This article analyses data from the 2015 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) to investigate the differentiated political values of the middle class in China. Combining the two factors of market situation and institutional division, the article first categorizes several basic types of middle class and then identifies two kinds of political values (liberal and conservative) from the indicators of support for freedom, government satisfaction, and political voting. The results show that the middle class, as a whole, tends to be more liberal than the working class. However, the internal divisions among the sub-groups in the middle class are more obvious – the political tendency of the middle class within the redistribution system is conservative but the middle class sub-groups outside the system, especially the new middle class, have the most liberal tendencies and constitute a potential source for change in China. Thus, the middle class is not necessarily a stabilizer or a subverter of the status quo and has a heterogeneous nature shaped by the dual forces of markets and institutions.

Whether local officials in China are promoted on a meritocratic basis has been the subject of long-standing debate. Merit is commonly gauged by a leader's ability to deliver local GDP growth. Although some find economic performance to be a strong predictor of the career success of local leaders, we argue that the existing measure, which focuses on the promotion outcome of a single career step, is problematic because the career success of individual local leaders is seldom determined by a single promotion, or the lack thereof. We propose an alternative measure that is more suitable for China's political context: the length of time until promotion. Analysing the time it takes to gain promotion for four types of local leaders, we find that good economic performance is associated with a shorter time until promotion. However, the cumulative time-reducing effect of economic performance is far from significant, as it is generally insufficient to help local leaders overcome the age ceiling for promotion.

Since the 1990s, the Chinese party-state has attempted to teach its youth how to think and speak about the nation through a “patriotic education” campaign waged in schools, the media and on public sites. The reception of these messages by youth of different social backgrounds remains a disputed issue, however. Drawing on a multi-sited field study conducted among rural and urban Han Chinese youth attending different types of schools, this article explores the effects of the patriotic education campaign on youth conceptions of the nation by examining the rhetoric high-school students employ when asked to reflect upon their nation. The study reveals that a majority of youth statements conform to the language and contents of the patriotic education campaign; however, there are significant differences in the discursive stances of urban youth and rural youth and of those attending academic and non-academic, vocational schools. These findings call into question the party-state's current vision of China as a “unified” national collectivity. They highlight the existence of variances in the sense of collective belonging and national identity of Chinese youth, while underscoring the importance of social positioning and perceived life chances in producing these variances.

Although the Chinese state has an outsized influence on shaping civil society in China, extant literature has generally overlooked the increasing role of the market in its non-governmental organization (NGO) development. This paper examines the marketization of Chinese civil society through an ethnographic investigation of funding relationships between domestic Chinese philanthropic foundations and grassroots NGOs. Two case studies of foundation venture philanthropy projects show that businesspeople, through their intensive involvement in foundation-led funding programmes, are introducing strong market influences to the non-profit sector. Notwithstanding the attraction of foundation funding, many NGOs decry the negative side effects of non-profit marketization. We argue that NGOs in this context risk being transformed into social product providers and resource-chasing machines, detracting from the self-directed social missions that many NGO leaders see as their original calling. These observations on emergent NGO–foundation relationships also reflect participants’ increasing uncertainty about the direction of Chinese civil society development.

Through studying a revenge murder triggered by a land dispute in China and the subsequent trial, this article explores “narrative transformation” in a social drama and proposes an event-based model for authoritarian deliberation. It argues that an obscure murder rose to prominence because it came to be narrated as a different kind of story. Initially viewed as “a normal killing,” it was transformed to represent a “contest” between a law-and-order frame, which emphasizes individual guilt, and a righteous-revenge frame, which symbolizes wider conflicts. The article also contends that in the absence of an institutionalized issue forum, contentious events present a model for authoritarian deliberation. That is to say, deliberation is often pegged to social dramas on the “judicial periphery,” thanks to a liminal phase inviting reflexivity, and exposes elite dissent that is otherwise veiled by an interest-driven alliance. In this case study, the media engaged with other institutions in contentious performances that affirmed hidden social fault-lines but also encouraged deliberation.

In spring 2018 China, indignant popular nationalists demanded that the “spiritually Japanese” activities of a fringe group of young Chinese who figure themselves as Japanese be proscribed. The National People's Congress quickly complied, passing legislation that made it illegal to “beautify the war of invasion.” Exploring how and why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) responded to the demands of popular nationalists, we suggest that authoritarian representation occurs in China even beyond the bounds of everyday apolitical issues like education and healthcare. Indeed, because the CCP relies upon a nationalist claim to legitimate rule, authoritarian legislators may respond to the public on politically sensitive issues like nationalism as well. Journalists and lawyers, furthermore, can play a vital mediating role between elites and masses, facilitating the transmission of the information and expertise needed for authoritarian responsiveness. Implications for our understanding of Chinese nationalism, authoritarian responsiveness and state legitimation in China today are discussed.

While China's Constitution says everyone is treated equally before the law, employment discrimination continues to exist. This paper breaks new ground by analysing a quantitative survey of more than 10,000 lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people, the largest dataset of its kind to date in China. Only 5.1 per cent of respondents were completely open about their gender and sexuality at work. More than one-fifth reported experiencing negative treatment in the workplace. Transgender and intersex people reported higher rates of negative treatment, as did respondents with lower educational levels and lower incomes and those residing in towns. Employer policies against discrimination were rare, but when in place, they were significantly associated with less negative treatment. These findings highlight an almost completely neglected segment of the workforce and document discriminatory experiences that could be addressed by changes in discrimination law and by employer policies and practices related to diversity and inclusion.

