Most research on intertemporal choice has examined choices between smaller, sooner gains and larger, later gains. A much smaller number of papers have examined intertemporal choices for losses. In this article, we explore whether mixed-sign choices with both gains and losses may better correlate with real-world behaviors. In two high-powered studies (pilot: N = 3,200; main study: N = 7,000), participants completed one of four normatively equivalent measures consisting of pure gain, pure loss, or mixed sign (Gain-Now-Loss-Later or Loss-Now-Gain-Later) intertemporal choices. Participants also self-reported a large number of demographic measures and real-world choice behaviors thought to be linked to intertemporal choice. The results indicate that (1) mixed-sign intertemporal choices yield more patient time preferences than pure-gain choices but less patient than pure-loss choices and (2) pure-gain intertemporal choices yield equivalent or superior predictive power across a range of real-world intertemporal choice behaviors.

We often forego a larger future reward in order to obtain a smaller reward immediately, known as impatient intertemporal choice. The current study investigated the role of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) as a mechanism contributing to impatient intertemporal choice, following a theoretical framework proposing that cues associated with immediate gratification trigger a Pavlovian approach response, interfering with goal-directed (instrumental) inhibitory behavior. We developed a paradigm in which participants first learned to make instrumental go/no-go responses in order to win rewards and avoid punishments. Next, they learned the associations between Pavlovian cues and rewards varying in amount and delay. Finally, we tested whether these (task-irrelevant) cues exerted transfer effects by influencing instrumental actions while participants again completed the go/no-go task. Across two experiments, Pavlovian cues associated with larger (versus smaller) and immediate (versus delayed) rewards were evaluated more positively, reflecting the successful acquisition of Pavlovian cue–outcome associations. These findings replicated the previously reported classical transfer effect of reward amount on instrumental behavior, as large (versus smaller) cues increased instrumental approach. In contrast, we found no evidence for the hypothesized transfer effects for reward delay, contrary to the proposed role of PIT in impatient intertemporal choice. These results suggest that although both reward amount and delay were important in the evaluation of cues, only the amount associated with cues influenced instrumental choice. We provide concrete suggestions for future studies, addressing instrumental outcome identity, competition between cue–amount and cue–delay associations, and individual differences in response to Pavlovian cues.

Delay discounting—the extent to which individuals show a preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards—has been proposed as a transdiagnostic neurocognitive process across mental health conditions, but its examination in relation to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is comparatively recent. To assess the aggregated evidence for elevated delay discounting in relation to posttraumatic stress, we conducted a meta-analysis on existing empirical literature. Bibliographic searches identified 209 candidate articles, of which 13 articles with 14 independent effect sizes were eligible for meta-analysis, reflecting a combined sample size of N = 6897. Individual study designs included case-control (e.g. examination of differences in delay discounting between individuals with and without PTSD) and continuous association studies (e.g. relationship between posttraumatic stress symptom severity and delay discounting). In a combined analysis of all studies, the overall relationship was a small but statistically significant positive association between posttraumatic stress and delay discounting (r = .135, p < .0001). The same relationship was statistically significant for continuous association studies (r = .092, p = .027) and case-control designs (r = .179, p < .001). Evidence of publication bias was minimal. The included studies were limited in that many did not concurrently incorporate other psychiatric conditions in the analyses, leaving the specificity of the relationship to posttraumatic stress less clear. Nonetheless, these findings are broadly consistent with previous meta-analyses of delayed reward discounting in relation to other mental health conditions and provide further evidence for the transdiagnostic utility of this construct.

Commitment contracts are a strategy for binding self-control failures, such as skipping a gym visit or breaking a dieting regime, to monetary penalties. Despite evidence that commitment contracts with stronger penalties improve self-control, they are relatively underused. Across 5 experiments, we find that decision makers are less likely to select commitment contracts with more severe penalties (i.e., anti-charity contracts) for themselves than they are for others. This self-other difference in contract choice arises because decision makers believe anti-charity contracts will be more effective for others than for themselves. Our results suggest that people recognize the potential effectiveness of using more aggressive commitment contracts to overcome self-control problems, but view themselves as an exception to that general rule.

