At mid-century, the north bank companies faced two main problems: wharf competition and the failure of earnings to keep pace with an increase in the shipping and cargoes handled. Adding to these challenges from the 1860s was accommodating steam shipping by investment in facilities, including new docks, and in the 1880s, a resurgence of fierce rivalry between themselves and a financial crisis created by the new Tilbury dock resulted in effective amalgamation. Their common response to diminishing profitability was the introduction of sub-contracting – to the detriment of the lives and livelihoods of a resistant workforce. Skilled port workers were unionised, unskilled generally not, but strikes by particular groups were not uncommon. Port-wide action by dock workers in the 1850s failed but stoppages in the early 1870s achieved wage rises, as also did the port-wide 1889 Great Dock Strike.

After a few years of competition following the end of monopolies and exacerbated by the new St. Katharine’s Dock Company, rivalry was muted by rate agreements and the amalgamation of the East and West India Companies. However, except in the Baltic trade south bank docks, regional cargo specialisation to a large extent came to an end. All north bank companies had a core of permanent employees, but most were casually employed. Company records reveal how managers organised, motivated and disciplined their labouring workforce and also how those men with particular skills resisted such control. Relations with the Customs could also be difficult. In 1848, both the London and St. Katharine’s companies were raided, accused of defrauding the revenue by passing off sugar as waste. After a very public row, significant reputational damage to the companies and the intervention of a parliamentary committee, a compromise was reached.

The nineteenth century saw a transformation in the concept of colonization as political economists recast the term to refer to directed migration and settlement processes. Brazilian statesmen, intellectuals, and businessmen in the newly independent Brazilian Empire (1822–1889) embraced this new brand of colonization as an advantageous policy expedient because it aligned with old regime peopling practices, promised to resolve the question of slavery, and, significantly, held the prospect of individual profits, particularly if carried out by colonization companies. Brazilian engagement with colonization fit within a wider series of colonization processes unfolding within European empires or their overseas dominions as well as throughout the new republics in the Americas. Comparing and connecting the Brazilian case to concurrent peopling efforts across the globe unsettles understandings of colonization as part of a global settler revolution of which Brazil figured as a peripheral case. The key role played by companies as the harbingers of a new colonization paradigm underscores profit as a guiding principle in Brazilian colonization schemes in the nineteenth century.

Companies are one of the most common forms of legal entity. They are popular business and investment vehicles and are also used for many other purposes. ASIC’s website indicates that there were 3,241,836 registered companies in Australia as at July 2023. While some of these have only one member, others have many thousands of members. Many large companies are listed on stock exchanges around the world, and their shares are traded daily. At the time of writing, the largest company listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (‘ASX’) was the mining company, BHP Group, which had a market capitalisation of around $230 billion. Companies make up the majority of Australia’s largest taxpayers. Traditionally, Australia has relied heavily on corporate taxation for its tax revenue, and it has one of the highest corporate tax-to-GDP ratios in the OECD. This chapter examines how the tax law applies to companies and their members (eg shareholders). Special taxation rules apply to certain companies, such as PDFs, life insurers, co-operatives, listed investment companies and corporate collective investment vehicles. A separate taxation regime also applies to companies that are members of a consolidated group.

Unlike late nineteenth-century nostalgists, modern readers are unlikely to conclude that the Company was an enlightened promoter of knowledge. Still, those concerned with the present relations among companies, states, and knowledge might learn much from the earlier debates in which it was involved.

Chapter 5 turns to the economic sphere, with special attention to the emergence of the modern economic corporation, as a competitor par excellence. I examine its origins in medieval antecedents, how post-revolutionary US was the ideal environment for its initial cultivation and elaboration, and its subsequent development in Europe and beyond. The economic firm is in many ways the ‘ideal type’ of the modern corporate actor, but I am concerned to show in the next two chapters that new corporate actors in the political and ideological/cultural spheres are also crucial to the general domestication of competition in liberal societies.

The legitimacy of ISDS appears to depend in part on an expectation that it benefits smaller businesses, not just large multinationals and the super-wealthy. This chapter collects data on size and wealth of the foreign investors that have brought claims and received monetary awards due to ISDS. Categories for the size and wealth of foreign investors are compared to the size of damage awards, which helps determine that the primary beneficiaries in ISDS cases have been companies with annual revenue exceeding US$1 billion and individuals with net wealth in excess of US$100 million. The main finding is that the beneficiaries of ISDS-ordered financial transfers, in the aggregate, have overwhelmingly been wealthy individual investors and large companies – and especially extra-large companies. The authors also note that the awards gained by small companies are not so different from their legal costs.

