Aerial visuals play a central – and increasing – role in military operations, informing military decision-makers in real time. While adding relevant and time-sensitive information, these visuals construct an imperfect representation of people and spaces, placing additional burdens on decision-makers and creating a persuasive – yet misleading – virtual representation of the actual conditions on the ground. Based on interdisciplinary analysis of critical security studies, behavioural economics and international law literature, as well as rich data from US and Israeli military investigations into four military operations spanning from 2009 to 2021, this article identifies three types of challenges stemming from the mounting reliance on aerial visuals to inform military operations: technical challenges, relating to the technical capabilities and features of aerial vision technologies; cognitive challenges, relating to decision-making biases affecting human decision-makers; and human-technological challenges, relating to the human–machine interaction itself. The article suggests ways to mitigate these challenges, improve the application of the law of armed conflict, and protect people, animals and the environment during armed conflicts.

It is the task of the International Court of Justice to establish the operative facts from which to draw normative conclusions in all contentious cases that come before it. This task, however, is complicated where those facts necessitate engagement with specialized epistemic fields other than law such as science. Drawing on legal theory and epistemology I propose a coherence framework for the establishment of the facts in such cases. In essence, this means that the Court need not show that its factual determinations have been established beyond all doubt, nor even that they satisfy a certain standard of probability. Rather, what the Court must show is that a factual determination it has made has been arrived at through a rational process and that it is coherent. The coherence framework also has both descriptive and normative value as it both maps neatly on to the current (best) practice of the Court and provides a justification for why it should operate this way in the future.

This article is based on an Ecclesiastical Law Society London Lecture delivered on 17 November 2021. It builds on a previous lecture entitled ‘Safeguarding in church and state over the last 50 years: “from Ball and Banks to Beech via Bell”’, which also formed the basis of an article published in this Journal in 2020. That article, among other things, identified a number of significant cases of sexual abuse by clergy which were/are the subject of ‘lessons learned’ reviews and concluded by suggesting how investigation and fact-finding might take place in the future, independent of the bishops, but under the supervision of a ‘judge’, and argued that effective risk assessments could only be based on findings of fact. The author was subsequently asked to chair a working party for the Ecclesiastical Law Society aimed at addressing how the Clergy Disciplinary Measure 2003 (‘CDM’) should be reformed. This article now deals with events that have occurred since, from the publication of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse (IICSA)'s investigative reports into the Anglican Church (inter alia), the Lambeth group's proposals for reform of the CDM, through to General Synod's responses to both sets of recommendations. It also surveys in some detail the approach the church has taken to the assessment of risk within its safeguarding policy in recent years, as well as its historical approach to clergy discipline. The article concludes by drawing some threads together as a result of the author's own work and research into these two subjects over the past two years, and finishes by suggesting some possible directions in which the church ought now to move.

The use of chemical weapons in the armed conflict in Syria has attracted universal and widespread condemnation and has led to unified responses by various international bodies. This article examines the international community's responses to chemical weapons use in Syria from the perspective of international law. It also analyzes the potential options for accountability that are available for chemical weapons-related crimes. The intention is ultimately to make the case that the special status the international community has ascribed to chemical weapons crimes could be harnessed to create an accountability mechanism, such as an ad hoc tribunal, that could help pave the complex road towards a negotiated peace.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (Amnesty), and other like-minded organisations have become major actors in the world of international humanitarian law (IHL). Every year they issue hundreds of publications purporting to document violations and to promote IHL enforcement. These publications are ubiquitously cited in the media, and used as source material for governmental and United Nations inquiries, quasi-judicial bodies, the International Criminal Court, academic studies, and other frameworks. Yet, despite the increase in the number, role and influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working on IHL enforcement, conflicts and civilian deaths show no signs of abating. Among the factors that reduce NGO impact in these areas is the demonstrated weakness of these organisations in the realm of fact-finding, and the tension between these activities and emphasis on political advocacy. This article will thus analyse both objective and subjective aspects of NGO fact-finding during armed conflict, including mandates and methodology, selectivity, the application of legal standards, military expertise and sourcing. These issues will be examined through case studies of Amnesty and HRW publications on the conflicts in Yemen, Ukraine and the 2014 Gaza War. The article will conclude with recommendations for NGOs and the actors with which they interact.

