This paper, building on new archival research and the social table method, presents comprehensive estimates of income inequality in Mexico in 1895, 1910, 1930 and 1940. Inequality grew from 1895 to 1910, driven by economic expansion within the context of an oligarchic economy. While real income increased for the lower classes during this period, the main beneficiaries were large landowners and entrepreneurs. In the revolutionary period from 1910 to 1930 inequality decreased especially as a result of land reforms, benefitting peasants at the expense of the large landowners. However, the economic structure of the country was not fundamentally changed, and in the 1930s inequality raised as incomes of peasants and those in the informal sector fell behind manufacturing and other high-earning sectors. The Mexican case shows the complex interaction of economics, demography and politics in determining economic inequality.

In the COVID-19 pandemic, people’s dwellings suddenly became a predominant site of economic activity. We argue that, predictably, policy-makers and employers took the home for granted as a background support of economic life. Acting as if home is a cost-less resource that is free for appropriation in an emergency, ignoring how home functions as a site of gendered relations of care and labour, and assuming home is a largely harmonious site, all shaped the invisibility of the imposition. Taking employee flexibility for granted and presenting work-from-home as a privilege offered by generous employers assumed rapid adaptation. As Australia emerges from lockdown, ‘building back better’ to meet future shocks entails better supporting adaptive capabilities of workers in the care economy, and of homes that have likewise played an unacknowledged role as buffer and shelter for the economy. Investing in infrastructure capable of providing a more equitable basis for future resilience is urgent to reap the benefits that work-from-home offers. This article points to the need for rethinking public investment and infrastructure priorities for economic recovery and reconstruction in the light of a gender perspective on COVID-19 ‘lockdown’ experience.

This paper engages with and aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the role of economic and political elites in inequality dynamics and their reproduction over time. We reconstruct the distribution of wealth employing a sample of wills from the El Colegio de Sonora database covering the period of 1871-1910. We show that the rapid industrialisation and modernisation process that occurred in northern Mexico during the late-19th and early-20th centuries led to a continuous increment in wealth concentration at the top of the distribution. The Gini index measure of 0.58 for the 1871-1885 period rose to 0.80 in 1901-1910. Rather than a natural or «Kuznetsian» inevitability fundamental (kuznetsian) necessity, however, our subsequent analysis of the wills of the upper classes suggests a critical role played by the political economy at the time and highlights the importance of control over natural resources on inequality dynamics.

Measured health output in the UK declined sharply during the Covid-19 pandemic, despite the evident large increase in some National Health Service (NHS) activities such as critical care, and the new test and trace and vaccination programmes. We explain the measurement methods applied to public services that produced the published decline, in the context of the inherent difficulties of defining and measuring health output and productivity; and describe the changes in practice that had to take place in NHS hospitals. We also discuss, on the basis of these changes including increased use of technology, the likely outlook for healthcare productivity. We conclude that within NHS England capacity, constraints have contributed to substantial falls in non-Covid-19 healthcare output and argue that increased capacity in the social infrastructure of the health service is essential to enable higher productivity in an uncertain environment.

The “shutdown” economy of April 2020 is compared to a normally functioning economy both in terms of market and nonmarket activities. Three novel methods and data indicate that a full shutdown of “nonessential” activities puts market production about 25 % below normal in the short run. At an annual rate, a full shutdown costs $9 trillion, or about $18,000 per household per quarter. Employment already fell 24 million by early April 2020. These costs indicate, among other things, the value of innovation in both health and general business sectors that can accelerate the time when, and the degree to which, normal activity resumes.

Expenditure-side and income-side gross domestic product (GDP) are measured at the quarterly frequency and contain measurement error. Econometric methods exist for producing reconciled estimates of underlying true GDP from these noisy estimates. Recently, the authors of this paper developed a mixed-frequency reconciliation model which produces monthly estimates of true GDP. In the present paper, we investigate whether this model continues to work well in the face of the extreme observations that occurred during the pandemic year and consider several extensions of it. These include stochastic volatility and error distributions that are fat-tailed or explicitly allow for outliers.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often treated as shorthand for national economic well-being, even though it was never intended to be; it is a measure of (some) of the marketable output of the economy. This paper reviews several developments in measuring welfare beyond GDP that were recently presented at the Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE) annual conference in May 2019. The papers discussed fall into three broad areas. First, a significant amount of work has focused on incorporating information about the distribution of income, consumption and wealth in the national accounts. Second, the effects of digitisation and the growth of the internet highlight the potential value in measuring time use as a measure of welfare. Third, the digital revolution has spawned many new, often ‘free’ goods, the welfare consequences of which are difficult to measure. Other areas, such as government services, are also difficult to measure. Measuring economic welfare properly matters because it affects the decisions made by government and society. GDP does a reasonable job of measuring the marketable output of the economy (which remains important for some policies), but it should be downgraded; more attention should be given to measures that reflect both objective and subjective measures of well-being, and measures that better reflect the heterogeneity of peoples' experiences.

When economists talk about ‘measurement’ they tend to refer to metrics that can capture changes in quantity, quality and distribution of goods and services. In this paper we argue that the digital transformation of the economy, particularly the rise of cloud computing as a general-purpose technology, can pose serious challenges to traditional concepts and practices of economic measurement. In the first part we show how quality-adjusted prices of cloud services have been falling rapidly over the past decade, which is currently not captured by the deflators used in official statistics. We then discuss how this enabled the spread of data-driven business models, while also lowering entry barriers to advanced production techniques such as artificial intelligence or robotic-process-automation. It is likely that these process innovations are not fully measured at present. A final challenge to measurement arises from the fragmentation of value chains across borders and increasing use of intangible intermediate inputs such as intellectual property and data. While digital technologies make it very easy for these types of inputs to be transferred within or between companies, existing economic statistics often fail to capture them at all.

