Logic is traditionally considered to be a purely syntactic discipline, at least in principle. However, prof. David Isles has shown that this ideal is not yet met in traditional logic. Semantic residue is present in the assumption that the domain of a variable should be fixed in advance of a derivation, and also in the notion that a numerical notation must refer to a number rather than be considered a mathematical object in and of itself. Based on his work, the central question of this thesis is what kind of logic, if any, results from removing this semantic residue from traditional logic.

We differ from traditional logic in two significant ways. The first is that the assumption that a numerical notation must refer to a number is denied. Numerical notations are considered as mathematical objects in their own right, related to each other by means of rewrite rules. The traditional notion of reference is then replaced by the notion of reduction (by means of the rewrite rules) to a normal form. Two numerical notations that reduce to the same normal form would traditionally be considered identical, as they would refer to the same number, and hence they would be interchangeable salva veritate. In the new system, called Buridan-Volpin (BV), the numerical notations themselves are the elements of the domains of variables, and two numerical notations that reduce to the same normal form need not be interchangeable salva veritate, except when they are syntactically identical (i.e., have the same Gödel number).

The second is that we do away with the assumption that the domains of variables need to be fixed in advance of a derivation. Instead we focus on what is needed to guarantee preservation of truth in every step of a derivation. These conditions on the domains of the variables, accumulated in the course of a derivation, are combined in a reference grammar. Whereas traditionally a derivation is considered valid when the conclusion follows from the premisses by way of the derivation rules (and possibly axioms), in the BV system a derivation must meet the extra condition that no inconsistency occurs within the reference grammar. For if the reference grammar were to give rise to inconsistency (i.e., it would be impossible to assign domains to all the variables without breaking at least one of the conditions placed on them in the reference grammar), there is no longer a guarantee that truth has been preserved in every step of the derivation, and hence the truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed by the derivation.

In Chapter 2 the BV system is introduced in some formal detail. Chapter 3 gives some examples of derivations, notably totality of addition, multiplication and exponentiation, as well as a lemma needed for the proof of Euclid’s Theorem. These examples, taken from prof. Isles’ First-Order Reasoning and Primitive Recursive Natural Number Notations, show that there is a real proof-theoretical difference between traditional logic and the BV system. Here we also find the first major point of departure between myself and prof. Isles, centered on the notion of inheritance of conditions in the reference grammar by way of lemmata. These different points of view are best illustrated in the sections on the totality of exponentiation and on Euclid’s Lemma: prof. Isles maintains that the proof of totality of exponentiation is not BV valid, while I maintain that it is. But I do agree with him that the traditional proof of Euclid’s Lemma is not BV valid. Chapter 6 also expands the arguments for my choice in this matter.

Now that it has been shown that there is a difference between traditional logic and BV, the properties of BV need to be examined. In Chapter 4 we give a proof of Cut-elimination for BV minus induction and the subformula property for BV, which allows us to prove the consistency of BV minus induction. We also expand on the reasons for excluding induction. In Chapter 5 we consider in detail the proof of a finite analog to the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem given by prof. Isles in his article with the same title. He proves that under certain conditions it is always possible, given the existence of a (possibly uncountable) model for a derivation, to give a finite model for this derivation. The system he considers deviates from BV as considered in this thesis in two significant ways: it does not contain the induction rule and the domains contain numbers instead of numerical notations. We then go on to show that it is possible to extend the result to include induction, in the sense that the existence of a possibly uncountable model for a derivation guarantees the existence of a model that is at most countable. We also consider the complications that arise from taking numerical expressions instead of numbers as the elements of domains.

Finally, in Chapter 6 we consider the philosophical consequences of the BV system, informed by the formal results from the previous chapters. In particular we discuss the relation between reduction and reference, the status of reference grammars, the notion of induction and its function within BV, and some brief considerations on the consequences of the BV system for the discussion regarding nominalism and realism with regard to mathematical objects. The object of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand applying the formal results to philosophical questions, on the other hand arguing that BV is not just a theoretically acceptable alternative to traditional logic, but is in fact deserving of further development and research into its properties. The latter will probably appeal most to those of a nominalist and/or finitist bent.

