Disseminating data is a core mission of international organizations. The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), in particular, have become a main data source for research and policy-making. Due to their extensive lending activities, the BWIs often find themselves in a position to assist and pressure governments to increase the amount of economic data that they provide. In this study, we explore the association between loans from the BWIs and an index of economic transparency derived from the data-reporting practices of governments to the World Bank. Using a matching method for causal inference with panel data complemented by a multilevel regression analysis, we examine, separately, loan commitments and disbursements from the IMF and the World Bank. The multilevel regression analysis finds a significant association between BWI loans and the improvement of economic transparency in all developing countries; the matching method identifies a causal effect in democracies.

Using archival material from states, international organizations, and business actors, this paper explores how the Association for the Promotion and Protection of Private Foreign Investments (APPI), a transnational business interest association (BIA), liaised with different international institutions to lobby for better foreign investment protection. We zoom in on the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank to examine how APPI influenced the global institutional landscape during its heydays from 1958 until 1974. We show that business actors, particularly oil and banking corporations, created APPI as a nimble, efficient alliance that could move faster than existing BIAs. We further demonstrate how companies “forum shop” between different BIAs, and how APPI injected its ideas into the policymaking process, using the framework of the three faces of power. By shedding light on the role private business actors played in foreign investor protection, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the emergence of global economic governance in the second half of the 20th century.

Many international organizations (IOs) rely on voluntary contributions from member states and private actors to fund their operations. Donations from individuals are a significant and increasing income source for these IOs, who rely on marketing strategies such as celebrity endorsement, in the form of Goodwill Ambassadors, to help raise funds. Little is known, however, about the effectiveness of this strategy in the context of IOs although intuition from literatures in marketing and psychology suggests that celebrity endorsement should be effective. We conduct a survey experiment to investigate the effectiveness of Goodwill Ambassadors and, contrary to expectations, find no average effect of celebrity endorsement on donations to, and interest in, IOs and only limited effects among certain sub-groups. We speculate that the context of IOs makes it harder to generate the type of connection between celebrity and cause necessary to make endorsement effective and suggest that further investigation is needed.

The law of international organizations is often described in terms of both its universality and its unity. Writers in this field begin their texts with an acknowledgement that there are common legal principles that have been developed by, and can be applied to, a variety of international organizations. The idea that there are legal principles applicable to multiple organizations – whatever their membership, location, powers, technical functions, or financial resources – is also implicit in the reports of the International Law Commission discussing the immunities, responsibilities, and law-making capacity of international organizations. But despite this search for common principles, a question remains whether international institutional law is based on the practice of all, or at the very least, a range, of organizations. Writers in this field have tended to focus on the activities of organizations based in either Europe or North America, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the European Union, and Council of Europe. This article argues that the omission of the principles and practices of organizations outside Europe and the United Nations’ system, specifically Asia Pacific organizations, undermines the claim of international institutional law to be universal. It explores the way in which a more inclusive approach – one that pays attention to the perspectives of Asia Pacific organizations – could illuminate certain features of the law and lead international lawyers to reconceive some of its central principles.

This study explores how race impacts the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Specifically, we examine whether the representation of Black people in IO leadership positions influences perceptions of IO legitimacy among Black and white individuals. To do so, we fielded seven survey experiments in two racially diverse countries, South Africa and the United States, and three experiments in one predominantly Black country, Kenya. Our experiments were designed to distinguish the effects of an IO leader's race from their region of origin. We find that Black IO leadership enhances perceptions of institutional legitimacy among Black citizens, but does not strongly influence the legitimacy perceptions of their white counterparts. Our findings suggest that improving the representation of historically marginalized racial groups within IOs can enhance their popular legitimacy.

Scholars of International Organizations (IOs) increasingly use elite surveys to study the preferences and decisions of policymakers. When designing these surveys, one central concern is low statistical power, because respondents are typically recruited from a small and inaccessible population. However, much of what we know about how to incentivize elites to participate in surveys is based on anecdotal reflections, rather than systematic evidence on which incentives work best. In this article, we study the efficacy of three incentives in a preregistered experiment with World Bank staff. These incentives were the chance to win an Amazon voucher, a donation made to a relevant charity, and a promise to provide a detailed report on the findings. We find that no incentive outperformed the control group, and the monetary incentive decreased the number of respondents on average by one-third compared to the control group (from around 8% to around 5%).

This article investigates how superpower rivalry affects public perceptions of international organization (IO) legitimacy in the hegemon. We argue that the representation of a superpower rival state at an IO in the form of its key decision maker's nationality can dampen the IO's perceived legitimacy within the rival power. We test this argument using a survey experiment in the United States under President Trump, where we manipulate the nationality of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judge who casts a tie-breaking vote against the United States. Our results show that when the judge is Chinese, there is a strong and robust dampening of Americans’ perceptions of the ICJ's legitimacy, with no comparable effect arising when the judge is from other countries, including Russia. Replication of the experiment in the United States under President Biden offers external validity for our findings, which may have important implications for the future of the liberal international order.

CJEU case law has long emphasized the autonomy of the EU legal order, recently triggering the foreclosure of intra-EU investment arbitration. Though academic discourse has treated this as a European peculiarity, autonomy is not unfamiliar to international law as an inherent attribute of all international organizations (IOs). This Article traces how the CJEU employed this as the basis for the development of a legal principle of significant constitutional role in safeguarding the EU’s jurisdictional integrity. First, It considers the EU conception of autonomy on the basis of two identified dimensions of IOs’ autonomy under international law. Political autonomy characterizes the scope of an IO’s powers and its independent legal personality. Institutional autonomy denotes its (im)permeability to external norms. Second, the Article examines autonomy’s different normative status under international and EU law as a legal notion and a constitutional principle, respectively. Rather than viewing the latter as an EU invention, it amounts to a Pygmalian judicial creation—the CJEU drew inspiration from a notion of international law and adapted it within the Union framework. The Article justifies these adaptations by reference to international law in light of the EU’s institutional-judicial architecture and the intertwining of autonomy with, inter alia, Article 2 TEU values.