The irony behind a simple definition of ‘[t]rusts for the transfer of money or other property for a specified purpose’1 is that, in continuing to name them after Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments,2 the doctrine seems to be as elusive as ever.3 In China Life Trustees v China Energy Reserve and Chemicals Group Overseas Company,4 the task of throwing light on the Quistclose trust fell to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA) for the first time.

The passage into law of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA 2023) marks the first time that Parliament has made significant changes to the common law principles of corporate criminal liability. First, for fault-based crimes, the ECCTA 2023 extends the common law practice of identifying a company with the criminal acts of its directors. By virtue of section 196 of the Act, a company may now also be identified with fault-based criminal acts engaged in by its ‘senior managers’ below directorial level. Secondly, the ECCTA 2023 creates a new corporate offence of failing to prevent fraud, although this may be committed only by so-called ‘large organisations’. I argue that the first of these reforms was not properly thought through, and that it should in any event have been made largely redundant by giving wider scope to the second of these reforms. An opportunity was missed in the ECCTA 2023 to make a failure-to-prevent serious crime a more generally applicable principle of corporate criminal liability.

In One Savings Bank plc v Catherine Waller-Edwards,1 the Court of Appeal considered – for the first time – whether banks are put on constructive notice to potential undue influence in joint benefit remortgage/suretyship hybrid transactions. At a time where there is an increasing awareness of economic abuse as a form of domestic abuse,2 this appeal offered an important opportunity to reassess banks’ responsibilities in assisting potential victim-survivors. Unfortunately, that opportunity was not seized. In this case comment, I set out the negative impacts the Court of Appeal judgment could have on victim-survivors of economic abuse going forward, and how these concerns could – since this case has now been given leave to appeal – be addressed by the Supreme Court.

Where, on the face of a contract, the existence of a debt is conditional on the occurrence of a particular fact, and that fact has not occurred, because the person who promised payment has prevented it from occurring, does the debt arise nevertheless on the notion that the condition is then to be deemed fulfilled? In King Crude Carriers SA v Ridgebury November LLC,1 a unanimous Court of Appeal, reversing the judge, endorsed the effect of that notion while appearing to resituate it as a matter of contractual construction, based upon the objective intention of the contracting parties. That would be a step in the right direction. The precise nature of that notion remains murky, however, and would profit from further clarification.

Natasha Abrahart was a physics student at the University of Bristol. She was suffering from depression and social anxiety disorder, which seriously impacted her ability to partake in oral assessments. Eventually, Natasha sadly took her own life. Her father, Dr Robert Abrahart, as personal representative and estate administrator, sued the University of Bristol for negligence and breach of sections 15, 19 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010, read with section 91(2)(a) and/or (f) of the same Act.1 Under such provisions, universities have a duty to provide reasonable adjustments and support, in educational provision and assessments, to disabled students, defined by section 6(1) of the Equality Act 2010 as ‘a physical or mental impairment’ which has ‘a substantial and long-term adverse effect’ on the ability to ‘carry out normal day-to-day activities’. However, Schedule 13, para 4(2), to the Equality Act 2010 exempts those assessments which constitute a competency standard, defined as ‘an academic, medical or other standard applied for the purpose of determining whether or not a person has a particular level of competence or ability’.2

Despite its contested scientific validity, polygraph interviewing is now an established yet opaque practice within criminal justice in England and Wales, with statute law covering polygraph use in the context of probation for released offenders. In this paper, we highlight non-statutory uses of the polygraph by police forces in England and Wales by presenting analysis of responses to freedom of information (FOI) requests. The boundaries around police polygraph use are undefined and potentially elastic. The policies disclosed state that polygraph interviewing is conducted with regard to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the Human Rights Act 1998; yet it is denied that a polygraph examination is a criminal interview conducted under PACE. Furthermore, there is a significant risk that the common law may not satisfy the quality of law requirement insofar as it is insufficiently clear who will be subject to polygraph testing, why and in what circumstances. Therefore, we argue that the legal basis for the police’s use of the polygraph is inadequate and imprecise. Without openness and scrutiny regarding the extent of this use, it is difficult to see how the key human rights principle of foreseeability can protect citizens from the risk of arbitrariness.

It is 100 years since the rights of those in ‘actual occupation’ joined the statute book as interests capable of binding transferees of land despite not appearing on the register. This paper seizes the opportunity to investigate and excavate the overlooked and under-examined historical origins of the actual occupation concept and to revisit the oft-touted rationales for the principle’s recognition. In so doing, the paper rejects the commonly-rehearsed justifications for the concept and makes the radical case for abolition of actual occupation.

