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This chapter provides an overview of the system of governance in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). It introduces readers to the fundamental concepts of ‘one country, two systems’ and ‘high degree of autonomy’ under the Basic Law, which provide the framework for the allocation and exercise of responsibilities over Hong Kong by the central authorities and the Hong Kong government. Within the sphere of Hong Kong’s autonomy, the Basic Law provides for the exercise of governmental powers by three arms of government: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The powers and functions of these three arms are outlined in this chapter, together with discussion of the doctrine of ‘separation of powers’.
This chapter discusses how laws are made in Hong Kong by studying the process of legislation. Issues are discussed surrounding how the Basic Law limits the scope of certain legislation and who has the authority to create legislation. Readers are taken through the step-by-step process of lawmaking in Hong Kong from the proposal to how a bill achieves status as law in Hong Kong. Both the passage of primary legislation and secondary legislation are illustrated. The interactions and balance between branches of government and between governments (the HKSAR and the PRC) are exemplified in the process of legislation.
The first chapter outlines the aims of the book, which is to provide an introduction to the Hong Kong legal system especially for first-year law students, but also for students of other disciplines, and practitioners and scholars from other jurisdictions who are looking for a comprehensive and user-friendly overview of Hong Kong’s legal system. It also highlights the key elements of that system, discussing its rules and principles, namely the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, as well as legal institutions and legal personnel. This chapter traces the historical development of Hong Kong’s legal system, from the acquisition of Hong Kong by the British and the importation of English law (including common law) into colonial Hong Kong to the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997 and the present-day legal framework under ‘one country, two systems’.
This chapter focuses on the civil justice system in Hong Kong. It provides readers with an overview of civil litigation and its processes, from starting an action to remedies. Key stages of civil procedure, such as summary and default judgment, discovery and injunctions, are highlighted and discussed. The drawbacks to civil litigation are also examined. The second part of this chapter looks at the Civil Justice Reform that occurred in Hong Kong in 2009, discussing the changes that were implemented in order to enhance efficiency, cost-effectiveness and fairness for individuals going through the civil justice system in Hong Kong.
This chapter examines the various schemes of how individuals can obtain legal advice and representation in Hong Kong. The chapter discusses the split legal profession in Hong Kong between barristers and solicitors and then focuses on legal aid and its various schemes and the schemes operated by the Duty Lawyer Service. Besides providing a descriptive account, this chapter also looks at the reforms that have been proposed with respect to legal aid, the challenges that litigants in persons (unrepresented litigants) may face and the problems that they may pose to the court system.
This chapter focuses on skills and techniques in finding the law. The accomplished lawyer might not necessarily know every legal principle in a particular area, but he or she would at least know how to find the law quickly and accurately. Tips and techniques on finding the law quickly in both hard copy and online databases is provided. The last part of this chapter offers a manual for legal citation. Consistent with the aim of this book, this chapter guides students in bestowing them with the skill set necessary to start their legal studies and subsequent legal careers.
How can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.
What role do emotions play in state repression? Building upon ethnographic observation in one Beijing petition bureau, this paper explores the emotional labour performed by grassroots officials to demobilize social dissent. The petition system serves as an official channel through which the Chinese government receives complaints and grievances from citizens. Notwithstanding its institutional inefficiency in addressing petitioners’ requirements, this system plays a critical role in maintaining social stability. I investigate the process by which frontline petition officials manage petitions. I argue that channelling petitioners’ emotions has become one of these officials’ core functions. Petition officials have developed three types of emotional strategies – emotional defusing, emotional constraint and emotional reshaping – to absorb petitioners’ complaints. This study of emotional repression offers a fresh perspective on the affective dimension of contentious politics and also contributes to the theoretical discussion on how authoritarian regimes deal with dissent.
Using a localized perspective, this paper explores the gap between the eligibility criteria for a Beijing hukou (household registration) and the reality of successfully acquiring one. By comparing those who are eligible to apply with those who actually succeed in gaining a hukou, it reveals that hukou practices are operated locally to serve the city's development needs. It also reveals huge gaps between migrants, eligible applicants and hukou winners. Most migrants in Beijing are not eligible to apply for a local hukou. However, among those limited applicants who can apply, those with a postgraduate education and who serve the capital's political functions are more likely than others to win a hukou, an advantage not pointed out in government documents. These “hidden” rules are most likely set intentionally by the city so that it can maintain absolute control over hukou transfers; however, at the same time, they frustrate migrants who meet the stated requirements but who are in reality still unlikely to ever acquire a Beijing hukou. These findings open up a novel perspective for exploring the people–city nexus in China during the migration process and highlight the gaps between policy and reality for those who can apply for a Beijing hukou and those who actually win one.
Many autocratic states cultivate networks of informants and operatives who have responsibility over small local cells. This chapter shows how the Chinese state has constructed a modern system of infiltration organized around sub-village cells. This decentralized system of informal control enables local officials to closely monitor local society. Case study and quantitative evidence show how village cell leaders help local officials implement policies including land confiscation and family planning quotas. Hiring more informants and putting them in charge of smaller cells, while costly, increases compliance with state policies. This strategy of infiltration is largely a substitute for cultivating and co-opting civil society.
In this concluding chapter, I briefly recap the main findings and then examine their broader implications. The case of Wukan Village shows how the strategy of informal control can be effective in the short run but backfire in the long run. The most effective check on autocratic state power is unlikely to come from the state itself, but from an adversarial relationship between local civil society and the state. Independent community leaders and activists who can mobilize their groups and threaten officials with broad-based political mobilization can even the balance of power between the state and society, and create meaningful incentives for responsiveness.
In this chapter, I turn my attention to the dynamics of co-optation of local notables. One might expect that the inclusion of communal elites in local political institutions might strengthen the voice of villagers and make local governments more responsive. By contrast, I argue that when communal elites are included in formal political institutions in rural China, they help the state control their group. Drawing on evidence from case studies, an original experiment, and a national dataset, I show how the inclusion of local elites in formal political bodies allows the state to requisition land and enforce family planning policy while forestalling collective action. Case studies from Scotland and the United States suggest that this mechanism of informal control may have applicability beyond China. When the leaders of communal groups remain outside the state, however, they can help to organize resistance against it.