Using data from the understudied language Gιsιɖa Anii, we provide a formal analysis of irrealis that builds on the framework of modality proposed in Giannakidou and Mari. In particular, we propose that Anii has an irrealis modal morpheme whose meaning is that the speaker does not believe that the proposition is true at a particular time. This gives irrealis, at least in Anii, a negatively biased meaning. Giannakidou and Mari propose that the subjunctive in European languages is a positively biased modal but find no evidence in their data for a corresponding negatively biased one. However, in expanding their approach to a completely unrelated language, we show that modal bias can also be negative, filling in the paradigmatic gap left open by Giannakidou and Mari’s work. We also illustrate the utility of analyzing irrealis (in relation to the concept of veridicality) as a morphosyntactic and semantic category with a status similar to tense and aspect. Our formal analysis accounts for the obligatory realization of irrealis in a wide range of semantic contexts in Anii, including future tense, negation, and wishes, and shows how irrealis can be composed with other clausal elements. We suggest that reality status, which we analyze as (non)-veridicality, is obligatorily present in the Anii clause and discuss the implications of this for other languages.

Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this article, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We should regard possibility with at least as much suspicion, that is to say as incurring at least as much of an explanatory demand, as necessity. In fact, I suggest that we might even be justified in reversing the burden of proof asymmetry and adopting a necessity bias. This has quite radical implications for philosophical methodology and hence for many first-order philosophical concerns.

I argue that Charles Travis’s interpretation of Frege, in Frege: The Pure Business of Being True, as consistent with Travis’s conception of occasion-sensitivity does not in fact require any modal notions, and so is consistent with the amodalist interpretation of Frege I elaborate in Necessity Lost.

Do bilinguals have similar bilingual control mechanisms in speaking and writing? The present study investigated the patterns of switch costs (reflecting reactive language control) and mixing costs (reflecting proactive language control) between Chinese (L1) and English (L2) in spoken and written productions and whether these patterns could be modulated by response-stimulus intervals (RSIs). In two experiments, unbalanced Chinese–English bilinguals completed a cued language switching task in spoken naming (Experiment 1) and written naming (Experiment 2), respectively. The results revealed asymmetrical switch costs (i.e., the larger cost in L1 than in L2) in spoken and written productions in the short RSI condition. However, there were asymmetrical mixing costs in spoken production and symmetrical mixing costs in written production both in the short and long RSIs. These findings suggest that for spoken and written productions, reactive language control operates in similar mechanisms, while proactive language control operates in specific mechanisms.

In Mapudungun, the suffix -fu- typically indicates the unsuccessful realization of either an event or its expected consequences. As is the case for frustrative morphemes in several unrelated languages, when applied to a stative VP, the interpretation tends to be linked to non-continuation. Interestingly, in addition to these core readings, -fu- also occurs in conditionals conveying counterfactuality, and in a large subclass of deontic and bouletic constructions, such as the ones that express weak necessity and unattainable desires. Following recent developments in the study of both frustratives and conditionals, this article shows how a modal analysis of -fu- can integrate these different readings into a unified account.

Female attorneys at the U.S. Supreme Court are less successful than male attorneys under some conditions because of gender norms, implicit expectations about how men and women should act. While previous work has found that women are more successful when they use more emotional language at oral arguments, gender norms are context sensitive. The COVID-19 pandemic prompted perhaps the most radical contextual shift in Supreme Court history: freewheeling in-person arguments were replaced with turn-based teleconference arguments. This change altered judicial decision-making and, I argue, justices’ assessments of attorneys’ gender performance. Using quantitative textual analysis of oral arguments, I demonstrate that justices implicitly evaluate gender performance with different metrics in each modality. Gender-normative levels of emotional language predict success in both formats. Function words, however, only predict success in teleconference arguments. Given gender’s salience at the Supreme Court and in broader society, my findings prompt questions about the extent to which women can substantively impact case law.

In Kant’s idealism, all spatiotemporal objects depend on the human mind in a certain way. A central issue here is whether the existence of spatiotemporal things requires that these things are, at least at some point, objects of some actual experience or of a merely possible experience. In this essay, I argue (on textual and philosophical grounds) for the latter view: spatiotemporal things exist (or spatiotemporal events occur) if they are objects of a (suitably qualified) possible experience.