The degree to which individuals prefer smaller sooner versus larger delayed rewards serves as a powerful predictor of their impulsivity towards a number of different kinds of rewards. Here we test the limits of its predictive ability within a variety of cognitive and social domains. Across several large samples of subjects, individuals who prefer smaller more immediate rewards (steeper discounters) are less reflective (or more impulsive) in their choices, preferences, and beliefs. First, steeper discounters used more automatic, less controlled choice strategies, giving more intuitive but incorrect responses on the Cognitive Reflection Test (replicating previous findings); employing a suboptimal probability matching heuristic for a one-shot gamble (rather than maximizing their probability of reward); and relying less on optimal planning in a two-stage reinforcement learning task. Second, steeper discounters preferred to consume information that was less complex and multi-faceted, as suggested by their self-reported Need for Cognitive Closure, their use of short-form social media (i.e., Twitter), and their preferred news sources (in particular, whether or not they preferred National Public Radio over other news sources). Third, steeper discounters had interpersonal and religious beliefs that are associated with reduced epistemic complexity: they were more likely to believe that the behavior of others could be explained by fixed rather than dynamic factors, and they believed more strongly in God and in the afterlife. Together these findings provide evidence for a link between individual differences in temporal discounting for monetary rewards and preferences for the path of least resistance (less reflective and/or more automatic modes of processing) across a variety of domains.

Similar to research on risky choice, the traditional analysis of intertemporal choice takes the view that an individual behaves so as to maximize the discounted sum of all future utilities. The well-known Allais paradox contradicts the fundamental postulates of maximizing the expected value or utility of a risky option. We describe a violation of the law of diminishing marginal utility as well as an intertemporal version of the Allais paradox.

People tend to prefer smaller and sooner (SS) rewards over larger and later (LL) ones even when the latter are much larger. Previous research have identified several ways to enhance people’s patience. Adding to this literature, the current paper demonstrates that introduction of upfront losses as well as gains to both SS and LL rewards can decrease people’s impatience. This effect is incompatible with both the normative exponential and descriptive hyperbolic discounting models, which agree on the additive assumption and the independence assumption. We also exculde the integration explanation which assumes subjects integrate upfront money with final rewards and make a decision with bottom line at the end. We consider several possible explanations, including the salience hypothesis, which states that introducing upfront money makes the money dimension more salient than not and thus increases the attractiveness of LL options.

Revealed preference is the dominant approach for inferring preferences, but it is limited in that it relies solely on discrete choice data. When a person chooses one alternative over another, we cannot infer the strength of their preference or predict how likely they will be to make the same choice again. However, the choice process also produces response times (RTs), which are continuous and easily observable. It has been shown that RTs often decrease with strength-of-preference. This is a basic property of sequential sampling models such as the drift diffusion model. What remains unclear is whether this relationship is sufficiently strong, relative to the other factors that affect RTs, to allow us to reliably infer strength-of-preference across individuals. Using several experiments, we show that even when every subject chooses the same alternative, we can still rank them based on their RTs and predict their behavior on other choice problems. We can also use RTs to predict whether a subject will repeat or reverse their decision when presented with the same choice problem a second time. Finally, as a proof-of-concept, we demonstrate that it is also possible to recover individual preference parameters from RTs alone. These results demonstrate that it is indeed possible to use RTs to infer preferences.

Recent research has shown that risk and reward are positively correlated in many environments, and that people have internalized this association as a “risk-reward heuristic”: when making choices based on incomplete information, people infer probabilities from payoffs and vice-versa, and these inferences shape their decisions. We extend this work by examining people’s expectations about another fundamental trade-off — that between monetary reward and delay. In 2 experiments (total N = 670), we adapted a paradigm previously used to demonstrate the risk-reward heuristic. We presented participants with intertemporal choice tasks in which either the delayed reward or the length of the delay was obscured. Participants inferred larger rewards for longer stated delays, and longer delays for larger stated rewards; these inferences also predicted people’s willingness to take the delayed option. In exploratory analyses, we found that older participants inferred longer delays and smaller rewards than did younger ones. All of these results replicated in 2 large-scale pre-registered studies with participants from a different population (total N = 2138). Our results suggest that people expect intertemporal choice tasks to offer a trade-off between delay and reward, and differ in their expectations about this trade-off. This “delay-reward heuristic” offers a new perspective on existing models of intertemporal choice and provides new insights into unexplained and systematic individual differences in the willingness to delay gratification.

Previous research has focused on studying the endowment effect for transactions that take place in the present. Many real-world transactions, however, are delayed into the future (i.e., people agree to buy or sell, but the actual transaction does not materialize until a later time). Here we investigate how transaction timing affects the endowment effect. In five studies, we show that the endowment effect systematically increases as transactions are delayed into the future. Specifically, buying prices significantly decrease as the transaction is delayed, while selling prices remain constant, resulting in an amplified endowment effect (Experiment 1). This pattern is not produced by a discounting of the money involved in the transaction (Experiment 2), and it holds across different types of items (Experiment 3). We also show that the phenomenon cannot be explained by sellers anticipating becoming increasingly attached to the items over time (Experiment 4). Finally, we demonstrate that this increased endowment effect in the future holds in the field, in the context of a real market and with real transactions (Experiment 5).

