• World economy will grow by 3.7 per cent in 2014 and 2015; an improvement on the 3.1 per cent last year, but still a sluggish recovery by historical standards.

• Growth prospects have improved in advanced economies, particularly in the US, but have deteriorated in a number of emerging market economies.

• High unemployment rates coupled with moderate and uneven growth raises the spectre of unexpectedly low inflation. This could greatly complicate macroeconomic policymaking.

• The economy will grow by 2.5 per cent in 2014 and 2.1 per cent in 2015.

• Unemployment will drop through the Bank of England's 7 per cent threshold early this year.

• CPI inflation will be marginally above target this year, dropping below target in 2015.

• On current plans the public sector finances will be in surplus in 2018–19.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.

Scotland's economic performance and fiscal make-up are key elements in the debate leading up to the forthcoming referendum on independence. However, in terms of understanding Scotland's economic performance, the situation is complicated by the high degree of overseas ownership, especially with regards to North Sea activity, and the importance of a natural commodity, oil. This makes the use of traditional measures of economic performance, like GDP or GDP per capita, less relevant than for most countries and suggests a greater need to use both constant price and cash GNI, neither of which are currently available. In terms of its fiscal balance, Scotland's independence would require taxes derived from its offshore (North Sea) activity to be sufficient to offset the extra monies (in per head terms) currently transferred from the rest of the UK (via the Barnett formula system) in order to pay for the current level of public services. Based on current projections, such North Sea related tax revenues would amount to less than the likely Barnett transfer, leading to a net loss in funding at the time of independence. Under such circumstances the question of whether or not Scotland could afford to initiate the building up of an ‘Oil Fund’, is largely a redundant one. However, uncertainties over both future oil and gas revenues and over the continuation of the existing Barnett system make it difficult to predict with any great certainty whether Scotland would see a longer-term net fiscal gain or loss post-independence. Apparent inconsistencies between official GNI and Scottish revenue figures also means that the existing fiscal balance position remains open to question.

This paper considers which currency option would be best for an independent Scotland. We examine three currency options: being part of a sterling currency zone, adopting the euro, or having an independent currency. No currency option is the best when considered against all criteria. Therefore, making the decision requires deciding which criteria are most important. Recent events around the world, particularly in Europe, show that it is essential to consider how an independent Scotland would seek to adjust to adverse economic circumstances. In economists' terms, it is important to think through the ‘off-equilibrium’ adjustment paths of each of the currency options. The amount of public debt, and so the capacity for a fiscal response, is a critical determinant of these paths and therefore of the optimal currency choice. Since commitment to a currency union by an independent country can only be conditional, an independent Scotland might find it optimal to abandon the currency union in the future if the financial stability advantages to having its own currency begin to outweigh any disadvantages due to trade and transactions costs.

Economic issues will be key determinants of the outcome of the Scottish referendum on independence. Pensions are a key element of the economic case for or against independence. The costs of funding pensions in an independent Scotland would be influenced by mortality risks, the costs of borrowing and the segmentation of costs and risks (i.e. pricing to Scotland's experience rather than pooled across UK experience). We compare the overall costs of providing pensions in an independent Scotland against the resources that are available to cover these costs. Scotland has worse mortality experience than the UK as a whole, and Scottish government debt is likely to attract a liquidity premium relative to UK government debt. An independent Scottish government would have to create a bond market for public debt. The liquidity premium would make pensions cheaper to buy, but taxpayers or the consumers of public services would have to pay the cost.

The aim and scope of this paper is to isolate the effects of population ageing in the context of potential Scottish independence. A dynamic multiregional Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model is used to evaluate the two scenarios. The status quo scenario assumes that Scotland stays part of the UK and all government expenditures associated with its ageing population are funded on a UK-wide basis. In the independence scenario, Scotland and the rest of the UK pay for the growing demands of their ageing populations independently. The comparison suggests that Scotland is worse off in the case of independence. The effective labour income tax rate in the independence scenario has to increase further compared with the status quo scenario. The additional increase reaches its maximum in 2035 at 1.4 percentage points. The additional rise in the tax rate is non-negligible, but is much smaller than the population ageing effect (status quo scenario) which generates an increase of about 8.5 percentage points by 2060. The difference for government finances between the status quo and independence scenarios is thus relatively small.

This paper looks at some of the key fiscal questions related to Scottish independence, drawing on detailed analysis of household survey data, official data on public spending and revenues, and using a model of the UK and Scotland's public finances over the next half a century. We examine how and why public spending on, and revenues raised from, Scotland differ from the average across the UK, and how Scotland's fiscal position might be expected to evolve over the next 50 years under current policies.

An independent Scotland would be a small European state. Small states may be at a disadvantage in world markets but can also adapt successfully. There are different modes of adaptation, notably the market-liberal mode and the social investment state. Either mode is dependent on internal institutions, social relationships and modes of policymaking. It is not possible to pick and choose items of different models since they have an internal coherence. The Scottish White Paper on independence supports the social investment state. Scotland has some, but not all, of the prerequisites for this so that independence would require internal adaptation.