Limited research has been devoted to investigating assumptions about competition dynamics established through a neoliberal lens. Advocates argue that competition fosters innovation and benefits consumers by incentivizing private enterprises to develop better products or services at competitive prices compared to their rivals. Critics argue that competition exacerbates inequality by disproportionately rewarding high achievers. Rewarding high achievers reflects the meritocratic aspect of competition, which has been widely assumed to be rooted in the individualistic culture of Western countries. Contrary to this assumption, the ideology of meritocratic competition thrived in ancient collectivist Asian countries. Moreover, the assumed linear relationship between individualism, competition, and inequality is contradicted by economic literature, which suggests more individualistic nations display lower income inequality. Despite extensive economic and cultural examination of competition, competition’s political dimensions remain understudied. This interdisciplinary book challenges conventional assumptions about competition, synthesizing evidence across economics, culture, and politics.

In this chapter, I explore competition among students and parents in a North Korean elementary school. Despite the perception that competition is discouraged in socialist countries like North Korea, it is prevalent as a means to motivate citizens to increase productivity. During my childhood in North Korea, competing with friends was commonplace. Teachers encouraged competition as a method to motivate students to study hard. While capitalist societies openly embrace competition, in North Korea, it exists in a visible but unspoken form. People are encouraged to compete to "praise the Great leaders" rather than for personal goals. The norms and meaning of competition tend to vary depending on the context, as illustrated by my childhood experiences. I highlight competition in three areas: (a) competition in classes through publicized performance scores, (b) competition among students to meet material quotas (e.g., papers, apricot stones, copper, etc.) through "mini assignments," and (c) competition for student leadership positions among parents through bribery.

The economic reforms of China in 1978 and Vietnam in 1986 have spurred the emergence of privately owned enterprises, leading to increased competition across state-owned and privately owned enterprises under communist authoritarian regimes. Upon joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), both countries faced unavoidable international competition, particularly excelling in labor-intensive manufacturing industries due to low labor costs. China’s pragmatic approach to market-oriented forces has resulted in a growth gap favoring China over Vietnam. Despite this, both nations have made significant economic strides, transitioning to fast-growing middle-income countries and reducing global inequality. The onset of the US–China trade war in 2018 has seen Vietnam emerge as a major beneficiary, challenging China’s dominance in labor-intensive manufacturing industries. This shift highlights the potential for hegemonic transitions in competition dynamics. Additionally, this chapter illuminates pre-reform competition in both countries, where shortages of goods led to resource competition among citizens – an aspect often overlooked in existing literature focused on market competition post-reform.

Little is known about how competitive attitudes differ between refugees and their host citizens. Study 1 investigated the relationship between refugee background and competitive attitudes, alongside demographic characteristics, social comparison concerns, and exposure to competition, using data from 190 North Korean refugees (NKRs) and 445 South Koreans (SKs). Refugee background and social comparison concerns had significantly more effect on competitive attitudes compared to other demographic characteristics and the ranking variable. In Study 2, cultural scores based on Hofstede’s theory were examined, alongside demographic factors, refugee background, and social comparison concerns. Refugee background and social comparison concerns showed stronger associations with competitive attitudes than cultural scores. Study 3 divided the sample into NKRs and SKs, revealing social comparison concerns’ predominant influence on competitive attitudes in both groups. However, the impact of the ranking variable varied between NKRs and SKs. These findings underscore the importance of understanding the experiences of refugees in shaping their competitive attitudes, from migration to resettlement.

Using the World Value Survey from Wave 2 (1989–1993) to Wave 7 (2017–2020), Study 1 demonstrates that individuals in individualistic regions exhibit more anti-competition attitudes compared to those in collectivist regions. Additionally, individuals in authoritarian, socialist, and collectivist Asian regions show the highest level of pro-competition attitudes, followed by those in democratic, capitalist, and individualistic Western regions and those in democratic, capitalist, and collectivist Asian regions. Study 2 reveals that competition is more likely to be endorsed by individuals who prioritize the individual’s responsibility over the government’s responsibility, value private ownership of businesses over government ownership of businesses, emphasize hard work for success, and prefer income incentives over income equality. Moreover, individuals with higher levels of materialism and self-determination are also inclined to endorse competition. Notably, variations exist in the relationship between individual difference variables and attitudes toward competition among the regions.

