Psychologists and others have long debated the moral consequences of religious identification, religious belief, spirituality, and religious ritual adherence. Many enlightened luminaries have been disquieted by fears of how people might act in a world without the strictures of God and religion. This chapter reviews data on how people around the world see morality and its linkage to religion. The chapter also considers theory and research on why people might want to act morally in the first place. One problem concerns defining just what people mean by moral character, a question explored from various angles. Moral psychology has developed as an important field, but one that frequently treats religious variables as an afterthought. Still, moral psychology is essential to understanding the development of values inside and outside religion and a large section of this chapter reviews relevant research and theory. The chapter also examines empirical studies of the connection between various measures of religiousness and generosity, charity, honesty, lawfulness, sexual propriety, sobriety, racial tolerance, open-mindedness, and other aspects of prosocial behavior.

This chapter discusses the field of moral development and explores what this research field can tell us about virtue development, which is a relatively neglected topic in virtue theory. The chapter is primarily about moral development in children, both because there is substantial scientific interest in this population and because virtue development must begin in childhood. Moral development research illuminates three apparently naturally developing preconditions for virtue development: (1) the ability to choose, (2) an interest in collective welfare, and (3) an interest in ethical normativity. Moral development research is also compatible with the STRIVE-4 Model in that it is primarily quantitative. Moral development generally does not focus on traits, with the exception of some research on moral identity, moral emotions, and moral exemplars. The chapter concludes by exploring how virtue science can contribute to moral development research, including an increased emphasis on (1) person-centered research, (2) the contextualizing of development in situations and roles, (3) flourishing, and (4) practical wisdom.

Given the apparent importance of exempla to Cicero’s project in De Officiis, any account of Cicero’s philosophical method in this work is forced to grapple with the question of how these historical insets function within the text. Yet understanding how, exactly, they contribute to the reader’s moral progress is an interpretative challenge: Cicero’s treatment warns us against taking them simply as models for imitation. Instead, I argue, Cicero focuses on three different, but related, functions for his exempla within De Officiis. First, looking at the behaviour of others can help us to develop the analytical skills necessary to correctly deliberate about our own actions. Secondly, exempla work to verify the theoretical claims of the text. Finally, they show the beneficial outcomes of following the teachings of the text, in terms of the glory and praise that accrues to those who engage in correct action – though, as we shall see, this strategy is only effective because of Cicero’s radical redefinition of the concepts of glory and praise.

This chapter discusses the intertwining of morality, values, and prosociality from childhood to adolescence. We define prosocial behaviors as acts that, if completed as intended, would directly promote the goals or welfare of others. We begin with three theoretical points: (1) People do not view all prosocial actions as inherently good or morally right. (2) Judgments about prosocial behaviors derive from reasoning about both moral and nonmoral values. (3) Judgments of right and wrong guide decisions about prosocial behaviors. From these propositions, we discuss research on three developmental periods: infancy and toddlerhood, when prosocial behaviors emerge; preschool age, when children make judgments of right and wrong; and school age to adolescence, when developments in social understanding and the coordination of competing considerations enable changes in prosocial judgments and decisions. Greater attention to how evaluative judgments shape prosocial decisions can strengthen efforts to explain and intervene on the development of prosociality.

This chapter features a book from the era which marks the culmination of the Ottoman intellectual efforts to reinstate traditional categories of knowledge from an imperial perspective. Ahlak-i Alai [The morals of Ali] of Kınalızade Ali Çelebi showcases the maturation of moral thinking that overlaps the central themes of Shakespearean virtue ethics. Written by a contemporary of Shakespeare and became the representative account of moral thinking in social and political domains of the Ottomans, the book is of interest to the readers of Shakespeare as it accommodates more parallels with the moral world of Englishmen than indicated in Shakespeare’s ‘turning Turk’ in Othello. Ahlak-i Alai follows in form and content the Aristotelian virtue ethics and deals with a broad spectrum of questions from the source of morality and the possibility of an individual’s moral education to the highest good and the moral order in society. It is suggested in the chapter that the common moral ground of Ottomans and Shakespeare is shaped mainly by the Aristotelian virtue ethics whose objective is to operate in moderation what is thought to be the powers of the self.

