Chapter 12 shows that the Covid-19 emergency and the ensuing suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its sanctioning mechanisms in 2020 led to crucial changes in the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) regime. For example, the transnational distribution of EU funds, institutionalised by the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) Regulation in 2021, meant that the post-Covid NEG regime no longer mimicked the divisive beggar-thy-neighbour tools that transnational corporations use to steer their subsidiaries and workforce. Even so, EU executives continue to direct the post-Covid NEG regime without much participation by national parliaments and the European parliament or unions and social movements. Instead of using the financial sanctions of the suspended SGP, EU executives use the policy conditionalities attached to RRF funding to reach their objectives, which are in keeping with the overarching commodification script.

Chapter 2 gives scholars and students across disciplines, but also policymakers, trade unionists, and social movement activists, a clear account of the arcane new economic governance (NEG) regime that European Union leaders adopted after 2008. The chapter avoids jargonistic academic language as well as the Euro-speak of the EU’s economic governance documents when describing the setup and operation of the NEG regime. This is important if one wants to understand its internal contradictions and change the operation and policy direction of the EU’s NEG regime.

Chapter 5 opens for Part II of the book with the task of taxonomy, classifying the emergent post-crisis EU fiscal architecture from the perspective of fiscal federalism theory in order to determine what it demands from the EU legal order to ‘work’. Chapter 5 finds that, from the perspective of fiscal federalism theory, the EU has sunk the cornerstones of a highly centralized model of ‘proto-fiscal union’ that is far more apt to unitary states than any of the other federations touched upon in this book. At its core, the new model supplants a legal pillar of fiscal sovereignty and market discipline (an entrenched ‘no-bailout’ law) with a legal feature of unitary states: centralized financial assistance and legal governance of fiscal policy. Chapter 5 evaluates the demands this places on the European legal order, and provides directions for the remainder of the analysis of Part II.

Chapter 7 examines whether the fiscal governance architecture enacted since the crisis is reconcilable with the constitutional boundaries of member state fiscal sovereignty underlying the EU legal order as a whole. It conducts a piece-by-piece deconstruction of the European governance framework to identify instruments which trespass on ultra vires and constitutional identity rulings of national constitutional courts. It finds that the new architecture is dependent, for its stable functioning, on instruments which are beyond the boundaries of the EU legal order and profess to bind national legislators in economic/fiscal policy, contrary to member state constitutional identity jurisprudence. By restricting fiscal autonomy and providing bailouts, the EU has sunk the foundation stones of a unitary model that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional jurisprudence of its twenty-eight member states catalogued in this book. This is not only legally unsound, but economically ineffective and injurious to good principles of fiscal federalism.

This chapter discusses the currency union’s original set-up. It first discusses the history of European monetary integration, distinguishing between two sorts of motives: one economic, the other political. From the establishment of the European Economic Community up until the Treaty of Maastricht, both have been important drivers of monetary integration. The chapter subsequently turns to the original legal set-up of the euro, in particular its internal policy dimension. The economic and political forces behind the currency union’s creation also exercised great influence on its set-up, which came to institutionalise a stability paradigm. Characteristic of this paradigm was that it granted overriding importance to price stability as a policy goal and argued for a privileged position of the central bank in achieving this. The chapter shows how its influence was most notably evident at the level of aims and principles and in the constitutional position of the European Central Bank. Yet it also shaped the single currency’s economic foundations, in particular, the Union’s limited competences in this area and its focus on fiscal prudence. It even informed the rules governing accession.

This chapter examines four flaws in the most essential assumptions underlying the single currency’s original stability set-up that were exposed by the crisis. The first concerns market discipline. The chapter looks at some of the key explanations for the failure of market discipline, in particular, those professed by the ECB. The second flaw concerns the instrument of public discipline. The shortcomings of this instrument were already visible in the early 2000s when France and Germany violated the Stability and Growth Pact. The chapter analyses these violations, the court case to which they gave rise and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact that followed it in 2005. The third flaw concerns the excessive attention for budgetary discipline. In its preoccupation with ensuring fiscal prudence, the original set-up was blind to risks stemming from other corners of the economy, especially the banking sector. The fourth flaw is the cardinal one. Geared to safeguarding price stability, the single currency’s legal set-up left another stability dangerously exposed: financial stability. The chapter discusses its importance and the need to have it protected by a ‘lender of last resort’.

The European Union (EU) has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was formed by six European countries in 1951. Since then, it has grown to 27 members through the accession of new Member States, and has increased its powers by adding new policy areas to its remit. At the time of writing, the EU is negotiating the first exit of a Member State after a majority of the UK electorate voted to leaving the EU on 23 June 2016 in a process that has come to be known as Brexit. The chapter explains the functions of the most important EU institutions (European Commission, Council of the EU, European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice) and legal instruments (including directives and regulations). It proceeds by outlining the process of monetary integration, from the agreement in principle in 1969, to the creation of an internal market, and the adoption of the euro in 1999 by 11 Member States. The final section discusses steps towards financial integration, including the Financial Services Action Plan, Banking Union and Capital Markets Union.