Judicial independence (JI) is a concept commanding an expansive literature. However, the findings in the literature are inconsistent: Measures of de facto and de jure JI have been shown to be uncorrelated, negatively correlated, or weakly positively correlated with each other. I argue that the inconsistent findings are the result of conceptual fuzziness and errors in measurement. As a corrective, I define JI as the conjunction of judicial discretion and judicial preferences. This definition leads to the identification of two separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for judicial independence: high discretion and preferences that diverge from the actors whose policy they can veto. I argue that when constitutions are difficult to amend, judiciaries have more discretion in their ability to interpret constitutional matters. However, because judicial preferences are generally unobservable, the relationship between JI and constitutional rigidity will be heteroskedastic. I operationalize JI as the proportion of a sitting government’s bills that the judiciary strikes down on constitutional grounds. The expected relationship – that both the mean and variance of JI are increasing in constitutional discretion – is corroborated.

We consider the deflection of light by the Sun (or a massive object) in general relativity. We first find it by analogy of the geodesic equation with the motion of light in a medium with small, position-dependent index of refraction, and then by the formal method of the Hamilton–Jacobi equation, which is first reviewed, before being used. Finally, we compare with the special relativity result, and find the famous ½ factor distinguishing between the two.

This chapter begins by sketching the standard belief-desire model of action and action-explanation employed by most philosophers, while also noting some variations. Of necessity, given the immense literature on the topic, this is presented at a high level of generality, abstracting over many local disagreements. The model and its variations provide the main set of foils for the scientifically grounded accounts to be discussed in later chapters, which are then briefly previewed. The remaining sections of the chapter go on to explain and quickly motivate three major assumptions that are taken for granted throughout the remainder of the book (and also by many philosophers and almost all cognitive scientists, it should be said): realism, physicalism, and representationalism.

Pregnant women who contract the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) face an elevated risk of preterm birth, and their newborns are more prone to stillbirth or admission to a neonatal unit. Despite the World Health Organization declaring the end of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic as a global health emergency in May 2023, pregnant women continue to contract SARS-CoV-2. Limited information is available on the impact of SARS-CoV-2 infection in early pregnancy on pregnancy outcomes. Additionally, understanding the safety of vaccination is crucial. Current evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2 infection in early pregnancy does not seem to heighten the risk of miscarriages. Moreover, vaccinations have demonstrated efficacy in safeguarding both pregnant women and their pregnancies