 elections, a small number of independent candidates present an organizational challenge: in some localities, they coordinated operationally to support one another by sharing information.
Since the global financial crisis of 2008–9, central-level, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have extended their reach into the Chinese economy. Some have interpreted this development as a turning point in Chinese economic development; a decision for state capitalism and a stand against slow but steady marketization. In The Advance of the State in Contemporary China, Sarah Eaton suggests that the shift is a much slower-moving process and that this particular aspect of state sector reform can be seen to predate the financial crisis. She argues that the 'advance of the State' has in fact developed incrementally from an eclectic set of ideas regarding the political and economic significance of large and profitable state-controlled enterprise groups. Drawing from case studies of China's telecommunication services and airline reforms, this fascinating study offers illuminating insight into China's much-vaunted, but poorly understood, brand of state capitalism.
This book investigates the new representation unfolding in Chinese local congresses. Drawing qualitative fieldwork and data analysis from original surveys of 5,130 township, county, and municipal congressmen and women and constituents, Melanie Manion shows the priorities and problems of ordinary Chinese significantly influence both who gets elected to local congresses and what the congresses do once elected. Candidates nominated by ordinary voters are 'good types', with qualities that signal they will reliably represent the community. By contrast, candidates nominated by the communist party are 'governing types', with qualities that reflect officially valued competence and loyalty. However, congressmen and women of both types now largely reject the Maoist-era role of state agent. Instead, they view themselves as 'delegates', responsible for advocating with local government to supply local public goods. Manion argues that representation in Chinese local congresses taps local knowledge for local governance, thereby bolstering the rule of autocrats in Beijing.
Performance evaluation systems fundamentally shape the behaviour of Chinese judges, but scholarship on the concrete implementation of these institutions is scarce. Relying on nearly 15 months of fieldwork in six cities in China, we explain how the judicial cadre evaluation system, as unified by the 2011 “Guiding opinion of the Supreme People's Court,” has been implemented. Over 30 indices quantitatively measure Chinese courts’ “fairness” (gongzheng 公正), “efficiency” (xiaolü 效率) and “impact” (xiaoguo 效果), incentivizing court leaders to pressure their subordinate judges to resolve disputes as quickly as possible without unduly angering litigants or other actors. Under the hyper-quantified conditions of cadre evaluation, systemic praising and shaming bring about what we call “intra-state legibility,” which leads to a variety of informal worker reactions to these tactics. This study not only uses interviews and new documentary evidence to add necessary detail to our understanding of cadre evaluation systems, it also engages debates in comparative law and politics regarding bureaucratic influence on authoritarian judicial behaviour.