Since the North Korean Famine in the mid-1990s, survivors have turned to cross-border activities for sustenance, evolving into commercial activities in black markets known as jangmadang. With the collapse of the socialist Public Distribution System, the majority of North Koreans now rely on these black markets to earn money and meet their basic needs. However, such commercial activities for personal gain are illegal in the country, symbolizing the emergence of North Korea’s hidden market economy. This hidden economy is characterized by various types of “shadowy private enterprises (SPEs),” ranging from entities officially registered as state-owned enterprises but run by private individuals to home-based enterprises. These SPEs sustain their operations and evade punishment by bribing bureaucrats. However, systematic corruption poses threats to the survival, safety, and well-being of marginalized groups who struggle to pay bribes, exacerbating inequality between privileged and unprivileged segments of society. Consequently, the hidden economy engenders various forms of competition, spanning from market competition to an invisible competition for safety and wellbeing.

Physical education in the Soviet Union, initially focused on health and military readiness, shifted toward producing athletes for international competitions by the early 1950s, peaking in the 1970s/1980s. This shift led to increased investment in sport psychology. To analyze this history, particularly the use of sports to promote communist values, and challenge other political systems, I synthesized peer-reviewed articles using keywords like "Soviet Union," "sport(s) psychology," and "Puni." As social scientists, we decided to analyze this specific history with an emphasis on psychological theories to better understand how the Soviet Union’s communist ideology impacted scientific study within the Soviet Union and sports competition abroad. Thus, I explored the life of the most prominent sports psychologist in the Soviet Union, Avksenty Cezarevich Puni, and his theory of Psychological Preparation for Competition (PPC), which serves as an example of the Soviet Union’s approach to applied sports. Additionally, I examined how Soviet Olympic successes spurred investment in sports and sport psychology, reflecting efforts to compete with the West and asserting the superiority of communism.

The dominant assumptions positing a linear relationship among individualism, capitalism, competition, and inequality are often rooted in the perspectives of social scientists, whose focus is frequently confined to the West in modern times. I argue that these dominant assumptions have been formulated without sufficient opportunities or willingness to consider societies with cultures and systems different from those of the West. In this regard, this book challenges these dominant assumptions by presenting compelling counter-evidence that (1) competition occurs in every society throughout history whenever humans seek to survive and thrive; and (2) competition does not necessarily lead to inequality, but often serves as a tool to mitigate it, as competitions prevent absolute hegemony and allow individuals to challenge incumbent powers or privileged groups across cultures, systems, and eras. This closing chapter encourages readers to reassess their existing beliefs about the sources and consequences of competition and to strive for a deep understanding of competition arenas that they may choose to enter or inadvertently launch.

The ideology of Marxism–Leninism seemingly contradicts competition, yet competition was prevalent in former communist countries to foster productivity and economic growth. The Stakhanovite movement, originating in the Soviet Union, incentivized laborers to excel as an economic propaganda tool, while also honoring them as socialist heroes but also penalizing dissent as a political propaganda tool. Competition extended to managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) vying for government resources. Consumer competition arose from pervasive shortages, driving black market economies. Underground enterprises, which were protected from competition, resisted economic reform from a planned economic system to a more market-oriented system to maintain their privileged status. Post-World War II, some SOEs adopted market-based approaches, competing domestically and globally. This chapter argues that such forms of competition emerge when humans struggle for survival amid perceived inequalities in the existing system, prompting them to seek opportunities and thrive.