More than ninety people died in political violence linked to the March–May 2010 “redshirt” protests in Bangkok. The work of the government-appointed Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) illustrates the potential shortcomings of seeing quasi-judicial commissions as a catch-all solution for societies struggling to deal with the truth about their recent pasts. The 2012 TRCT report was widely criticized for blaming too much of the violence on the actions of rogue elements of the demonstrators and failing to focus tightly on the obvious legal transgressions of the security forces. By failing strongly to criticize the role of the military in most of the fatal shootings, the TRCT arguably helped pave the way for the 2014 coup. Truth commissions that are unable to produce convincing explanations of the facts they examine may actually prove counterproductive. Following Quinn and Wilson, we argue in this article that weak truth commissions are prone to politicization and are likely to produce disappointing outcomes, which may even be counterproductive.

The traditional vision that international courts and tribunals do ‘good’ or create a better world through law is increasingly under question. International criminal justice started largely as a ‘faith’-based project, but is increasingly criticized in light of its actual record and impact. This essay examines this journey and, in particular, the role of ‘faith’ and ‘fact’ in the treatment and assessment of international criminal courts, through four core themes (‘effectiveness’, ‘fairness’, ‘fact-finding’, and legacy’) addressed in André Gide's version of the parable of The Return of the Prodigal Son. It argues that, in its ‘homecoming’, international criminal justice would benefit from a greater degree of realism by openly accepting its limitations and embracing its expressivist function. It cautions at the same time against exclusively quantitative understandings of impact, arguing that the power of international courts and tribunals lies not so much in their quantitative record as in their role in setting a moral or legal example or shaping discourse. It concludes that a better match between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ requires greater attention to the interplay between ‘international’, ‘domestic’, and ‘local’ responses to conflict, as well as recognition of their legitimate differences.

The Nicaragua case demonstrates the Court's competence in receiving and interpreting evidence, and in making reasoned findings of fact, even in the most complicated evidentiary context, as is often presented in cases involving use of force and armed conflict. The Court applied well-established standards for evaluating the conflicting evidence presented to it. In particular, the Court determined that greater weight should be given to statements against interest made by high-level government officials than to a state's self-serving declarations. The Court also determined that statements by disinterested witnesses with first-hand knowledge should receive greater weight than mere statements of opinion or press reports. In applying these guidelines, the Court found, correctly, that (i) the United States had used military and paramilitary force against Nicaragua both directly and indirectly, by organizing, financing, arming, and training the Contra guerrillas to attack Nicaragua; (ii) the evidence did not support a finding that the United States exercised direct control over the Contras’ day-to-day operations; and (iii) there was no evidence that Nicaragua supplied arms to guerrillas fighting against the government of El Salvador during the relevant period, or carried out an armed attack against that state. While Judge Schwebel's dissent criticized the last of these findings, in fact, the evidence fully supported the Court's conclusion. In subsequent decisions during the past 25 years, the Court has continued to rely on the approach to evidence first elaborated in the Nicaragua case and has continued to demonstrate its competence as a finder of fact, including in cases involving armed conflict (Bosnia Genocide) and complex scientific and technical issues (Pulp Mills).

This article reviews Dutch contributions to international law and focuses on the last 100 years to mark the centenary of the Netherlands Society of International Law. It poses the question whether this is a missionary burden, resulting from the constitutional duty incumbent upon the Dutch government to ‘promote the development of the international legal order’, or enlightened self-interest on the part of the Netherlands. The article briefly recalls the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and Dutch initiatives for a third that had been planned for 1915 at a time when the Dutch pursued a policy of neutrality. It also reviews some Dutch initiatives in the context of the League of Nations and Dutch policy during the San Francisco Conference that established the United Nations in 1945. The German occupation and membership of the United Nations marked the real end of the Dutch policy of neutrality. From the outset, the Netherlands became an active participant in nearly all principal fields of the United Nations' activity. The article highlights a number of Dutch international law initiatives in the fields of human rights, development, peace and security, international humanitarian law, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It concludes with final observations on the preoccupation of the Netherlands with international law.

This article uses the recent judgment of the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia to highlight the potential problems that arise when international courts have to adjudicate on overlapping situations. It describes the dispute between the ICJ and the ICTY on the appropriate legal standard for the attribution of state responsibility, and finds that the ICJ's approach in this case suggests that those keen to minimize the fragmentation of international law between adjudicative bodies should not overlook the need for consistency within those bodies. With regard to fact finding, this article raises serious concerns about the manner in which the ICJ relied on the ICTY's work. The decision of the ICJ not to demand crucial documents from Serbia is discussed and criticized. Based on its approach to fact finding in this case, doubts are raised as to whether the ICJ will ever hold a state responsible for genocide outside the parameters of the prior criminal convictions of individual perpetrators.