By drawing on civil chambers court observation data collected in the Vancouver Supreme Court of British Columbia, this article explores the relationship between institutional court practices and the emerging concept of person-centred justice. Despite some efforts at procedural reform, superior trial courts have been resistant to change, and access to justice challenges around cost, accessibility and complexity are stubbornly persistent. Rather than fulfilling normative visions of substantive and equal justice, several arguments and empirical studies build a compelling case that formalistic adjudicative venues such as the Supreme Court of British Columbia are vulnerable to reinforcing existing societal inequalities. Do the principles of person-centred justice—that promise to enable effective participation and engagement in justice processes—hold the answer to unlocking transformative institutional change? By engaging in a qualitative analysis that illuminates how time (or lack thereof) and relational proximity shapes institutional practices and resource distribution in Vancouver’s civil chambers courts, this article offers an initial foray into understanding what person-centricity might mean in an environment with deeply embedded institutional and epistemic practices traditionally dominated and captured by justice system professionals. By introducing qualitative evaluation of institutional practices in the civil courts of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, this article extends early conceptual debates about person-centred justice. This article further highlights the formidable challenges we face in embedding new social practices into relationally and materially unequal terrains.

Latin America was one of the regions hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper aims to assess the evolution of family income inequality and its components from the onset of the pandemic to the end of 2021 in six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay. The unequalising impact of the worsening of the labour market during the contraction period was associated with the significant loss of informal jobs. This effect was partially offset by the equalising role of cash transfer policies. During the recovery period, the distributive impacts of these income sources were the opposite of those observed during the contraction period, as most countries gradually reduced or ceased these transfers while labour incomes partially rebounded. Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, income inequality in most countries either remained the same or had decreased compared to 2019, even though total family incomes are still below the levels of that year.

In a field experiment where revelation of co-worker earnings and the shape of the earnings distribution are exogenously controlled, I test whether relative earnings information itself influences effective labor supply and labor supply elasticity. Piece-rate workers shown their peer earnings standing provide significantly more labor effort. However, the productivity boost from earnings disclosure disappears when inequalities in the underlying piece rate exist. By cross-randomizing net of tax piece rates, labor supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax wage is also estimated. Unlike labor level, I find this labor elasticity is unchanged by the relative standing information. Taken together, these findings have direct implications for how to best model relative status concerns in utility functions, supporting some and precluding other common ways. More speculatively, they also suggest social comparisons could be strategically used to grow firm output or the tax base, and, that underlying inequalities in compensation schemes inhibit the ability of social comparisons to incentivize work.

This paper examines why, some 25 years beyond the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland (NI) remains a highly polarised society despite the return of devolution (in February 2024) after a 2-year hiatus. Using the theoretical lens of social capital, it draws on the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey and the World Values survey (the latter conducted for the first time in NI) to examine levels of trust as a pre-requisite to reconciliation between the two main communities. The research finds a high degree of trust towards people of another religion and limited affective polarisation across the main political parties. Yet government community relations policies appear to have had limited impact over time and may contribute to ‘bad social capital’ through bonding within communities at the expense of ‘the other’. The paper considers tackling social and economic inequalities, common to both communities, as a means of bridging social capital.

Several non-experimental studies claim that heterogeneity among individuals reduces trust. A few experimental studies have examined the effects of naturally-occurring differences among subjects on trusting behavior, and in contrast, most have not supported these claims. We adopt a novel approach by inducing heterogeneity among subjects in a canonical trust experiment. We accomplish this by varying the show-up payments given to subjects for participating in the experiment. We find that this induced inequality does not consistently affect first- or second-mover behavior in the classic trust game in the manner predicted by either previous theoretical work or empirical studies of survey-based measures of trust. Further, the effect of inequality on trust, in terms of both sign and significance, depends on whether show-up payments are awarded publicly or privately.

Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime—autocracy—efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter.

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.

We investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal on cooperation decisions. Subjects can contribute to a global public good which benefits all subjects and two local public goods which benefit only subjects of either their own group or the group of the other endowment type. Endowment inequality per-se decreases contributions of subjects with a high endowment to the global public good, but increases cooperation of subjects with a low endowment on their local public good, thereby aggravating income disparities. Exogenously induced role reversal for several periods affects cooperation behavior of subjects with a high endowment positively and induces them to contribute more to the global good. Cooperation in unequal environments thus appears to be more stable when all parties have experienced the public goods game from the disadvantageous perspective.

It has been proposed by several scholars that Hegel’s political philosophy can be utilized as a foundation for welfare theory. This article argues that to comprehend the principles, objectives, and limitations of a Hegelian welfare state, we need an account of the theory of justice underlying his political philosophy. This requires an analysis of how Hegel conceptualizes and assesses different kinds of inequality. This article identifies the three kinds of natural, societal, and market inequality and elucidates their interaction and transformation. An examination of the inner workings of the market through the lens of Hegel’s economic theory reveals how these inequalities impede citizens’ freedom. For a Hegelian theory of justice, inequalities pose a problem to the extent that they impede the citizens’ possibility of self-actualization. Consequently, the objective of a Hegelian welfare state is not to actualize an abstract notion of justice, but rather to ensure this possibility of self-actualization.