We examine how adding an Attractive but Unattainable Alternative (AUA) to a set of available but less attractive alternatives influences evaluations of near vs. distant future sets of alternatives. According to Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008) including an AUA would decrease the attractiveness of near future sets, but may increase the attractiveness of distant future sets. In four studies participants imagined a choice situation with three alternatives. For some participants a fourth alternatives was added, which was attractive but unattainable. Half of the participants in each condition imagined making a decision in the near future whereas others imagined making the decision in the distant future. Participants then evaluated the attractiveness of the entire set of alternatives, as well as of each alternative separately. We examined choices between jobs, computers and roommates. The last study examined negotiations with the landlord about an apartment. Consistent with our hypothesis, an AUA increased the evaluation of the distant set and decreased the evaluation of the near set.

Executing an important decision can be as easy as moving a mouse cursor or reaching towards the preferred option with a hand. But would we decide differently if choosing required walking a few steps towards an option? More generally, is our preference invariant to the means and motor costs of reporting it? Previous research demonstrated that asymmetric motor costs can nudge the decision-maker towards a less costly option. However, virtually all traditional decision-making theories predict that increasing motor costs symmetrically for all options should not affect choice in any way. This prediction is disputed by the theory of embodied cognition, which suggests that motor behavior is an integral part of cognitive processes, and that motor costs can affect our choices. In this registered report, we investigated whether varying motor costs can affect response dynamics and the final choices in an intertemporal choice task: choosing between a readily available small reward and a larger but delayed reward. Our study compared choices reported by moving a computer mouse cursor towards the preferred option with the choices executed via a more motor costly walking procedure. First, we investigated whether relative values of the intertemporal choice options affect walking trajectories in the same way as they affect mouse cursor dynamics. Second, we tested a hypothesis that, in the walking condition, increased motor costs of a preference reversal would decrease the number of changes-of-mind and therefore increase the proportion of impulsive, smaller-but-sooner choices. We confirmed the hypothesis that walking trajectories reflect covert dynamics of decision making, and rejected the hypothesis that increased motor costs of responding affect decisions in an intertemporal choice task. Overall, this study contributes to the empirical basis enabling the decision-making theories to address the complex interplay between cognitive and motor processes.

Mathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studyingchoice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposedover the long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. Theexistence of so many models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy,obscuring key insights into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about theessential properties of preferential choice. We provide a synthesis of formalmodels of risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal choice, three importantdomains in decision making. We identify recurring insights discovered byscholars of different generations and different disciplines across these threedomains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing models asinvolving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computationalproperties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical developmentin decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities anddifferences between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses andempirical tests.

In this investigation, we test whether temporal discounting is domain-specific (i.e., compared to other people, can an individual have a relatively high discount rate for one type of reward but a relatively low discount rate for another?), and we examine whether individual differences in the types of rewards one finds tempting explain domain-specificity in discount rates. Adults discounted delayed rewards they found particularly tempting (defined as the visceral attraction to and enjoyment of a reward) more steeply than did adults who did not find the rewards as tempting, contrary to what might be expected from the magnitude effect. Furthermore, we found significant group by domain interactions (e.g., chip lovers who do not like beer have relatively high discount rates for chips and relatively low discount rates for beer, whereas beer lovers who do not like chips showed the opposite pattern). These results suggest that domain-specificity in temptation partially accounts for corresponding domain-specificity in temporal discounting.

Increasingly, we can invest in projects that are distributed around the world through online investment platforms. Will the spatial distance between these projects and ourselves affect our investment preferences? The present research aims to experimentally examine the impact of spatial distance on intertemporal preferences for investment returns and to explore the underlying mediating effect of the sense of control. Three studies were devised to address this topic. Studies 1 and 2 used two methods to manipulate the spatial distance between the location of investment projects and the location of investors. Participants were more impatient with investment returns when the investment project was located farther away. In other words, they preferred lower but earlier returns in intertemporal choice. Moreover, participants’ sense of control over the investment project mediated the relationship between spatial distance and intertemporal preferences. Using a priming method, Study 3 showed that participants’ impatience for investment returns in investments with different spatial distances could be remedied by giving them generalized control. Theoretical implications for studies regarding psychological distance and intertemporal decision making and practical implications for investments are discussed.

Prior studies have found that subjects prefer an improving sequence of incomeover a constant sequence, even if the constant sequence offers a largerpresent-discounted value. However, little is known about how these preferencesvary with the size of the wage payments. In each of four studies, we find apositive relationship between the preference for increasing payments and thesize of the payments. We find no evidence that our measure of the decreasingmarginal utility of money is associated with this relationship. Additionally, wefind weak evidence in support of a theoretical prediction that the differencebetween the preference for increasing wage payments and the preference forincreasing nonwage payments will be largest for intermediate amounts. We do notfind a relationship between the preference for increasing payments and thepreference for improving nonmonetary sequences. Finally, the relationshipbetween the preference for increasing payments and the size of the payments doesnot appear to be sensitive to the precise specification of the increases.