Between 2009 and 2014, against the background of the Xinjiang ethnic unity education textbook reform (2009–2010), vigorous academic debate on China's ethnic policy reform took place. Two academic cliques – one championing reform and the other representing the status quo – gradually came to the fore in this debate and competed to influence policy. This research seeks to unpack the mechanisms in China's knowledge regime that allow one agent (such as a think tank or academic) to prevail over others. Agents have an impact on policymaking mainly through connections with the decision-making body. This research uses three variables (ideological connection, level and nature of the connection) to analyse the relative policy influence of different agents in the debate. This research is among the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the debate's policy impact at the local level. The reform clique prevailed in this case because of its ability to bond with and influence higher-level decision-making bodies. Beginning in 2014, the Chinese Communist Party officially adopted the reform clique's language because of its alignment with the Party's growing need to maintain security in ethnic minority areas. Furthermore, key reform clique players continue to have an impact on the national policy shift.

This article examines Chinese engagement in Ethiopia's telecommunications sector. It argues that while theories of developmental state and global production networks contribute important insights on the roles of state agency and inter-firm relations in the rise of global lead firms from East Asia, they are insufficient to interpret the recent overseas ventures of Chinese companies in Africa. A case study of one flagship Chinese telecommunications company in Ethiopia advances the existing literature by highlighting the influences of host government intervention and inter-firm competition in shaping firms’ local operations. Specifically, this article analyses a myriad of changes in the case company's organizational structure and business practices in response to increased market competition administered by the Ethiopian government. Findings reveal that despite benefiting from official inter-state cooperation, Chinese overseas companies are neither static nor merely state-driven players but are flexible in adjusting strategies to improve their competitiveness in the local market.

Philosemitism – the idealization of Jews and Israel – and Chinese-Jewish history function as a platform of soft power for growing China–Israel relations and as a means to bolster Chinese nationalism. Given the Chinese Communist Party's current positioning of China as a globally dominant power as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, this article re-examines the contemporary incarnation of philosemitism in China as part of a civilizationist narrative designed to position China as globally central and superior. This not only places heavy emphasis upon Jewish racial stereotypes and erases genuine historical Jewish voices but it also ignores evidence of anti-Semitic beliefs in China.

This article discusses the “museumification” of an urban village in Taipei into the Treasure Hill Artist Village in the context of wider debates on gentrification and the redevelopment of marginal urban spaces. Populated by soldiers evacuated to Taiwan following the Chinese Civil War, Treasure Hill became a hybrid space, combining welfare provision for elderly veterans with an artist colony, forming part of the Taipei Cultural Foundation. Lauded as a compromise that combined social, cultural and economic aspects of urban regeneration, the mix of high-modernist paternalism and neoliberal place-making resulted in the integration of the space into the existing city bureaucracy as a museum-like institution, with elderly residents and artists becoming exhibits in a living diorama. Although widely understood as “gentrification” at the time, the article argues that the museumification of Treasure Hill was a process led by a coalition of state and spatial experts which has distinct implications for the study of state-led neighbourhood amelioration.

Militaries are sustained by public money that is diverted away from other domestic ends. How the public react to the “guns-versus-butter” trade-off is thus an important question in understanding the microfoundations of Chinese military power. However, there are few studies on public attitudes towards military spending in China, whose rising power has been a grave concern to many policymakers around the world. We fielded a national online survey to investigate the nature of public support for military spending in China. We find that Chinese citizens support military spending in the abstract, but their support diminishes when considered alongside other domestic spending priorities. We also find that public support for military spending coexists surprisingly with anti-war sentiments and a significant strain of isolationism. In addition, while the conventional wisdom suggests that nationalism moves a state towards bellicosity and war, we find that Chinese citizens with a stronger sense of national pride report stronger anti-war sentiments than other citizens.

Current anti-Chinese sentiment in the international community has emerged from a knowledge-production background that entails the material fact of China's rising power and ideational factors tied to how the rising China phenomenon is interpreted. The ideational factors can be divided into two groups. One analyses China according to established Western IR theories that describe the country in terms of either threat or opportunity, thereby rendering China as part of an established universal ontology. A second group approaches China's experiences in a more sympathetic light, but still conceptualizes China's rise according to fixed categories such as “nation-state.” This paper argues that both of these groups are guilty of creating self-fulfilling prophecies – that is, they consistently theorize China in opposition to the West owing to the rational epistemology upon which they built their knowledge or perceptions of China. This epistemology conflicts with the efforts of Chinese IR scholars to evaluate China's rise in a relational manner.

This study focuses on the theoretical links between two important ingredients of individuals’ fundamental political values (i.e. authoritarian ideology and national attachment) and their life satisfaction assessments in an authoritarian context. We employ data from a 2016 national public survey in China to empirically examine how these political values relate to Chinese citizens’ life satisfaction. Our regression analyses demonstrate that Chinese citizens with stronger authoritarian ideology and national attachment are likely to report a higher level of life satisfaction. Our study contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the importance of the connections between political values and citizen life satisfaction. It also advances our understanding of the origins of social and political stability in authoritarian regimes, where citizen life satisfaction usually represents a major source of state legitimacy.