The majority of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions result from the activities of non-state actors (NSAs). States recognize the need to engage with NSAs as mitigation actors, including by encouraging or requiring them to pledge, or commit to, mitigation action. NSAs are also making waves through civil-society organizations (CSOs) bringing cases to court to test the legal obligations of large corporations. This chapter reflects on the academic and social debates on whether NSAs—in particular, companies, cities, and CSOs—have any legal obligation to mitigate climate change or could meaningfully assume such an obligation, and whether they have demonstrated any kind of effective leadership in mitigation action. The author finds that, while NSAs assert themselves as high-profile players in the mitigation realm, their effectiveness is unclear, and so is their theorization as actors from a legal-scholarly perspective.

Chapter 4 focuses on the variety of governors in areas of limited statehood. State and non-state, local, national, transnational, as well as international actors are motivated to engage in governance in areas of limited statehood if certain conditions are present. Moreover, we find the entire range of modes of governance, from hierarchical steering including the use of force to inclusive, participatory, and deliberative governance. We start with external state governance, including international and regional organizations, development agencies, and foreign governments. We then turn to the non-state sector, starting with (I)NGOs and multi-stakeholder partnerships. A very different type of actor are (multinational) companies who are usually not inclined to become governors to begin with. In contrast, “traditional” authorities, such as tribal chiefs and community leaders as well as non-state justice institutions tend to be among the most important indigenous governors in many areas of limited statehood. A rather unlikely group of governors are violent non-state actors such as rebel groups or warlords.

Chapter 6 investigates human rights, the rule of law, as well as participatory institutions. Democratic governance is possible, even if state capacities to enforce rules and decisions are weak or absent. We start by addressing the human rights problematique in areas of limited statehood. Strengthening state capacity might do human rights and the rule of law more harm than good, resulting in autocratic and repressive statehood. We explore the effectiveness of regional organizations (RO) and of (I)NGOs and non-state justice institutions to provide fair and transparent access to justice as a crucial component of the rule of law. They can accomplish these goals, the more their institutional design enables deliberative negotiations through fair and transparent procedures. The remainder of the chapter discusses the effectiveness of companies and rebel groups to engage in human rights and democratic governance. It is one thing to expect from companies to comply with human rights norms. It is quite different to ask them to promote human rights and the rule of law beyond their premises. Rebel groups are more likely to provide effective human rights and inclusive governance, particularly if they require international and domestic legitimacy and if they are faced with trust-based communities.

English imperial networks in the seventeenth century connected London, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, New England, and North Africa through intersecting commercial, religious, political, and intellectual commitments. These networks were populated by scholars, scientists, and slaves, as well as missionaries, merchants, and ministers. Their connections reveal relationships – between translation and conversion, commerce and religion, and English and Native peoples – that span from Malaysia to Massachusetts. This chapter focuses on the role of companies, violence, and translation in these multilayered global contexts and brings those features to bear on the way we understand American literary and cultural history and the role of puritanism in it.

Chapter 5 examines the bubble that occurred in Australia in the late 1880s. During 1887 and 1888, there was a major bubble in the price of suburban land, particularly in Melbourne. In addition, companies involved in the financing and development of urban land were created at this time and during the first half of 1888, their share prices doubled. After the peak in October 1888, the share prices of these companies and urban land prices fell sharply. We then explain why it took several years for the liquidation of the land boom to affect the wider economy. The chapter then moves on to discuss how the bubble triangle explains this episode. In particular, this was the first major bubble where investors were speculating with other people’s money, provided ultimately by the country’s banks. The spark which ignited the land boom was the liberalisation in 1887 of the restriction on banks’ lending on the security of real estate. This was the final act in a 25-year liberalisation process. The chapter concludes by examining the dire consequences of the bubble. In 1893, the Australian banking system collapsed and, as a result, Australia experienced a very long and deep economic recession

Chapter 3 examines the bubble that occurred in the UK in 1824 and 1825. This bubble concerned the promotion of Latin American mining companies and various new companies on the London stock market. The price of mining shares quintupled and those of other new companies more than doubled between August 1824 and February 1825. Over the next year, the prices of these stocks plummeted. This was then followed by one of the most serious banking crises ever to hit the UK. The chapter then moves on to discuss how all three sides of the bubble triangle were in play. Marketability had been revived by the liberalising attitudes of MPs in the UK Parliament. Part-paid shares leveraged the buying of shares and, allied to low denominations and low returns on other assets, stimulated speculation. The spark which set the bubble fire alight was a change in government policy towards Latin America and the corporation. The chapter concludes by examining the consequences of the bubble. The post-bubble banking crisis which started in December 1825 resulted in the collapse of many banks and was followed by a very deep recession.