Through this chapter, I explored life in a competitive arena during socialist mass movements in North Korea. Since liberation from Japanese rule at the end of World War II, North Korea has implemented mass movements to increase labor productivity, known as "Socialist Efforts toward Competition Movements." These movements have permeated various settings, including individuals, workplaces, enterprises, and cooperative farms. The Chollima movement, initiated in December 1956, symbolizes North Korea’s path toward economic development. It has promoted labor competition through mass movements such as "Speed War" and "Learning to Follow Hidden Heroes." Socialist mass movements influenced my daily life, fostering competition in schools and workplaces. Through the lens of my lived experiences, I share stories covering my life journey from North to South Korea, historical backgrounds of North Korea’s competition movements, a comparison analysis before and after the North Korean Famine in the mid-1990s, and characteristics of competition in North Korean society.

Little attention has been paid to competitive dynamics from a political perspective, despite numerous instances of political competition across cultures and systems. In liberal democratic societies, political competition is legalized, allowing citizens to elect leaders who represent their ideas. Conversely, in totalitarian societies, citizens lack voting rights, and political authority is not challenged through democratic means. However, political competitions still occur among ruling elites, often through purges to seize power. This chapter explores political competition, particularly in totalitarian regimes, where purges eliminate rivals among ruling elites. The collapse of such regimes has marked an evolution toward freedom and equal opportunities for all individuals, regardless of background, which aligns with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Highlighting the lack of research on political competitions from an evolutionary psychology perspective, this chapter underscores the need for future research on human emotions and competitive behaviors in the political arena.

This first chapter introduces the reader to the central research questions and hypotheses investigated in this book. In particular, it discusses the role that the morphologically and semantically related simple verbs (e.g. notice in the case of take notice of) may play for the semantic evolution of the CPs. It draws on previous literature, showing that not much has been done in the way of studying the role of the simple verb. Further, the chapter introduces other factors that may help predict or explain the evolution of the CPs. The chapter is rounded off by a summary of the book’s structure.

Chapter 10 provides a conclusion and outlook. It summarizes how the three principles of competition, iconicity and economy of expression help to explain language change in the CPs. In addition, it asks how the findings obtained on the CPs and their morphologically and semantically related CPs can be transferred to other cases of competition (e.g. to phrasal verbs and their corresponding simple verbs). More than that, the present study adds to research on semantic–syntactic mismatches in cases of lexialization and provides new evidence on constructions which run counter to the trend of the English language to become ever more analytic. The latter findings tie in with such other cases of semantic competition as the gentive variation, the dative alternation or the comparative alternation.

In Chapter 9, I offer a discussion related to the main theoretical contributions of this study. I here elaborate on how these findings tie in with three concepts known to be well-supported functional principles at work in various languages. These are the principles of competition, iconicity and economy of expression. As for the principle of competition, I unfold a model of competition that can account a) for the specialization and non-specialization of the CPs, b) for an interaction between the token frequencies of the simple verb and the strength of semantic specialization in the CP and c) for why certain CPs do not fall under the scope of the hypothesis. I also briefly discuss how psycholinguistic experiments on the activation levels of competing constructions can extend our perspective beyond cases of semantic competition. The principle of iconicity, in turn,can account for why formal and semantic changes do not entirely drift apart. Finally, speakers’ preference for shorter rather than longer expression helps explain why the simple verbs are preferred over the CPs in those contexts where they are in semantic competition.

A realistic utopia is a utopia that respects basic constraints imposed by the Human Condition. This chapter explains why some kinds of political manipulation are not bad or wrong at all, and would accordingly remain operative in a realistic political utopia. The legitimacy of manipulation is first demonstrated with respect to five categories of the non-deliberative dimensions of political life: mobilizing, participation, negotiation, ruling, and ensuring stability. It is then demonstrated with respect to political deliberation itself. All of this applies to manipulation’s function in the two faces of democratic politics: cooperation and competition. The need for the “social lubrication” functions of manipulation is especially acute in politics, given the intractability of the coordination challenges on a society-wide scale. Specifically, manipulation is, at certain junctions, a necessary tool for overcoming motivational obstacles to the flow of political information in a way conducive to rational persuasion. In such ways manipulation is integral to the very idea of a functioning democracy.