In multi-panelled higher jurisdictions, a larger, extended formation of judges tends to be established within the court. It bears various names: the grand chamber, the extended chamber, the expanded composition, the reunion of several chambers, a court sitting en banc, an extended section or a division of a court. In larger but not too large jurisdictions, the same role is adopted by the plenary. For ease of reference, I shall refer to all such extended judicial formations with the generic name ‘grand chamber’.

To bear the same name does not necessarily mean to perform the same function. As a Czech lawyer, I have always intuitively assumed that the role of such a body within an apex court is to unify the case law. In the Czech Republic, as well as in a number of other supreme continental jurisdictions for that matter, there tends to be only one reason for the presence of a grand chamber within a supreme court: to unify the diverging lines of case law and to set a clear line of precedent. However, that has never really been the job description, least of all the practice, of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’). This begs the question: what may then be other structural reasons for the existence of such a body within an apex jurisdiction? What is the specific role, function, and ensuing justification for the Grand Chamber of the Court?

This article offers some personal reflections on that question. It is structured as follows: it begins with a short comparative overview of some of the grand chambers within European (national) courts, overseas in the common law world, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, in order to tease out the functional rationale for various types of extended judicial compositions within those systems (Part I). Next, two types of such functional justifications for grand chambers in the form of ideal models are identified (Part II). Finally, those justifications are then considered in light of the legislative design and the current practice of the Grand Chamber of the Court, before concluding with two modest suggestions (Part III).

This article aims to map how soft law tools have complemented and supported the overall regulatory strategies implemented by European countries to counter the Covid-19 crisis (the soft law atlas), to shed light on some key topics of general interest for legal theory and practice: how soft law tools interact and complement one another including on different levels (the soft law web), how soft law tools interact and complement the sources of pandemic law (the interplay between soft and hard law), and the positive and negative impacts on governance and policy-making of soft law tools during the pandemic and beyond (soft law bright and dark sides).

The establishment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is often still regarded today as an unequivocal success story, especially compared to the troubles experienced by kindred institutions elsewhere. For non-specialist audiences, it would even seem that its performance has only recently been cast in a more negative light, pursuant to the pushback of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Weiss/PSPP saga. The current article aims to unpack a collection of shortcomings that have accumulated gradually and persist right up to the present, which have however not been interrogated in sufficient depth so far. It starts off with a contextual depiction of the tug-of-war between the supranational and the national judiciaries, juxtaposing the earlier confrontations with contemporary debates and controversies. Subsequently, attention is drawn to the sustained imperfections of the judicial selection and appointment process, addressing a few pervasive questions of institutional propriety. Hereafter, the article engages in a meta-analysis of ongoing discussions on the quality of the case law, testing the veracity of popular contentions pertaining to its constant variability. Lastly, it canvasses the pressures and agitations internal to the CJEU that have become increasingly manifest since the creation of the Court of First Instance. Overall, this fourfold re-appraisal aims to put back on record some of the B-sides on the sountrack of the new legal order, so as to compensate for the lack of airplay they have received hitherto.

This article proposes the “muting” of the SGP, the framework of rules that the EU has implemented since the coming into being of the European Monetary Union in the fiscal domain. It is argued herein that the system is far from being credible, from the perspective of the law-as-credibility paradigm. Therefore, the legal condition of the SGP should be “muted”. Three proposals to legally mute the SGP are examined in this article. The Open Method of Coordination is used as a useful model that could be followed from now on in the EU fiscal field. The gains in terms of legal credibility would argue in favour of the muting of the SGP and its correlative conversion into an OMC-like system.

The article addresses the role market definition can play for EU competition practice in the platform economy. The focus is on intermediaries that bring together groups of users whose decisions are interdependent, which therefore are commonly referred to as ‘two-sided platforms’. We address challenges to market definition that accompany these cross-group network effects, assess current practice in a number of competition cases, and provide guidance for adapting practice to properly account for the economic forces shaping markets with two-sided platforms. We ask whether and when a single market can be defined that encompasses both sides. We advocate a multi-markets approach that takes account of cross-market linkages, acknowledges the existence of zero-price markets, and properly accounts for the homing behaviour of market participants.

This article provides a constitutionally grounded understanding of the vexing principle of ‘national procedural autonomy’ that haunts the vindication of EU law in national court. After identifying tensions and confusion in the debate surrounding this purported principle of ‘autonomy’, the Article turns to the foundational text and structure of Union law to reconstruct the proper constitutional basis for deploying or supplanting national procedures and remedies. It further argues that much of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be considered through the lens of ‘prudential avoidance’, ie the decision to avoid difficult constitutional questions surrounding the principle of conferral. As the last Part shows, a constitutional understanding of ‘national procedural authority’—not ‘autonomy’—helps clear up some persistent puzzles, and provides critical guidance for when deference to national procedures and remedies is appropriate, and when such deference is misplaced. Comparative references inform the argument along the way.

The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists.

In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved.

It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.

