Climate change is one of the most serious risks facing humanity. Temperature rises can lead to catastrophic climate and natural events that threaten livelihoods. From rising sea levels to flooding, bush fires, extreme temperatures and droughts, the economic and human cost is too large to ignore. More than 190 world leaders got together in Glasgow during November 2021 at the UN’s COP26 climate change summit to discuss progress on the Paris Agreement (COP21) and to agree on new measures to limit global warming. In Paris, countries agreed to limit global warming to well below 2° and aim for 1.5° as well as to adapt to the impacts of a changing climate and raise the necessary funding to deliver on these aims. However, actions to date were not nearly enough as highlighted by the IPCC (2018) special report. The world is still on track to reach warming above 3° by 2100. As evident from figure 1, global temperatures have been on a steadily increasing path since the start of the 20th century and this process has substantially accelerated since the beginning of the 1980s. This has been unevenly distributed, with temperatures in the Northern hemisphere being a full 1°C higher than for the 1961–1990 average, whilst temperatures in the Southern hemisphere have increased by almost 0.5°C.

A four-pronged approach to climate policy is presented consisting of carbon pricing, subsidies for renewable energies, transformative green investments and climate finance and engendering flywheel effects. Then, a variety of societal and political challenges and obstacles faced by such a climate policy and what can be done to overcome them are discussed. These range from stranded assets, the very long time scales needed to adapt and deal with global warming, intergenerational conflict, international free-rider problems, carbon leakage, green paradoxes, policy failure and capture, adverse income distributional effects and spatial scarcity to the problem of climate deniers and sceptics. The paper also discusses the various tools that are needed for the analysis of both ideal and workable climate policies, and the need to collaborate with complexity scholars, political scientists, sociologists and psychologists.

Both the physical and transition-related impacts of climate change pose substantial macroeconomic risks. Yet, markets still lack credible estimates of how climate change will affect debt sustainability, sovereign creditworthiness and the public finances of major economies. We present a taxonomy for tracing the physical and transition impacts of climate change through to impacts on sovereign risk. We then apply the taxonomy to the UK’s potential transition to net zero. Meeting internationally agreed climate targets will require an unprecedented structural transformation of the global economy over the next two or three decades. The changing landscape of risks warrants new risk management and hedging strategies to contain climate risk and minimise the impact of asset stranding and asset devaluation. Yet, conditional on action being taken early, the opportunities from managing a net zero transition would substantially outweigh the costs.

Carbon taxes are likely to play a key role in meeting greenhouse gas emission targets that are consistent with the Paris Agreement. In this article, we assess the macroeconomic effects of a carbon tax on the global economy, paying particular attention to the terms-of-trade implications for importers and exporters of fossil fuels. We use a modified version of the National Institute’s Global Econometric Model, NiGEM. In the stylized scenarios, all countries and regions impose a permanent and uniform carbon tax immediately. Our simulations show that demand for fossil fuels falls substantially in response to the tax, global (pre-tax) prices of fossil fuels decline, and the tax can raise substantial revenue for the government. The overall impact on GDP growth and inflation in each country depends on the fossil fuel intensity of output, the net losses/gains in terms of trade and the macroeconomic policy reaction.

Climate change and weather shocks have multi-faceted impacts on food systems with important implications for economic policy. Combining a longitudinal household survey with high-resolution climate data, we demonstrate that both climate and weather shocks increase food insecurity; cash assistance and participation in Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme have reduced food insecurity; but food assistance has been ineffective. Importantly, households with savings, and those that stored their harvest to sell at higher prices rather than for home use, suffered less from food insecurity, yet both strategies are harder for the poorest and most food insecure households to adopt. Our paper provides micro-founded evidence needed to design policies that both improve agricultural yields in the context of a changing climate and target households’ abilities to cope with shocks that put upwards pressure on food prices.

This article presents clear evidence that current announced climate pledges by Asia-Pacific countries – even those dependent on climate finance – are insufficient to keep the world within a 1.5°C temperature rise. The article provides analysis explaining why and how countries in the region are not being ambitious enough, and proposes three key steps for how to overcome a “decisiveness” deficit to spur further ambition.

Measured health output in the UK declined sharply during the Covid-19 pandemic, despite the evident large increase in some National Health Service (NHS) activities such as critical care, and the new test and trace and vaccination programmes. We explain the measurement methods applied to public services that produced the published decline, in the context of the inherent difficulties of defining and measuring health output and productivity; and describe the changes in practice that had to take place in NHS hospitals. We also discuss, on the basis of these changes including increased use of technology, the likely outlook for healthcare productivity. We conclude that within NHS England capacity, constraints have contributed to substantial falls in non-Covid-19 healthcare output and argue that increased capacity in the social infrastructure of the health service is essential to enable higher productivity in an uncertain environment.