This paper examines the critical concept of "reasonably foreseeable failures and misuse" in product design. The psychology of failures and the ethical/legal implications are highlighted. The approach aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges associated with integrating reasonably foreseeable user failure and misuse into the design process. By taking a proactive approach to failure and misuse, designers can not only increase product safety, but also stimulate innovation that takes into account a wide range of user behaviour, including in unexpected circumstances.

In applied sciences large-scale surveys are a popular means to acquire insights in the choices that people make in different contexts. In transportation research, for example, tens of thousands stated their choices between alternatives characterized by cost and time attributes. In this study I explore the extent to which the data acquired in such studies may exhibit the co-occurrence of different choice algorithms within such survey populations. For that purpose I propose a novel version of the outcome-oriented approach. It is applied to the outcomes of two Dutch value-of-time surveys. If the recorded choice patterns are viewed apart, most could be the result of several different algorithms, in line with the main criticism of the outcome-oriented approach. The novel version considers the causal relationships between an individual’s personal circumstances, his use of a particular algorithm and the resulting choice pattern. It employs inferential statistics for analyses of the frequencies of the expected and actually recorded choice patterns within groups of respondents. Applied to the Dutch survey results this allowed disentangling, at the aggregate level, the overlap in explaining compensatory and non-compensatory algorithms to a large extent. It revealed that weighted additive (WADD) algorithms incorporating different degrees of loss aversion could explain most recorded choice behaviour while none of the many non-compensatory algorithms that were considered yielded a more than marginal explanation. Replications of this study, preferably by re-analysing other large-scale surveys with more complicated choice sets, is recommended to find out whether or not these findings are incidental.

It is a well-known fact that humans are subject to circadian alterations caused by the action of sunlight. This strongly affects their behaviour and skill, making them change their level of alertness from high at daytime to low at night-time. Taking into account this biological feature, and considering that commercial shipping is one of the oldest round-the-clock activities, raises the question whether bridge watchkeepers can carry out their tasks on night shifts with the same level of alertness as on day shifts. Furthermore, night bridge watchkeeping has to be performed in darkness or very dim light to improve the visual capacity of lookouts. A sample of vessel collisions was analysed and it was find out that this kind of accident tends to be more frequent and more serious during the darkness period of the solar day.

Naval maritime operations entail a permanent concern for safety, ensuring that all crew members receive the necessary information on time. This implies the existence of specific training for improving non-technical skills (NTS). This paper proposes that bridge resource management (BRM) may be determinant for the success of naval maritime operations. Through a literature review on NTS, maritime team training and BRM, the paper presents insights about the way the level of NTS, inherent to BRM, may be determinant for naval officers to operate in safety. We propose that human error may be minimised and safety maximised in military teams operating in the maritime environment through the implementation of an NTS training programme. The paper offers an insight into the importance of safety during maritime operations, focusing on recent international orientations about training requirements, proposing that implementing BRM will be pivotal for the future of the military navy context.

Evidence for the existence of risk compensation behaviour in the operation of vessels is shown in the paper The Risk Homeostasis Theory (Baniela and Ríos, 2010). In that analysis, it is concluded that the people engaged in the commercial affairs of ships tend to exchange the level of safety standard of vessels for a more profitable and riskier activity, which makes the rate of shipping accidents fluctuate within certain limits. Since the different levels of power and motivation of those involved in the risk-taking process were not considered in that research, it is the aim of this paper to analyse, on the one hand, how the pressure of the shipping market influences the risk behaviour of shipping business decision-makers and to show, on the other hand, how this influence makes them alter their target level of risk and introduce risks related to low operating cost strategies on vessels. This behavioural adaptation to the shipping market demand has led the human element to be regarded as a factor of risk in the activity of commercial vessels. In this context, the increasing incidence of human errors has arisen as a consequence of practices and manning policies established by the managers of shipping companies.

