This article contributes an account of a key moment in the development of venture capital. I argue the US Small Business Administration’s Task Force on Venture and Equity Capital for Small Business, established in 1976 and headed by William J. Casey, had an outsized impact on the development of modern venture capital and its close associations with the high technology sector. The Task Force’s 1977 report was influential in establishing both the figure of the venture capitalist and the business model of institutionally supported, limited partnership venture capital in the minds of policymakers, businesspeople, and the general public. This article traces the influence of one part of the Report: a prominently featured schematic model, entitled “Life Cycle of a New Enterprise: Model of a Growing and Successful Company, 1975-1976 Financial Market Conditions.” I trace the influence of the LCM as it spread through the developing high technology sector, as shown by its appearances in business publications, governmental reports, and congressional testimonies offered by industry leaders. The LCM was genericized away from its original authors and intentions, becoming part of the economic imaginary of the technology and innovation sector.

This article explores venture capital (VC) as a means and process of accumulating future social necessity. It explores the mechanisms of growth that make VC-backed firms distinct. I argue that a distinctive feature of surplus value capture through VC is valorization via socially necessary contracted space-time, a corrective to Marx’s theorization of socially necessary labor time, which appears incomplete in the context of VC. First, extending Marx’s general formula for capital, I develop a general formula for VC, demonstrating how the VC investment upends traditional theories of capitalist accumulation. Second, I argue that VC invests in firms seeking to capture ‘human capital’ resources and uncapitalized market ‘space’ (noncapitalist social logics of exchange) with the aim of achieving ‘product-market fit’. Third, I demonstrate how time and space are contracted under the VC process as a value capture (VC) mechanism relating to future social necessity. VC is, I argue, about accumulating today what we will all need to be consuming tomorrow, just to keep up with social norms. Finally, I explore how the valorization of crisis (VC) demonstrates the accumulation of future social necessity in practice. I conclude with thoughts concerning the possibility of alternatives beyond the overdetermined rapacity of ‘VC’.

A new form of digital economic circulation has emerged, wherein ideas, knowledge, labour and use rights for otherwise idle assets move between geographically distributed but connected and interactive online communities. Such circulation is apparent across a number of digital economic ecologies, including social media, online marketplaces, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding and other manifestations of the so-called ‘sharing economy’. Prevailing accounts deploy concepts such as ‘co-production’, ‘prosumption’ and ‘peer-to-peer’ to explain digital economic circulation as networked exchange relations characterised by their disintermediated, collaborative and democratising qualities. Building from the neologism of platform capitalism, we place ‘the platform’ — understood as a distinct mode of socio-technical intermediary and business arrangement that is incorporated into wider processes of capitalisation — at the centre of the critical analysis of digital economic circulation. To create multi-sided markets and coordinate network effects, platforms enrol users through a participatory economic culture and mobilise code and data analytics to compose immanent infrastructures. Platform intermediation is also nested in the ex-post construction of a replicable business model. Prioritising rapid up-scaling and extracting revenues from circulations and associated data trails, the model performs the structure of venture capital investment which capitalises on the potential of platforms to realise monopoly rents.

Narratives and conventions have received considerable attention in recent discussions of the valuation of financial assets. Narratives and conventions, however, can only be effective to the extent that they attract and persuade audiences, and this article makes the case for paying more attention to those audiences. In particular, the article argues that financial assets can only be established as assets if there is a group of potential investors that has been persuaded to accept them as such: to take them seriously as potential investments. The article coins the term asset circles to refer to such groups and supports the argument with a discussion of venture capital and its role in the production of unicorns: private companies with extraordinary valuations. Venture capital firms may be thought of as value entrepreneurs, and much of the venture capital process is oriented towards constructing both value narratives for the companies they invest in and asset circles prepared to accept those value narratives. Their aim in these processes is a profitable exit, in which the venture capital firm converts its investment back into cash at a considerable profit through either an acquisition or a flotation.

This research uses signaling theory to combine the perspective of investment results with existing venture capital (VC) standards and reexamines the factors that influence the attractiveness of innovative internet tech startups to VC from the perspective of equal opportunity startups. Taking the financing status of 310 startups in China's sharing economy as an example and using regression analysis, we empirically test the influence of entrepreneur and firm characteristics on attracting VC. Our results show that among founder characteristics, the entrepreneur's entrepreneurial experience alone is insufficient to attract VC. Industrial experience and political background have a positive influence on attracting VC. Among firm characteristics, market-entry order and business group (BG) affiliation positively influence attracting VC. This is a new and relevant discovery. In the Chinese market, investors are more inclined to provide financial support to entrepreneurs or startups that have already gained legitimacy from the government or business groups.

In 2005, the Chinese government deployed a new financial instrument to accelerate technological catch-up: government guidance funds (GGFs). These are funds established by central and local governments partnering with private venture capital to invest in state-selected priority sectors. GGFs promise to significantly broaden capital access for high-tech ventures that normally struggle to secure funding. The aggregate numbers are impressive: by 2021, there were more than 1,800 GGFs, with an estimated target capital size of US$1.52 trillion. In practice, however, there are notable gaps between policy ambition and outcomes. Our analysis finds that realized capital fell significantly short of targets, particularly in non-coastal regions, and only 26 per cent of GGFs had met their target capital size by 2021. Several factors account for this policy implementation gap: the lack of quality private-sector partners and ventures, leadership turnover and the inherent difficulties in evaluating the performance of GGFs.

With the exponential growth in investment attention to brain health—solutions spanning brain wellness to mental health to neurological disorders—tech giants, payers, and biotechnology companies have been making forays into this field to identify technology solutions and pharmaceutical amplifiers. So far, their investments have had mixed results. The concept of open innovation (OI) was first coined by Henry Chesbrough to describe the paradigm by which enterprises allow free flow of ideas, products, and services from the outside to the inside and vice versa in order to remain competitive, particularly in rapidly evolving fields where there is abundant, relevant knowledge outside the traditional walls of the enterprise. In this article, we advocate for further exploration and advancement of OI in brain health.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is currently developing fast and its potential as driver of innovative solutions is increasing, pushed by technologies, networks, communication, and computing power, and has the potential to drive the development of technological ecosystems, such as innovation clusters. Innovation clusters are agglomeration of enterprises and research organizations, which cooperate, interact and compete, generating innovation and driving the growth of ecosystems. The narrative around innovation clusters has been developing since many years and policy-makers seek to use such clusters as a policy instrument to support the growth of technology on the one hand and regional and sectoral development on the other hand. This policy paper expands an empirical study on IoT innovation clusters in Europe and places it within the current debate around clusters and innovation clusters to provide evidence-based advice to policy-makers on what may and may not work as public policy measures. The paper highlights the findings of the interaction with several hundred European IoT innovation clusters and points out their points of view on their own creation factors, operational characteristics, and success stories, as well as their expectations in respect to policy interventions for IoT and for clusters. Suggestions for IoT policy-making are provided. The paper has also undertaken an extensive review of up-to date research on innovation cluster creation and performance, thoroughly analyzing the real possibility to define causal relationships between clusters, productivity and economic growth, and business performance, and providing suggestions for policy-makers on the approach to cluster policy.