Predominant climate club research emphasizes state-centric clubs that alter the incentive structure and bargaining context for climate cooperation. This focus on national governments, however, leaves climate clubs vulnerable to political turbulence afflicting individual club members. Subnational governments are an important yet often overlooked type of actor in the club literature. This article contributes to understanding the role and nature of subnational government-led clubs in transnational climate governance and lawmaking through qualitative case studies of the Western Climate Initiative and the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. I identify the distinguishing characteristics that these clubs manifest in their membership and functions, as formalized through legal arrangements. I demonstrate that these clubs have the potential to increase structural stability, withstand political changes, and enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of climate action. They do so by functioning not only as organizations that create incentives for committing to legal norms and mechanisms for deterring free riding but also as communities of practice that generate shared understandings, resources, and norms to sustain club cooperation in pursuing a shared commitment to climate action. As such, each club applies a mix of rationalist approaches to benefit generation and constructivist approaches to community building.

Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are touted as an integral component to anticorruption efforts in developing nations. SAIs review governmental budgets and report fiscal discrepancies in publicly available audit reports. These documents contain valuable information on budgetary discrepancies, missing resources, or may even report fraud and corruption. Existing research on anticorruption efforts relies on information published by national-level SAIs while mostly ignoring audits from subnational SAIs because their information is not published in accessible formats. I collect publicly available audit reports published by a subnational SAI in Mexico, the Auditoria Superior del Estado de Sinaloa, and build a pipeline for extracting the monetary value of discrepancies detected in municipal budgets. I systematically convert scanned documents into machine-readable text using optical character recognition, and I then train a classification model to identify paragraphs with relevant information. From the relevant paragraphs, I extract the monetary values of budgetary discrepancies by developing a named entity recognizer that automates the identification of this information. In this paper, I explain the steps for building the pipeline and detail the procedures for replicating it in different contexts. The resulting dataset contains the official amounts of discrepancies in municipal budgets for the state of Sinaloa. This information is useful to anticorruption policymakers because it quantifies discrepancies in municipal spending potentially motivating reforms that mitigate misappropriation. Although I focus on a single state in Mexico, this method can be extended to any context where audit reports are publicly available.

Although the research surrounding PRR parties has increased over the years, health policies, an important part of the welfare system, have generally been neglected. Using an in-depth case-study approach, this article analyses the health policy consequences of PRR parties in Austrian and Italian subnational governments over time, thereby expanding the units of analysis while also looking at an understudied level of government. The findings indicate a propensity towards neoliberalism, combined with accents of welfare chauvinism in Austria and a strategy of shutting down the Freedom Party of Austria. In the case of Italy, both regional cases mark a desire for welfare chauvinism but an inability to restrict healthcare access directly. In all four cases (except Burgenland), the PRR parties are consistently chauvinistic (despite seeming to prefer welfare to liberal chauvinism, they typically implement the latter for health policies) and any factor of generosity comes from a social democratic coalition partner or not at all.

Coalition governments prevail at the European subnational level. Although some studies explain the formation of subnational government coalitions, we know little about the determinants of individual parties' likelihood of joining such coalitions. This article aims to fill this gap in empirical and theoretical ways. It shows that an important institutional constraint matters for political actors' strategies when forming subnational coalitions: the party affiliation of the directly elected head of the executive. Being the party of the head of the executive or being ideologically close to that party significantly increases a party's likelihood of joining a coalition. The empirical evidence results from multinomial choice models using a novel data set on subnational parties' likelihood of joining 92 coalition governments at the local level in Germany between 1999 and 2016. The findings have substantive implications for subnational institutional settings resembling ‘mixed’ political systems (i.e. neither purely presidential nor purely parliamentarian).