Intertemporal choices involve tradeoffs between outcomes that occur at different times. Most of the research has used pure gains tasks and the discount rates yielding from those tasks to explain and predict real-world behaviors and consequences. However, real decisions are often more complex and involve mixed outcomes (e.g., sooner-gain and later-loss or sooner-loss and later-gain). No study has used mixed gain-loss intertemporal tradeoff tasks to explain and predict real-world behaviors and consequences, and studies involving such tasks are also scarce. Considering that tasks involving a combination of gains and losses may yield different discount rates and that existing pure gains tasks do not explain or predict real-world outcomes well, this study conducted two experiments to compare the discount rates of mixed gain-loss intertemporal tradeoffs with those of pure gains or pure losses (Experiment 1) and to examine whether these tasks predicted different real-world behaviors and consequences (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 suggests that the discount rate ordering of the four tasks was, from highest to lowest, pure gains, sooner-loss and later-gain, pure losses, and sooner-gain and later-loss. Experiment 2 indicates that the evidence supporting the claim that the discount rates of the four tasks were related to different real-world behaviors and consequences was insufficient.

In “The value of nothing: asymmetric attention to opportunity costs drives intertemporal decision making” Read, Olivola and Hardisty (2017) proposed an asymmetric subjective opportunity cost (ASOC) effect to explain and predict why impatience can be detected in intertemporal choice. This work deserves to be replicated and extended for its novel and potentially important findings. The present study aimed to examine the reliability and robustness of the evidence presented by Read et al. by conducting precise replications of their key findings in Study 1. The ASOC effect (Read, et al., 2017) was important for expanding its application and reported to be typically stronger when baseline larger-but-later option (LL) and smaller-but-sooner option (SS) preferences were closer to 50% in the authors’ original condition. Therefore, the present study also aimed to replicate and test the ASOC effect when baseline LL preferences were higher or lower than those in the original condition. We intended to set two additional conditions wherein either LL or SS is more obviously favored (i.e., baseline LL preferences were higher or lower than those in the original condition) by respectively applying the common difference effect (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995) and the unit effect (Burson, Larrick & Lynch Jr., 2009; Pandelaere, Briers & Lembregts, 2011). Having successfully generated two more obviously favored conditions, the ASOC effect was replicated and confirmed under the original condition and one additional condition wherein SS was more obviously favored. However, the ASOC effect was not detected under the other additional condition wherein LL was more obviously favored. The implications of these findings were discussed.

Recently, Scholten and Read (2014) found new violations of dominance in intertemporal choice. Although adding a small receipt before a delayed payment or adding a small delayed receipt after an immediate receipt makes the prospect objectively better, it decreases the preference for that prospect (better is worse). Conversely, although adding a small payment before a delayed receipt or adding a small delayed payment after an immediate payment makes the prospect objectively worse, it increases the preference for that prospect (worse is better). Scholten and Read explained these violations in terms of a preference for improvement. However, to produce violations such as these, we find that the temporal sequences need not be constructed as Scholten and Read suggested. In this study, adding a small receipt before a dated receipt (thus constructed as improving) or adding a receipt after a dated payment (thus constructed as improving) decreases preferences for those prospects. Conversely, adding a small payment after a dated receipt (thus constructed as deteriorating) or adding a small payment before a delayed payment (thus constructed as deteriorating) increases preferences for those prospects.

When making decisions that involve tradeoffs between the quality and timing of desirable outcomes, people consistently discount the value of future outcomes. A puzzling finding regarding such decisions is the extremely high rate at which people discount future monetary outcomes. Most economists would argue that decision-makers should turn down only rates of return that are lower than those available to them elsewhere. Yet the vast majority of studies find discount rates that are significantly higher than market interest rates (Frederick et al., 2002). Here we ask whether a lack of knowledge about the normative strategy can explain high discount rates. In an initial experiment, nearly half of subjects did not spontaneously cite elements of the normative strategy when asked how people should make intertemporal monetary decisions. In two follow-up experiments, after subjects read a “financial guide” detailing the normative strategy, discount rates declined by up to 85%, but were still higher than market interest rates. This decline persisted, though attenuated, for at least one month. In a final experiment, peer-generated advice influenced discount rates in a similar manner to “expert” advice, and arguments focusing on normative considerations were at least as effective as others. These studies show that part of the explanation for high discount rates is a lack of knowledge regarding the normative strategy, and they quantify how much discount rates are reduced in response to normative arguments. Given the high level of discounting that remains, however, there are other contributing factors to high discount rates that remain to be quantified.