In a series of academic publications, Edward Nelson has contended that from the 1950s until the late 1970s, UK policymakers failed to recognise the primacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation. He argues that the highwater mark of monetary policy neglect occurred in the 1970s. This thesis has been rejected by Duncan Needham who has explored several experiments with monetary policy from the late 1960s and challenged the assertion that the authorities neglected monetary policy during the 1970s. Drawing on evidence from the archives and other sources, this article documents how the UK authorities wrestled with monetary policy following the 1967 devaluation of sterling. Excessive broad money growth during the early 1970s was followed by the highest level of peacetime inflation by 1975. The article shows that despite the experiments with monetary policy, a nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the mindset of policymakers during the first half of the 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s there was a change in emphasis and monetary policy became more prominent in economic policymaking, particularly when money supply targets were introduced. Despite this, the nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the decision processes of policymakers during the 1970s.

This paper develops a monetary R&D-driven endogenous growth model featuring endogenous innovation scales and the price-marginal cost markup. To endogenize the step size of quality improvement, we propose a tradeoff mechanism between the risk of innovation failure and the benefit of innovation success in R&D firms. Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth; however, its relationship with social welfare is ambiguous. Second, either strengthening patent protection or raising the professional knowledge of R&D firms leads to an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Third, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal in view of the social welfare maximum. Finally, our numerical analysis indicates that the extent of patent protection and the level of an R&D firm’s professional knowledge play a crucial role in determining the optimal interest rate.

This paper identifies several ways in which “measurement matters” in detecting quantity-theoretic linkages between money growth and inflation in recent data from the Euro Area, United Kingdom, and USA. Elaborating on the “Barnett critique,” it uses Divisia aggregates in place of their simple-sum counterparts to gauge the effects that monetary expansion or contraction is having on inflationary pressures. It also uses one-sided time series filtering techniques to track, in real time, slowly shifting trends in velocity and real economic growth that would otherwise weaken the statistical money growth-inflation relationship. Finally, it documents how measures of inflation based on GDP were distorted severely, especially in the EA and UK, during the 2020 economic closures. Using measures based on consumption instead, estimates from the P-star model confirm that changes in money growth have strong predictive power for subsequent movements in inflation.

The 1922 Rand Rebellion was the only instance of worker protest in the twentieth century in which a modern state used tanks and military airplanes, as well as mounted infantry, to suppress striking workers. These circumstances were unprecedented in their own time and for most of the century. The compressed and intensely violent rebellion of twenty thousand white mineworkers in South Africa’s gold mines had several overlapping features. Within a matter of days—from 6 to 12 March—it went from a general strike to a racial pogrom and insurrection against the government of Prime Minister Jan Smuts. Throughout all these twists and turns, the battle standard remained, “Workers of the world unite and fight for a White South Africa!” Race and violence were integral features of South Africa’s industrial history, but they do not explain the moments when discrete groups of people chose to use them as weapons or bargaining tools. At the close of the First World War, for instance, South Africa’s white mine workers demanded a more comprehensive distribution of the privileges of white supremacy, but in a manner that was both violent and contentious. Consequently, South Africa’s immediate postwar period became one of the most violent moments in its history.

We examine financial literacy in Germany and its relevance for financial wellbeing. Using data from the Panel on Household Finances collected in 2021, we show that about 62% of German households answer the Big Three financial literacy questions correctly. Those with lower education, who are out of the labor force, women, and those living in East Germany have lower levels of financial literacy. Identifying groups with lower financial literacy and developing strategies to reach them and enhance their abilities should therefore be an integral part of the German national financial literacy strategy. Financial literacy is linked to financial wellbeing: we document that those with higher financial literacy have a higher stock market participation rate and are less likely to report financial difficulties.

We provide new evidence about US monetary policy using a model that: (i) estimates time-varying monetary policy weights without relying on stylized theoretical assumptions; (ii) allows for endogenous breakdowns in the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and output; and (iii) generates a unique measure of monetary policy activism that accounts for economic instability. The joint incorporation of endogenous time-varying uncertainty about the monetary policy parameters and the stability of the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and output materially reduces the probability of determinate monetary policy. The average probability of determinacy over the period post-1982 to 1997 is below 60% (hence well below seminal estimates of determinacy probabilities that are close to unity). Post-1990, the average probability of determinacy is 75%, falling to approximately 60% when we allow for typical levels of trend inflation.

The Economic Freedom of the World report measures five dimensions of economic freedom, one of them being Sound Money. Compared to where it had been in decades for most of the West, inflation skyrocketed in 2021. Yet the indicator which measures inflation in the most recent year barely budged due to how it is specified and parameterized. This paper explores potential improvements on the methodology, although ultimately only modest improvements are achieved over simply changing the value of inflation that corresponds to zero (the lowest index score) in the simplest linear specification.

We test the neutrality of nominal interest rates taking advantage of recent advances in quantitative financial history using the Schmelzing (2022) global nominal interest rate and inflation rate series (across eight centuries), for France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the USA. We pay attention to the integration and cointegration properties of the variables and use the bivariate autoregressive methodology proposed by King and Watson (1997). We argue that meaningful long-run neutrality tests can be performed only for three countries—Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom—and we find no evidence consistent with the neutrality of nominal interest rates.

This introduction to our themed section on social policy responses to the recent cost-of-living crisis spells out this topic and the key issues examined in the section’s main contributions before summarising their findings and overall contribution to the literature. More specifically, to frame this themed section, the present Introduction begins with a concise, up-to-date overview of the inflationary crisis that emerged in late 2021 and evolved throughout 2022 and the first half of 2023. It then charts, and reflects upon, the diversity of responses enacted in a variety of countries reflective of different models of welfare provision in Europe and North America.

As they were just coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, Southern European nations were confronted with a new shock to their economies – this time in the form of a steep rise in prices. This article describes and typifies the social policy responses and measures adopted in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain in response to rising inflation. We find that Southern European (SE) governments have put forward a substantive fiscal response – which compares well with that of its neighbours, and even with the previous crisis. The thrust of the response was targeted at limiting the pass-through of international energy prices to consumers. This was complemented, albeit to a lesser degree, with direct support to families. Nevertheless, we do find important differences concerning the weight given to (traditional) welfare transfers, and the role given to indexation mechanisms and wage increases. We also find important continuities with the model of crisis-response adopted during the pandemic.