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Automatic Identification System (AIS): Data Reliability and Human Error Implications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2007

Abbas Harati-Mokhtari ,
Alan Wall ,
Philip Brooks  and
Jin Wang
Abbas Harati-Mokhtari
Affiliation:
(Liverpool John Moores University, UK & Chabahar Maritime University, Iran) (Email: [email protected])
Alan Wall
Affiliation:
(Liverpool John Moores University, UK)
Philip Brooks
Affiliation:
(Liverpool John Moores University, UK)
Jin Wang
Affiliation:
(Liverpool John Moores University, UK)
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Abstract

This paper examines the recent introduction of the AIS to the ship's bridge and its potential impact on the safety of marine navigation. Research has shown that 80 to 85% of all recorded maritime accidents are directly due to human error or associated with human error. Safety is an important element of marine navigation and many people at different levels are involved in its management. The safe and efficient performance of joint systems, is heavily dependent upon how functions are allocated between the human and the machine. This paper investigates different regulations, supervision for proper use, training, and management of AIS users. It uses previous research and three separate AIS studies to identify problems. The potential of the AIS to cause problems is analysed. The classic human factor “Swiss Cheese” Model of system failure has been modified for the AIS to investigate a possible accident trajectory. The paper then concludes with recommendations and suggestions for improvements and further work.

Keywords

Human errorAISMarine navigation safetyTraining
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Navigation , Volume 60 , Issue 3 , September 2007 , pp. 373 - 389
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 2007

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