This article explores the European Parliament's July 2018 non-legislative resolution proposing to the European Commission a directive for facilitating social enterprise companies’ cross-border activities. The proposal is first situated within the context of the social economy and how the sector has grown in importance to European integration. The proposal and the European Commission's response are then examined. Although the European Commission was not convinced that Member States would be amenable to the proposal, a consensus may already exist that is sufficient to garner their support. Even if this prediction is wrong, however, it is argued that there are reasons to surmise that the proposal will likely be reassessed and ultimately successful at some future point. Finally, the proposal is viewed with a reflexive harmonisation lens. Through the analysis, regulatory issues are identified, and a solution is then suggested.

This article proposes two broad ways to conceptualise EU competition law. EU competition law could be viewed as ‘autonomous law’ (‘AL’), namely as a closed normative system a technocratic tool consisting in a set of rules that prohibit undue restraints of trade. Or, EU competition law could be viewed as ‘responsive law’ (‘RL’), namely as a relatively open normative system and an interpretive practice that oscillates between openness and integrity. The responsiveness approach offers a compelling conceptualisation as it explains certain endogenous features of EU competition law: its fuzzy mandate, conceptually elastic vocabulary, and use of rules and standards. In addition, the responsiveness approach can clarify the role economics plays in EU competition law. It views economics as an ‘ideological science’, which, even though it cannot insulate this legal field from value disagreements and make it ‘autonomous’, it can provide a source for positive and normative interpretive statements. On this basis the responsiveness approach maintains that EU competition law is by design open—ie conceptually elastic and factually sensitive—and that its openness can enhance, but also undermine its integrity—ie its capacity to realise its objective in a rule of law compatible manner. These conflicts between openness and integrity are the cause of EU competition law's relative indeterminacy. To deal with the problem of indeterminacy, the RL approach proposes a tripartite legal-institutional modus operandi consisting in constructive interpretation, responsive enforcement, and catalytic adjudication. Hence, considering EU competition law as a form of responsive law has three major implications: first, it offers a new way for understanding how this legal field works and changes; second, it suggests a strategy for dealing with EU competition law's indeterminacy, and third it proposes a new framing for the discursive practices of EU competition law's epistemic community.

Cooperation with third countries on readmission has occupied an increasingly prominent place in the EU's migration management strategy. The EU and its Member States have progressively concluded an extensive set of bilateral and multilateral, binding and non-binding, cooperation instruments on readmission. This proliferation questions the field's coherence with the principle of sincere cooperation, governing the interplay between the Union's and Member States’ action. By taking this principle as a benchmark, the article highlights the ineffective nature of the current ‘unprincipled’ pursuit of readmission goals. It also demonstrates that sincere cooperation—if read together with subsidiarity—does not necessarily favour the Union's international action, to the detriment of the Member States’. Rather, it requires a good faith effort to identify, and stand by, the most effective level of action.

In the last decade, EU competition law reached a major turning point in its history. Anti-competitive object became an elusive and unpredictable rule, which boosts the risk of false positives and has a significant chilling effect. This article analyses this metamorphosis and the social damages it is causing, and proposes an alternative conception. The article demonstrates that the emerging new concept of anti-competitive object erroneously conflates ‘contextual analysis’, which has been part of the object-inquiry from the outset, and ‘effects-analysis’, which has no role to play here. It submits that both doctrinal and policy reasons confirm that anti-competitive object should be a category-building principle of ‘judicial rule-making’ (‘definition of the definition’) and not applicable to individual arrangements directly.

This article will place the 2020 amendments to the Russian Constitution in comparative perspective. Although these amendments were officially justified as strengthening the Russian state in order to tackle emerging new problems, they constitutionalise already-existing legislative trends from the last twenty years. They therefore do little to overcome existing problems of Russian state building. What was the reform process about then? It was intended to project the image of reform by involving the people in a staged process of constitutional change while further entrenching the power of the current political elite. The constitutional reforms therefore demonstrate the symbolic role that constitutional law can play in seeking to ensure the survival of mature or later-stage forms of authoritarian populism. This kind of ‘theatrical constitution-making’ is a broader reminder of how the expressive aspects of constitutional change can be (ab)used by established authoritarian regimes.

In recent years, a platform economy has emerged that is dominated by undertakings such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft. They have established a form of private governance vis-à-vis their consumers and customers by means of standard terms that create a risk of exploitation. This trend clashes with the internal market effort of the EU that is predicated on consumer rights and fair competition to address market failures such as market power, information asymmetry, and asymmetrical contractual dependency. In this article we examine how the resulting tensions can be addressed by means of EU competition and contract law. This is based on enforcing fairness by requiring (1) the implementation of proportionality—balancing interests—and (2) respect of the duty of care, in the sense of compliance by design. Jointly this can be seen as an expression of accountability that needs to be made explicit. Apart from pre-existing case law and legislation, we take into account the December 2020 Commission proposals for platform regulation, as well as behavioural insights into consumer behaviour.