When natural rights justify ownership, the justification is only a prima facie justification. Ownership may justly be limited when it seems unlikely in practice to serve people’s interests in acquiring and using ownable resources. Each of the four elements of natural property rights highlights limits on ownership, and this chapter surveys a range of doctrines illustrating the relevant limits – limits on the scope of property in air columns via aerial trespass doctrine; adverse possession; doctrines enforcing limits on malicious conduct and abuse of right; remedial defenses for undue hardship in property disputes; public commonses; the necessity privilege in tort; rights of way to access public commons; common carrier doctrines; and progressive taxation, welfare, and other public assistance policies.

Shelley has traditionally been associated with radical atheism and freethought. This chapter places those movements in a wider context by tracing historical definitions of religion and atheism. It suggests that Shelley’s doctrine of Love moves beyond atheism and the radical enlightenment that influenced Shelley’s early verse. The entry concludes with a discussion of the Victorian Shelley, capable of being understood as a non-doctrinal spiritual guide whatever his private opinions were. This leads to some reflections about how scholars define and analyse religion in literary texts.

This chapter studies the elements of an interest-based natural property right. To acquire a prima facie right in a resource, the claimant must use it productively and claim exclusivity to its use in terms others will understand. But the prima facie right may be overridden by either of two provisos. The sufficiency proviso limits property rights when a proprietor’s use of a resource does not leave others sufficient access to the same type of resource for their own needs. The necessity proviso limits natural rights when someone who does not hold property in a resource needs access to it to repel some serious threat to life or property. This chapter illustrates legal doctrines for capturing animals and other articles of personal property, occupying unowned land, and appropriating water flow by use. This chapter contrasts productive use with Locke’s treatments of labor, waste, and spoliation, and it contrasts claim communication with Pufendorf and Grotius’s treatments of possession. This chapter also considers familiar criticisms of rights-based property theories, involving hypotheticals with radioactive tomato juice or ham sandwiches embedded in cement.

International criminal law recognizes certain defences, excuses and justifications that may be raised against a charge of genocide. These include mistake of fact, duress and necessity and self-defence. The defences are codified in detailed provisions of the Rome Statute but they are also derived from case law. The Rome Statute declares that an order to commit genocide is ’manifestly unlawful’ and therefore unavaible to an accused person. A defence of ’official capacity’ is explicitly excluded by article IV of the Convention whereby offenders must be punished ’whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’.

This and the next chapter together offer a reanalysis of the semantic domain covered by the traditional notion of modality. On the basis of a scrutiny of the characteristics of the individual qualificational categories involved, they propose a view of the organization of the field that differs from earlier analyses in the literature. The present chapter focuses on the definition of the traditional modal subcategories: dynamic, deontic and epistemic modality. It discusses the differences of the present approach with classical conceptions of the categories in the literature. The chapter moreover critically reviews alternative divisions of (parts of) the field proposed earlier, and it surveys and deconstructs the most important traditional arguments for covering the three semantic categories in one (super)category of modality.

In Chapter 8, I deal with the threat that the present account strips arithmetical knowledge of all the important characteristics traditionally associated with it: apriority, objectivity, necessity and universality. I argue that apriority can be saved in the strong sense of arithmetical knowledge being contextually a priori in the context set by our cognitive and physical capacities. Objectivity can be saved in the sense of maximal inter-subjectivity, while necessity can be saved in the sense of arithmetical theorems being true in all possible worlds where cognitive agents with proto-arithmetical abilities have developed. Finally, universality of arithmetical truths is saved through arithmetic being universally applicable and shared by all members of cultures that develop arithmetic based on proto-arithmetical abilities.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus deploys modal vocabulary, especially “possibility.” Some readers take this to signal commitment to substantive modal theories. For others, it is metaphysical nonsense to be thrown away. We steer a middle path. We uncover the central role of possibility in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development from criticism of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment to the conception of propositions as pictures in the Tractatus. In this conception, modality is not the subject matter of theorizing but an ineluctable aspect of picturing of reality whose showing forth Wittgenstein aims to help us see by operationalizing the construction of propositions.

In this chapter, I interpret section 6.361 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – containing Wittgenstein’s second reference to Heinrich Hertz in the book – in the context of the nearby framing remarks concerning the ‘law of causality’. Attention to the relevant details of Hertz’s work sheds light on a number of Wittgenstein’s remarks about mechanics in the 6.3s and, in particular, explains Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘What can be described can happen too, and what the law of causality is meant to exclude cannot even be described’ (6.362). For Wittgenstein, to describe events in causal terms is to describe them via an appeal to temporal and spatial asymmetries. However, no alternative is available: a description that did not appeal to such asymmetries would not be a description of anything. According to the Tractatus, descriptions are recognized as causal when they are embedded in a unified theoretical framework, but causal powers, understood as relations of material necessity, do not exist.