An in-depth understanding of human factors and human error is lacking in current research on seniors' falls. Additional knowledge is needed to understand why seniors are falling. The purpose of this article is to describe the adapting of the Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology (ISIM) (used for investigating transportation and industrial accidents) to studying seniors' falls. An adapted version—the Seniors Falls Investigative Methodology (SFIM)—uses a systems approach to take an investigation beyond the immediate cause of an incident and reveal unsafe acts and deeply imbedded unsafe conditions that contribute to adverse outcomes. An example case study is used to describe six phases of the investigative process in detail. The SFIM has the potential to identify safety deficiencies; utilize existing knowledge about falls; establish a standardized reporting system; shift focus from the faller to the system; and guide targeted prevention.

This paper discusses human error from two perspectives: errors made by operators on the one hand and errors made by designers and manufacturers of technological aids on the other. The question of operators' reliance on technological aids is discussed, as well as the concept of “overreliance” in connection with technologically aided presentation of navigational information. The accident investigation report following the grounding of the M/V Royal Majesty in 1995 is taken as an example. In that and many reports, designers and technology were not investigated as carefully as the operators on site. In that report, total responsibility for the accident was attributed to the mariners, while unreliable, incorrectly designed or incorrectly mounted technological aids, as well as the constructors, manufacturers and technical expertise behind it, were not investigated. This biased praxis when investigating human error is questioned and another investigative approach is suggested, in which operators and technology are treated equally and where the people behind the technologies can also be scrutinised. Such an approach would have a great beneficial impact on safety at sea.

The complexity of the modern systems providing health care presents a unique challenge in delivering care of the required quality in a safe environment. Issues of safety have been thrust into the limelight because of adverse events highly publicized in the general media.

In the United States of America, improving the safety and quality in health care has been set forth as a priority for improvements in the 21st century in the report from the Institute of Medicine. Many measures have now been initiated for improving the safety of patients at hospital, regional, and national level, and through initiatives sponsored by governments and private organizations. In this review, we summarize known concepts and current issues on the safety of patients, and their applicability to children with congenital cardiac disease. Prior to examining the issues of medical error and safety, it is important to define the terminology.

An error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended, also known as an execution error, or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim, this representing a planning error. An active error is an error that occurs at the level of the frontline operator, and the effects of which are felt immediately. A latent error is an error in the design, organization, training and maintenance, that leads to operator errors, and the effects of which are typically dormant in the system for lengthy periods of time. Latent errors may cause harm given the right circumstances and environment.

An adverse event is defined as an injury resulting from medical intervention. A preventable adverse event is an adverse event that occurs due to medical error. Negligent adverse events are a subset of preventable adverse events where the care provided did not meet the standard of care expected of that practitioner.

The study of improving the delivery of safe care for our patients is a rapidly growing field. Important components for development of programmes to improve the safety of patients include the leadership for the programme, the implementation of process design based on human limitations, the promotion of teamwork and function, the anticipation of unexpected events, and the creation of a learning environment.

Much is yet to be learned about the risk and incidence of adverse events during hospitalization of children with congenital cardiac disease. Errors due to human factors, such as poor communication, poor coordination, and suboptimal team work, have shown to be important causes of adverse outcomes in children undergoing cardiac surgery, and should be a focus for improvement. Future research on evaluating causes and prevention of medical errors and adverse events in this population at high risk, and consuming high resources, is essential.

Issues of inadequate safeguards for patients have been prominent in the media, and have been highlighted in reports from the Institute of Medicine. Our review discusses research on the causes of medical error, and proposes concepts to design successful programmes to improve safety for the patients on a local level.

This paper examines the recent introduction of the AIS to the ship's bridge and its potential impact on the safety of marine navigation. Research has shown that 80 to 85% of all recorded maritime accidents are directly due to human error or associated with human error. Safety is an important element of marine navigation and many people at different levels are involved in its management. The safe and efficient performance of joint systems, is heavily dependent upon how functions are allocated between the human and the machine. This paper investigates different regulations, supervision for proper use, training, and management of AIS users. It uses previous research and three separate AIS studies to identify problems. The potential of the AIS to cause problems is analysed. The classic human factor “Swiss Cheese” Model of system failure has been modified for the AIS to investigate a possible accident trajectory. The paper then concludes with recommendations and suggestions for improvements and further work.