UK labour productivity is significantly lower than that of many other similarly advanced economies and has been so for decades, with negative implications for UK living standards. To make matters worse, during the last ten years labour productivity growth has stalled in most industrialised countries, and particularly in the UK. This has led to a renewed policy focus on productivity growth, as evidenced by successive government productivity plans and efforts to re-invigorate industrial strategy. This paper reviews the evidence on UK productivity performance, identifying what we know about the causes of its weakness, what we do not know and what this means for policy. We review the evidence through the lens of developments in economic measurement, drawing in particular on the work of National Institute colleagues past and present, and with a view to the key measurement challenges ahead that, unlocked, will help us understand better what is holding back UK productivity.

The financial crisis has led to a change in the mix of capital and labour employed in the UK and a sharp decline in total factor productivity. This has meant that labour productivity has not recovered to any great degree since the financial crisis. We explore the role of overall and sectoral productivity in explaining the fall in labour productivity, but also question the extent to which productivity in the service sector may be measured with error. We outline the links between a constrained financial sector and a fall in overall productivity – in which intangible capital seems to play an important role – and illustrate how a financial sector providing intermediate services may act to amplify the business cycle impetus from a total factor productivity shock within the context of a calibrated model.

The purpose of this work is to correct an error contained in the historical record of Mexico’s GDP which has led to underestimate considerably the progress achieved by industrialisation in the Mexican economy before the Great Depression, also distorting its position within the Latin American context. This error consists in the misleading identification of industry with manufacture, ignoring the contribution to Mexican industrial production made by the metallurgical sector. By incorporating the value added from metallurgy to the net output of manufacture the share of industry in GDP grows accordingly, placing Mexico among the most industrialised countries of Latin America by the end of the export era.

A drop in net FDI investment income has been the primary factor in the recent deterioration in the measured UK current account balance, with the trade balance relatively stable. We argue that financial engineering (with little net impact on the underlying international investment position for the UK) may have contributed to the decline in net FDI investment income, such that the headline current account balance cannot be interpreted as a sufficient indicator of the state of the UK's external position. A more granular analysis of cross-border financial linkages than is possible with currently-published data would be required in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of external sustainability.

Scotland's economic performance and fiscal make-up are key elements in the debate leading up to the forthcoming referendum on independence. However, in terms of understanding Scotland's economic performance, the situation is complicated by the high degree of overseas ownership, especially with regards to North Sea activity, and the importance of a natural commodity, oil. This makes the use of traditional measures of economic performance, like GDP or GDP per capita, less relevant than for most countries and suggests a greater need to use both constant price and cash GNI, neither of which are currently available. In terms of its fiscal balance, Scotland's independence would require taxes derived from its offshore (North Sea) activity to be sufficient to offset the extra monies (in per head terms) currently transferred from the rest of the UK (via the Barnett formula system) in order to pay for the current level of public services. Based on current projections, such North Sea related tax revenues would amount to less than the likely Barnett transfer, leading to a net loss in funding at the time of independence. Under such circumstances the question of whether or not Scotland could afford to initiate the building up of an ‘Oil Fund’, is largely a redundant one. However, uncertainties over both future oil and gas revenues and over the continuation of the existing Barnett system make it difficult to predict with any great certainty whether Scotland would see a longer-term net fiscal gain or loss post-independence. Apparent inconsistencies between official GNI and Scottish revenue figures also means that the existing fiscal balance position remains open to question.

If official figures overstated the growth of banking output in the UK in the recent boom, does this mean that GDP growth was overstated too? The answer is no. It is truer to say that if banking output was overstated then the output of some other industry or industries must have been understated, leaving GDP relatively unaffected. The reason is that the Office for National Statistics measures the real growth of GDP primarily from the expenditure side. And from the expenditure side most of the problematic part of banking output drops out since it constitutes intermediate consumption not final expenditure. Consequently, the effect of any mismeasurement of banking output on GDP growth in the boom of 2000–7 is likely to have been small; GDP growth might have been overstated by about 0.1 per cent per annum.

This paper gives an overview of the construction of and preliminary results from the EU KLEMS database which contains industry estimates of output, input and productivity growth for EU countries. The paper begins with a discussion of methodology and data sources covering output and intermediates, capital and labour services. The content and scope of the database is then briefly described. This is followed by a discussion of preliminary results focusing on comparisons between the EU and US. These confirm the relatively poor productivity performance of the EU relative to the US since the mid-1990s, mostly driven by low productivity growth in market services.

We set out a framework for measuring the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom by assessing the absolute level of savings based on individual preferences of different ages. We examine this relationship between age and savings using data from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2004–5. We show that, while the level of national saving is about 8.4 percentage points of net national income lower than is required if one assumes that each cohort pays its own way, wealth holdings are considerably higher than are required on the same basis. Looking at household, rather than national saving, the current pattern of benefits on public sector pensions removes the need to save for old age. While perhaps £4000m of household wealth holding can be accounted for by bequest and other transfer motives, our results suggest excess wealth holding of around £1600m in 2004.

This essay contends that Western Europe's economy started to grow at a more rapid pace than the rest of the World during the Early Modern or Late Medieval era. Using the latest quantitative information available it is argued that, between the years 1000 and 1820, GDP per head in Western Europe experienced a threefold increase whereas that of the rest of the World grew only 33 per cent. Among the factors responsible for this difference the author highlights the progress in navigation techniques, with its consequences on trade and the division of labour; the adoption of institutions that also favoured trade; the knowledge revolution which started during the Renaissance period; the political division of Europe, with its corollary of competition among states and enhanced freedom, as well as the development of individualism favoured by the Christian cultural tradition.