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Since the 1990s, the Chinese party-state has attempted to teach its youth how to think and speak about the nation through a “patriotic education” campaign waged in schools, the media and on public sites. The reception of these messages by youth of different social backgrounds remains a disputed issue, however. Drawing on a multi-sited field study conducted among rural and urban Han Chinese youth attending different types of schools, this article explores the effects of the patriotic education campaign on youth conceptions of the nation by examining the rhetoric high-school students employ when asked to reflect upon their nation. The study reveals that a majority of youth statements conform to the language and contents of the patriotic education campaign; however, there are significant differences in the discursive stances of urban youth and rural youth and of those attending academic and non-academic, vocational schools. These findings call into question the party-state's current vision of China as a “unified” national collectivity. They highlight the existence of variances in the sense of collective belonging and national identity of Chinese youth, while underscoring the importance of social positioning and perceived life chances in producing these variances.
From 1998 to 2018, China had three political-economic crises, resulting in bureaucratic paralysis. It was at such junctures that China's leadership launched initiatives, like the Western Development Program, that mobilized state and market actors to expedite globalization and revive economic growth. In The Belt Road and Beyond, Min Ye reevaluates the common tendency to attribute China's Belt and Road to individual leaders' strategic ambitions, using state-mobilized globalization as a comparative framework and investigative tool to understand Chinese capitalism. State-mobilized globalization has helped sustain China's high-growth economy and social-political stability, while also sparking some political backlash. In order to succeed in globalization, the author argues, China's state mobilization must readapt to global circumstances. She sheds light on the tactics China used to spring from a crisis-stricken middle economy to a formidable global power, implicating not only China, but also the world.
Between 2009 and 2014, against the background of the Xinjiang ethnic unity education textbook reform (2009–2010), vigorous academic debate on China's ethnic policy reform took place. Two academic cliques – one championing reform and the other representing the status quo – gradually came to the fore in this debate and competed to influence policy. This research seeks to unpack the mechanisms in China's knowledge regime that allow one agent (such as a think tank or academic) to prevail over others. Agents have an impact on policymaking mainly through connections with the decision-making body. This research uses three variables (ideological connection, level and nature of the connection) to analyse the relative policy influence of different agents in the debate. This research is among the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the debate's policy impact at the local level. The reform clique prevailed in this case because of its ability to bond with and influence higher-level decision-making bodies. Beginning in 2014, the Chinese Communist Party officially adopted the reform clique's language because of its alignment with the Party's growing need to maintain security in ethnic minority areas. Furthermore, key reform clique players continue to have an impact on the national policy shift.
This article discusses the “museumification” of an urban village in Taipei into the Treasure Hill Artist Village in the context of wider debates on gentrification and the redevelopment of marginal urban spaces. Populated by soldiers evacuated to Taiwan following the Chinese Civil War, Treasure Hill became a hybrid space, combining welfare provision for elderly veterans with an artist colony, forming part of the Taipei Cultural Foundation. Lauded as a compromise that combined social, cultural and economic aspects of urban regeneration, the mix of high-modernist paternalism and neoliberal place-making resulted in the integration of the space into the existing city bureaucracy as a museum-like institution, with elderly residents and artists becoming exhibits in a living diorama. Although widely understood as “gentrification” at the time, the article argues that the museumification of Treasure Hill was a process led by a coalition of state and spatial experts which has distinct implications for the study of state-led neighbourhood amelioration.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prosecuted Japanese military servicemen for war crimes committed during and after the Sino-Japanese War. This paper examines written confessions left by those Japanese war crimes suspects and considers to what extent they were used by the CCP to prosecute sexual violence during the trials. The historical analysis is contextualized by an examination of the representation of the CCP's legal approach to sexual violence in articles from the People's Daily. This paper finds that although accounts of sexual violence are found in the confessions written by suspected Japanese war criminals, the courts did not make rape a focal point of the prosecutions and did not pursue the so-called “comfort women” issue. Furthermore, no victim of rape was called to testify before the court. The CCP's approach to the issue of sexual violence in the 1956 trials closely corresponded to the discourse and propaganda in the People's Daily.
This research investigates the contentious use of temple assets amid widespread local state-led religious commodification in contemporary China. Based on a comparative analysis of 22 historic temples, this paper argues that given the choice, temple leaders strive for property-management autonomy, which they negotiate on two fronts. Externally, owing to the immobility of historic temple assets, temple leaders avoid antagonizing local state agents by demonstrating political conformity and the temple's economic contribution. Internally, they seek to build a donation-based merit economy to sustain the monastic institution. Since such autonomy must operate within the authoritarian state's regulatory framework, the restrained contestation of the religious leadership actually helps to strengthen state control over religion.
This article explores the discursive functioning of education policies, bringing into consideration community perspectives regarding policy enactment in contemporary China. With the intention of building upon ongoing discussions surrounding both the conceptions and purposes of policy sociology, we critically analyse policies directly related to the education of migrant children living in and around China's largest urban centres, with a specific focus on those implemented in Beijing. We emphasize two important aspects that previous studies of China's education policies have tended to underplay given their focus on social-economic perspectives. The first argument is that education policies have an underlying agenda that extends beyond that of simply addressing the educational needs of migrant children – evidenced through the discursive functions of policy texts. The second argument is related and seeks to raise questions about who is best served by these policies and for whom these policies are intended.