Abstract prepared by Harrie de Swart and Sven Storms.

E-mail: [email protected]

URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/files/61701294/Storms_The_ Buridan_Volpin_04_05_2022.pdf

The proof theory of the constructive modal logic S4 (hereafter $\mathsf{CS4}$ ) has been settled since the beginning of this century by means of either standard natural deduction and sequent calculi or by the reconstruction of modal logic through hypothetical and categorical judgments à la Martin-Löf, an approach carried out by using a special kind of sequents, which keeps two separated contexts representing ordinary and enhanced hypotheses, intuitively interpreted as true and valid assumptions. These so-called dual-context sequents, originated in linear logic, are used to define a natural deduction system handling judgments of validity, truth, and possibility, resulting in a formalism equivalent to an axiomatic system for $\mathsf{CS4}$ . However, this proof-theoretical study of $\mathsf{CS4}$ lacks, to the best of our knowledge, its third fundamental constituent, namely a sequent calculus. In this paper, we define such a dual-context formalism, called ${\bf DG_{CS4}}$ , and provide detailed proofs of the admissibility for the ordinary cut rule as well as the elimination of a second cut rule, which manipulates enhanced hypotheses. Furthermore, we make available a formal verification of the equivalence of this proposal with the previously defined axiomatic and dual-context natural deduction systems for $\mathsf{CS4}$ , using the Coq proof-assistant.

One of the most fundamental properties of a proof system is analyticity, expressing the fact that a proof of a given formula F only uses subformulas of F. In sequent calculus, this property is usually proved by showing that the $\mathsf{cut}$ rule is admissible, i.e., the introduction of the auxiliary lemma H in the reasoning “if H follows from G and F follows from H, then F follows from G” can be eliminated. The proof of cut admissibility is usually a tedious, error-prone process through several proof transformations, thus requiring the assistance of (semi-)automatic procedures. In a previous work by Miller and Pimentel, linear logic ( $\mathsf{LL}$ ) was used as a logical framework for establishing sufficient conditions for cut admissibility of object logical systems (OL). The OL’s inference rules are specified as an $\mathsf{LL}$ theory and an easy-to-verify criterion sufficed to establish the cut-admissibility theorem for the OL at hand. However, there are many logical systems that cannot be adequately encoded in $\mathsf{LL}$ , the most symptomatic cases being sequent systems for modal logics. In this paper, we use a linear-nested sequent ( $\mathsf{LNS}$ ) presentation of $\mathsf{MMLL}$ (a variant of LL with subexponentials), and show that it is possible to establish a cut-admissibility criterion for $\mathsf{LNS}$ systems for (classical or substructural) multimodal logics. We show that the same approach is suitable for handling the $\mathsf{LNS}$ system for intuitionistic logic.

Certain instances of contraction are provable in Zardini’s system $\mathbf {IK}^\omega $ which causes triviality once a truth predicate and suitable fixed points are available.

The paper provides a proof theoretic characterization of the Russellian theory of definite descriptions (RDD) as characterized by Kalish, Montague and Mar (KMM). To this effect three sequent calculi are introduced: LKID0, LKID1 and LKID2. LKID0 is an auxiliary system which is easily shown to be equivalent to KMM. The main research is devoted to LKID1 and LKID2. The former is simpler in the sense of having smaller number of rules and, after small change, satisfies cut elimination but fails to satisfy the subformula property. In LKID2 an additional analysis of different kinds of identities leads to proliferation of rules but yields the subformula property. This refined proof theoretic analysis leading to fully analytic calculus with constructive proof of cut elimination is the main contribution of the paper.