This introductory chapter provides the rationale for the book, as well as its organization. As part of the linguistic landscape, public signage provides glimpses of a culture and its changes. The ability to read signs is a practical skill essential for daily survival in the target language environment. But there seems to have been a general neglect of signs in the typical Chinese language curriculum, even at advanced levels of instruction. This book aims to rectify the situation.

In this chapter, the semantical framework of Chapter 7 is fine-tuned in order to provide a semantics for Anderson and Belnap’s logic E of relevant entailment. It is shown how a form of logical necessity can be represented in the semantics, and this is used to motivate the postulates that are needed to characterize that logic. A labelled deduction system (introduced in Chapter 7) is also used to show how to derive the axioms of E easily.

This chapter considers the criteria for collective self-defence that are shared with individual self-defence. It is uncontentious to say that the same criteria that apply to individual self-defence – armed attack, necessity, proportionality, the reporting requirement, and the ‘until clause’ – also apply to collective self-defence. Indeed, this is an inevitable consequence of the way the concepts appear in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The nature and application of these criteria in the context of individual self-defence have been examined at great length in the existing literature. This chapter therefore does not provide in-depth analysis of all of their aspects. That said, it does provide a brief overview of these requirements to ensure that this book presents a comprehensive picture of the operation of collective self-defence today. The chapter’s main focus, though, is to examine how the operation of these criteria works specifically in the context of collective self-defence actions, which is something that has been largely overlooked in scholarship.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the general aspects of the right of self-defence. It first examines the concept of an ‘armed attack’ as found in Article 51, with the aim of shedding some light on the difficult issues and questions raised by this prerequisite for the invocation of the right of self-defence. It then goes on to provide an examination of the twin customary principles of necessity and proportionality, including a specific look at the controversial concept of armed reprisals, before moving on to examining military action for the protection of nationals who are located abroad. The right of self-defence exists in both individual and collective forms, and the chapter takes a specific look at the right of collective self-defence. Finally, it examines the role of the UN Security Council in the invocation and implementation of the right of self-defence, an aspect of the right which is prominent throughout Article 51.

This chapter explores the Laudian critique of the (allegedly) puritan doctrine of absolute predestination, and particularly absolute reprobation. This critique imputed an absolute, fatal or stoic necessity to questions of salvation and damnation, which, the Laudians claimed, reduced the role of human free will and moral effort to nothing. In so doing it created desperately difficult pastoral dilemmas for ministers trying to rescue members of their flocks from the desperation such doctrines all too often induced. This was particularly the case for absolute reprobation. It was in the course of dealing with puritan error on this subject that the Laudians came to deal with the topic of predestination, and faute de mieux, to adumbrate their own position, asserting that saving grace was offered to all, that Christ died for the sins of the whole world, that God willed the salvation of every sinner, that human effort was required for salvation, that true faith could be totally and finally lost and that no one was simply doomed to damnation; contentions which they defended not as resolutions of the paradoxes at the heart of the debate about predestination, but rather as saving truths central to the nature of Christianity.

Machiavelli cannot accomplish conversion of the world by himself. He has to convince future philosophers to follow or obey him. This is his succession problem.

Drone programs in the counterterrorism context rest on the use of force in self-defense not against an (imminent) act, but against individuals in the light of their personal or behavioral characteristics. Because drone programs are motivated by the objective of permanently addressing future threats before they materialize, technology and legal rhetoric are used as instruments to authorize action against individuals who are not presently perpetrating terrorist acts, nor even clearly preparing, such acts. Some states active in the transnational war on terror have proposed a legal framework for the continuous anticipation of armed attacks against individuals who show signs of hostile intent. These changes in military strategy and legal discourse are not merely the result of how states decide to use force in the counterterrorism context, but also of what technology allows them to do. As such, drones facilitate and arguably intensify the phenomena of the individualization and dematerialization of the use of force. Although the interpretation of self-defense proposed by some states active in the war on terror is still highly contested on some points, the chapter shows that even if some limitations remain, concessions to the extensive interpretation of some limitations appear to have a direct cascade effect on the remaining checks because these limitations are interconnected.

Chapter 9 studies access to landlocked land and shows that most jurisdictions aptly use a mixture of ex ante and ex post viewpoints to design their doctrines. This chapter follows American parlance and divides the doctrine into “easements of necessity” and “statutory easements.” They have intuitive appeal: for statutory easements, owners of servient land should be compensated; easements should be necessary; and the location of the passage should cause the least damage to the servient land. As for easements of necessity, the landlocked owners can only gain access to land held by the grantor at the time of the conveyance. The prevalent scheme under statutory easement to solve this legal entanglement is neither the property rule nor the liability rule, but a “hybrid rule,” an unheralded mixture of the property rule and liability rule. Chapter 9 argues that the hybrid rule stipulates that the extent of statutory easements should be set at where the marginal social benefit of prescribed passage sharply declines, and passage locations should be determined following the least damage rule. As for easements of necessity, the limited access rule and the gratuity requirement make economic sense from an ex ante viewpoint.