This chapter recounts some of the most important work that has been achieved or is ongoing: at global level (in the United Nations system); at regional level (especially in the African, American, and European human rights systems); by the International Committee of the Cross; and especially by pioneering civil society organizations (local and international human rights bodies). Thus, for instance, the seminal role of Amnesty International in promoting the adoption and implementation of a global treaty on the prohibition of torture—and drawing attention to the problem of torture more broadly—cannot be overstated.

The US-driven and NGO-mediated prosecutorial approach to address trafficking prioritizes efforts to convict the accused and foregrounds victim-witness testimony as the central piece of evidence to do so. Though training rescued women to testify against alleged traffickers is thus a key component of donor-driven NGOs’ efforts, the author’s ethnographic research revealed that this is a rare occurrence. This chapter explores the multiple and complex reasons why most rescued women don’t testify, by situating them in the broader Indian sociolegal context. In juxtaposition, it tracks the case of a trafficked woman, Sunaina Das, who testified for the prosecution in a New Delhi trial court, to also explore the constellation of factors that lead some women to testify and the challenges they face. It follows Sunaina’s encounters with the Indian criminal justice system and the support she received from both NGOs and Indian legal actors. Finally, it explores how an NGO-led training session for Indian judges impacted her case. Through these contributions, this chapter challenges prevalent assumptions in global anti-trafficking campaigns about the victimhood of Global South sex workers, about criminal justice necessarily benefiting trafficked sex workers, and about the Indian criminal justice system necessarily lacking the ability to address sex trafficking.

This chapter studies the interaction between human rights lawyers and activists and political policing in China. While coercion is key to authoritarian governance, coercive and repressive measures in and of themselves do not produce regime resilience and deliver orders, compliance, and effective governance that is commonly observed in China. This chapter examines the systemic use of “soft repression,” which is preventive and preemptive in nature, characterized by surveillance, early intervention, and political persuasion. The process is informal and interactive i nwhich the Chinese political policing systems bring government pressure and other non-state forces to bear on target groups and individuals to achieve compliance. Subtle intimidation, consent under duress, relational repression, and voluntary detention, all hallmarks of China’s political policing, which is referred to as coercive political persuasion, have worked to constrain legitimate advocacy without frequently resorting to direct violence or blatant violation of legal rules.

In this chapter, we examine the role of NGO activism as a driver of sustainability. Such activism offers opportunities and poses challenges to firms; examining the role of activism is important to appreciate the broader question of what makes businesses more sustainable and more socially responsible. We provide an overview of what activist NGOs are and explore ways by which they seek to influence corporate policies, ranging from collaboration and partnerships to contestation and protest. We then discuss which firms are more likely to encounter NGO activism as not all firms are equally susceptible to NGO activism. Firm size, industry and visibility to consumers are important elements, as well as their historical record on CSR and sustainability issues. Finally, we discuss how firms may respond to NGO activism. For a firm to take responsibility implies that it moves beyond the defence of its own economic interests, to consider the questions of what kind of corporation the firm wishes to be, what role in society it aspires to fulfil and how to relate to its various stakeholders. Ultimately, these are questions of ethics.

In 2005, voters in Zimbabwe performed their civic duty in the seventh election since 1980. The preceding three years were crucial to understanding the 2005 election. Many sources of violence existed in this intervening time, influenced by the referendum vendetta, the continuing land reform process, and the apparent bitterness engendered by the 2000 and 2002 election outcomes. It was crystal clear that Zanu PF’s first weapon of choice in elections was stick rather than carrot. Zanu PF viewed MDC voters as minors and Western stooges and its own supporters as adults of unquestionable loyalty and obedience. State patronage and state-sponsored violence had always taken centre stage before, during and after elections. The violent May 2005 Operation Murambatsvina was a largely state-sponsored campaign (with support from some businesses) to stifle dissent and independent economic and political activity in the country’s urban areas. The main victims of Murambatsvina were younger and unemployed, whom state security agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest. The extent of Zimbabwe’s poor human rights record was exposed by new information technology and increased reporting. As Zimbabwe prepared for the 31 March 2005 parliamentary election, Zanu PF’s campaign was decidedly violent and anti-Western.

This chapter explores the conditions under which global elites are influential in shaping citizens’ legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. It distinguishes between member governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations as three sets of global elites, evaluates whether these elites impact legitimacy beliefs through their communication, and identifies the conditions under which such communication is more successful. The chapter examines theoretical expectations comparatively across five prominent global or regional international organizations, including the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations. At the heart of the empirical investigation is a survey-embedded experiment in three countries (Germany, the UK, and the US). The analysis shows that communication by more credible elites (member governments and NGOs) has stronger effects on citizens’ legitimacy perceptions than communication by less credible elites (international organizations themselves).

This chapter surveys the rapid growth of globe-spanning organizations and institutions over the past 120 years – from the League of Nations to the UN to today’s International Criminal Court and European Union. Spurred by the world wars, economic crises, and environmental disasters of the twentieth century, humanity has already come much farther than most people realize in building innovative instruments of global concertation and crisis management. Therefore, the pathways of constructive change that lie ahead of us can best be understood as continuations and extensions of the remarkable gains already achieved. Four institutions – OECD, UN, NATO, and EU – exemplify distinct levels of rising integration across national boundaries. Institutions such as International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have offered powerful new pathways for citizens’ concerted action beyond borders. The recently-adopted UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) reflects a newfound legitimacy of cross-border ethical obligations and proactive interventions to halt large-scale humanitarian disasters.

Although there has been little discussion of the issue in academic literature, at the least, NGOs are bound by jus cogens human rights norms, including the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life and on enforced disappearance. An NGO is not, however, formally defined under international law.

There is a complex set of political systems in Africa. While some countries democratized, particularly in the 1990s, others are run by authoritarian leaders. Some of the former have made efforts to strengthen their democracies whereas others have started to dismantle them. To understand these dynamics, this chapter scrutinizes the nature of the state, political orders, and democratization (attempts). It discusses the introduction of term limits (and their later abolishment) and strategies of leaders to stay in power: neopatrimonialism, violence and intimidation, electoral manipulation, as well as culture. There is a variety of actors operating in these systems besides the president, including the government, the public administration, parliamentarians, the military, judges, traditional leaders, and non-governmental organizations, all being discussed in this chapter.

Bangladesh’s elite had been decimated twice within a generation. In 1947 many upper-class, professional and entrepreneurial Hindus had left for India and they had been largely replaced by newcomers from West Pakistan. In 1971 these newcomers retreated to Pakistan amidst targeted killings of the delta’s professionals and intellectuals. As a result, independent Bangladesh started out with only a few people who had any experience in running state institutions or large enterprises. They needed all the help they could get.Suddenly they had to perform on the global stage. As a result, Bangladesh society rapidly developed new transnational links that would shape its future course. Especially influential were foreign aid and investment, mass migration and rapid advances in connectivity.

This chapter looks at the persuasion strategies and successes of INGOs. Building on the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, we examine to what extent the most capable INGOs engage in conflict warning (warner capacity), when and how they communicate warnings (communication and message factors) and how they are perceived by key recipients in media and policy-making (credibility and persuasiveness). Our investigation centres on Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group. These INGOs are atypical insofar as they belong to a small group of international ‘advocacy superpowers’. We draw on three sources of data: first, interviews with 154 practitioners from international and local NGOs and think-tanks plus a further 127 interviews with foreign affairs journalists and government/IO officials in the field of conflict prevention; second, a text analysis of the public warning output of these NGOs across six different conflict cases; and third, a recipient survey among analysts and officials active in different organisational contexts, most notably the EU, the United Kingdom and the UN.