We construct a geometry of interaction (GoI: dynamic modelling of Gentzen-style cut elimination) for multiplicative-additive linear logic (MALL) by employing Bucciarelli–Ehrhard indexed linear logic MALL(I) to handle the additives. Our construction is an extension to the additives of the Haghverdi–Scott categorical formulation (a multiplicative GoI situation in a traced monoidal category) for Girard’s original GoI 1. The indices are shown to serve not only in their original denotational level, but also at a finer grained dynamic level so that the peculiarities of additive cut elimination such as superposition, erasure of subproofs, and additive (co-) contraction can be handled with the explicit use of indices. Proofs are interpreted as indexed subsets in the category Rel, but without the explicit relational composition; instead, execution formulas are run pointwise on the interpretation at each index, with respect to symmetries of cuts, in a traced monoidal category with a reflexive object and a zero morphism. The sets of indices diminish overall when an execution formula is run, corresponding to the additive cut-elimination procedure (erasure), and allowing recovery of the relational composition. The main theorem is the invariance of the execution formulas along cut elimination so that the formulas converge to the denotations of (cut-free) proofs.

In sequent calculi, cut elimination is a property that guarantees that any provable formula can be proven analytically. For example, Gentzen’s classical and intuitionistic calculi LK and LJ enjoy cut elimination. The property is less studied in coinductive extensions of sequent calculi. In this paper, we use coinductive Horn clause theories to show that cut is not eliminable in a coinductive extension of LJ, a system we call CLJ. We derive two further practical results from this study. We show that CoLP by Gupta et al. gives rise to cut-free proofs in CLJ with fixpoint terms, and we formulate and implement a novel method of coinductive theory exploration that provides several heuristics for discovery of cut formulae in CLJ.

We study various extensions of Gentzen’s sequent calculus obtained by adding rules for equality. One of them is singled out as particularly natural and shown to satisfy full cut elimination, namely, also atomic cuts can be eliminated. Furthermore we tell apart the extensions that satisfy full cut elimination from those that do not and establish a strengthened form of the nonlenghtening property of Lifschitz and Orevkov.

This is a sequel article to [10] where a hypersequent calculus (HC) for some temporal logics of linear frames including Kt4.3 and its extensions for dense and serial flow of time was investigated in detail. A distinctive feature of this approach is that hypersequents are noncommutative, i.e., they are finite lists of sequents in contrast to other hypersequent approaches using sets or multisets. Such a system in [10] was proved to be cut-free HC formalization of respective logics by means of semantical argument. In this article we present an equivalent variant of this calculus for which a constructive syntactical proof of cut elimination is provided.

We give examples of calculi that extend Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK by unsound quantifier inferences in such a way that (i) derivations lead only to true sequents, and (ii) proofs therein are nonelementarily shorter than LK-proofs.

We present an embedding of the Lambek–Grishin calculus into an extension of the nonassociative Lambek calculus with negation. The embedding is based on the De Morgan interpretation of the dual Grishin connectives.

The article approaches cut elimination from a new angle. On the basis of an arbitrary inference relation among logically atomic formulae, an inference relation on a language possessing logical operators is defined by means of inductive clauses similar to the operator-introducing rules of a cut-free intuitionistic sequent calculus. The logical terminology of the richer language is not uniquely specified, but assumed to satisfy certain conditions of a general nature, allowing for, but not requiring, the existence of infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. We investigate to what extent structural properties of the given atomic relation are preserved through the extension to the full language. While closure under the Cut rule narrowly construed is not in general thus preserved, two properties jointly amounting to closure under the ordinary structural rules, including Cut, are.

Attention is then narrowed down to the special case of a standard first-order language, where a similar result is obtained also for closure under substitution of terms for individual parameters. Taken together, the three preservation results imply the familiar cut-elimination theorem for pure first-order intuitionistic sequent calculus.

In the interest of conceptual economy, all deducibility relations are specified purely inductively, rather than in terms of the existence of formal proofs of any kind.

We present a cut elimination argument that witnesses the conservativity of the compositional axioms for truth (without the extended induction axiom) over any theory interpreting a weak subsystem of arithmetic. In doing so we also fix a critical error in Halbach’s original presentation. Our methods show that the admission of these axioms determines a hyper-exponential reduction in the size of derivations of truth-free statements.