This article is Part II of a survey of Russia's position as one of the great powers and how it has evolved from 1815 to the present day. Part 1 ended on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (1941‒1945), and Part II begins where Part 1 left off, with some data on the Great Patriotic War and its influence on the USSR's position as a great power. It deals with post-war reconstruction and then considers the Cold War and post-Soviet Russia (1992‒2022). Attention is paid to Soviet economic policies, the reasons for the long-run decline in Soviet economic growth, and the state collapse of 1991. Explanatory theories used include List's economic recommendations for medium-developed countries, Wintrobe's political economy of dictatorship, and Tilly's analysis of the war–state relationship. It is concluded that a relatively poor country can become a great power and maintain that position for long periods if it has institutions that enable it to squeeze its population for military purposes.

This article is Part 1 of a survey of Russia's position as one of the great powers and how it has evolved from 1815 to the present day. It begins with the situation in 1815 and the path to it, and devotes attention to important Russian institutions then, soldiers' cooperatives, autocracy and serfdom. The subsequent wars and their consequences are discussed. The end of the Empire, the creation of the USSR and Soviet institutions are considered. Consideration is also given to the relative economic position of Russia/USSR and its changes over time. Attention is paid to the economic policies of Witte and Stalin. Explanatory theories used include List's economic recommendations for medium-developed countries, the institutional theories of Acemoglu, North and others, Modelski's evolutionary analysis of global politics and Tilly's analysis of the war–state relationship. Part 1 ends on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (1941).

Although evidence shows that territorial disputes fundamentally shape relations among states, we know surprisingly little about when territorial claims are made. We argue that revisionist states have incentives to make territorial claims when the great powers that manage the system are in crisis. We identify five main sources of systemic instability and develop measures of each of them, demonstrating that the majority of territorial claims in Europe are drawn at times when regional great powers are embroiled in crisis, for example, 1848 or 1870 during the nineteenth century. The claims that emerge at these times are not necessarily among states involved in the crises that generated turmoil (e.g., Prussia and France in 1870). We use a newly developed spatial measure of historical boundary precedents in Europe from 1650 to 1790 to demonstrate that the effect of this known spatial correlate of where claims are drawn matters only when the European system is in crisis. We further demonstrate that this claim-timing pattern is general to the global system of states. In the appendix we corroborate our explanation of our findings with a detailed case study of the territorial claims that led to the contemporary Italian state's formation.

Despite recurring elections and the transition to multiparty systems, authoritarianism has re-emerged in the Post-Soviet Space. Along with domestic factors, the external dimension should also be considered to fully understand this regional trend. Scholars depict Russia as a typical ‘black knight’ for democracy. While most of the literature deals with the Kremlin's policies in the ‘new’ Eastern Europe, this article pays attention to Russia's actions in the relatively understudied Southern Caucasus. Specifically, it investigates why and how Moscow tried to thwart democratization in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The diachronic analysis addresses three periods, namely, Yeltsin's presidency, the first Putin presidency and the Putin–Medvedev diarchy. Findings suggest that the Kremlin implemented an increasingly nuanced and intentional black knight strategy in Southern Caucasus, aimed at gaining primacy in the Post-Soviet Space and recognition of its great power status.