Agitation and aggression are common behavioral manifestations in patients with PWS. This chapter reviews how to recognize possible triggers and psychological mechanisms behind them. Caregivers are made aware of operant conditioning and the stages of moral development. Additionally the role of externalization is described. The underlying cause of the agitation can vary from person to person and similarly the management strategy differs considerably. The importance of ensuring the safety of the patient and others is emphasized. Behavioral management techniques can be very effective when started at an early age. Medications are effective options to supplement behavioral strategies as long as they are prescribed under the close monitoring of a medical provider. Finally, remember that most patients with PWS do not have malicious intent when they are exhibiting aggression. Their aggression is rooted in poor impulse control and hence is reactive in nature. Their aggression should be treated as a symptom rather than an inherent character flaw.

This chapter provides an overview of the process of moral development and the five domains of conscience functioning in children and adolescents. It describes how moral development and conscience functioning are affected by moral injuries and exposure to a natural disaster, specifically the 1988 Spitak earthquake. Alterations to conscience development and interference with conscience functioning resonate with the concept of moral injury, scientific studies of which have described moral injury in both combat and civilian populations. Both fields have been hampered by the fact that the current psychiatric diagnostic system for PTSD and depression in DSM-5, although identifying cognitive disturbances as symptoms, does not include specific reference to the moral domain. While symptoms of PTSD and depression may co-occur with conscience impairment, the moral injury involved requires creative methods for delineating the impact on demoralization and identifying potential treatments for re-moralization. Examples of conscience-sensitive evaluation methods for the domains of conscience – conceptualization, moral attachment, moral-emotional responsiveness, moral valuation, and moral volition – are presented. Each domain points the way to treatment possibilities.

One theme we’ve been pursuing throughout is the notion that high human fertility is facilitated by the child’s relatively rapid transition from wholly dependent to semi-dependent status. Childhood, as a stage of development unique to our species, allows the child to develop slowly with relatively little attention from its mother, freeing her to bear another infant. However, being a child does not just mean that one can survive well with minimal care from adults; it also means, in a more positive sense, that one’s life is filled with play activity. From the perspective of the harried parent, children’s deep engagement with playthings and playmates is a godsend. However, keeping busy turns out to be only one of a host of potential benefits conveyed by play.

The early years of life offer ample opportunities for revenge, as young children face frequent frustrations and often use physical force against others. Still, studying revenge in young children is challenging, theoretically and methodologically. This chapter proposes criteria for studying revenge, synthesizes what is known about the origins of revenge, and points to new questions for research. We define revenge as an effort to harm someone who has affected you negatively. Based on extant evidence, we conclude many of infants’ aggressive responses likely constitute early forms of revenge. Later, from around the third birthday, children also appear capable of taking revenge against someone who has wronged them. From that age, children can also form moral judgments about revenge; both children and adults judge that revenge is sometimes permissible. Throughout the chapter, we stress the need to distinguish revenge from other forms of reactive aggression in future research.

In this chapter, we consider how youth make sense of their own retaliatory goals and actions in the aftermath of being harmed, and we elaborate on the implications of their meaning-making for processes of moral development and behavior. We begin by describing how youths’ experiences of revenge are distinct from other forms of harmdoing, and how these unique features of revenge may inform the meanings that they construct from their retaliatory desires and actions. Next, we describe age-related changes in these constructive processes, and discuss how youths’ histories of interactions in their social milieu may undergird their constructions of meaning about revenge. We conclude by articulating implications of our analyses for intervening with children and adolescents surrounding issues of revenge.

This chapter addresses several central issues in the study of revenge during childhood and adolescence, focusing specifically on moral evaluations of retaliation and retributive justice. We begin by distinguishing among relevant concepts and consider their respective moral status by discussing their moral-philosophical foundations. Next, we summarize and critique classic developmental psychology research on children’s reasoning about retaliation, focusing on Piaget’s (1932) early work but also addressing Kohlberg’s (1981) account when appropriate. This is followed by a discussion of social-cognitive domain theory (SCDT), a constructivist developmental perspective that we assert is better able than earlier psychological approaches to address the ambiguities of provocation, retaliation, and revenge. Consistent with recent trends in SCDT research, we also consider individual differences in children’s evaluations and responses to provocation, focusing on research investigating the social and psychological correlates of retaliatory aggression. Finally, the chapter concludes with a review of key findings and suggestions for future research.