The Irish Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 allows a broad approach to civil legal aid, but cultural legacies distort civil legal aid towards legal remedies on marital breakdown. The genesis of the symbiotic relationship between civil legal aid and family law is explored through in-depth examination of archival materials related to Airey v Ireland, while modern day qualitative interviews with Legal Aid Board workers investigate how entrenched this distortion towards marital breakdown remains and how it manifests. This Irish experience demonstrates the need to consider how legal aid is dependent on and informed by other substantive areas of law, and the potential for certain legal areas to dominate, distorting national legal aid provision and discourse.

This paper explores the use of mediation in medical treatment disputes through the lens of therapeutic justice (TJ), a concept developed in the 1990s to consider the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic effects of justice systems. The paper argues that mediation may be a mechanism for achieving therapeutic effects for people involved in medical treatment disputes. In doing so, the paper highlights the conflict that can often arise between healthcare professionals, family members and patients in medical treatment disputes and the related difficulties with using litigation to resolve this type of conflict. It has been suggested by judges, academics and policy-makers that mediation might be a better way of resolving conflict in these cases. While mediation and TJ have much in common, the paper explores the many tensions between them, considering ways in which mediation might need to be done differently to achieve therapeutic aims. Finally, the paper identifies six TJ features against which mediation can be tested to consider whether it can live up to the claims that it can be used to resolve medical treatment disputes more therapeutically.

This paper explores understudied issues surrounding accessions to shareholder and partnership agreements: the process by which such accessions take effect; the survival of equities following an accession; and the enforcement of a condition for incoming shareholders to have to execute and deliver a deed of accession. Accessions happen extremely often in modern commercial life, which renders surprising the dearth of academic and judicial discussion, but more disconcerting is the unsettledness of some of the complex issues implicated. The repurposing of unilateral contracts to explain how deeds of accession operate is not fully tested in English law; the conception of partial novation as adumbrated in Unitech Global Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG, which is not even law – much less bad law – has already generated academic controversy; and the enforcement of a condition precedent, in the form of prior accession to a shareholder agreement, for registration of membership in a company interacts in an uncertain way with the Companies Act 2006, lending impetus to the adoption of new methods for attaining relief.

In recent years concern about Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) has intensified, prompting calls for societal action. Pregnant women's consumption of alcohol is increasingly surveilled, public health campaigns now promote abstinence, and in some jurisdictions, prenatal alcohol exposure (PAE) resulting in FASD has received criminal sanction. This paper anticipates potential calls to criminalise PAE resulting in FASD by envisioning what such a case might look like. Applying Duff et al's framework for determining whether an act should be criminalised, we draw upon public health and jurisprudential discourses to trace the outline of an argument for framing maternal alcohol consumption causing injury to the child born alive as a public wrong and a crime.1 We show how an ‘in principle’ case may be constructed, but argue that countervailing principles, including women's rights, and practical considerations, tell decisively against criminalisation.

To promote cooperation among stakeholders in different jurisdictions to facilitate coordinated insolvency proceedings, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI) in 1997. The MLCBI harmonises certain procedural aspects of the cross-border insolvency process, though states may choose to make modifications when adopting the MLCBI in their own legal systems. This was completed in Singapore in 2017, and the Singapore Model Law (SML) can now be found in the Third Schedule to the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (2020 Rev Ed) (IRDA 2018). One topic that has been the subject of much debate internationally is whether foreign solvent proceedings can be recognised under the MLCBI or the corresponding provisions in various jurisdictions: the Nevada Bankruptcy Court first answered this question in the affirmative, but this was explicitly rejected by the High Court of England and Wales (EWHC) in Re Sturgeon Central Asia Balanced Fund Ltd (in liquidation) (No 2) (Re Sturgeon). In Ascentra Holdings, Inc (in official liquidation) v SPGK Pte Ltd (Ascentra), the Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA) held that foreign proceedings concerning solvent companies may be recognised under the SML. This commentary addresses the salient points of the SGCA's judgment and highlights the positive impact of this gradual harmonisation of the approaches taken in different jurisdictions to the MLCBI. Through a comparative analysis of the conflicting Re Sturgeon decision, three additional justifications based on the preparatory documents pertaining to the MLCBI, relevant authorities in the UK and a purposive reading of the MLCBI are provided for the approach in Ascentra. It is contended in closing that these reasons support the argument for definitively overruling the Re Sturgeon decision in the UK.

The sovereign power to control the entry and residence of persons in the state, and the corollary power to deport, has long been considered to be a defining feature of statehood. State discretion as to who may remain within the national border is, however, tempered by international and regional human rights obligations, as well as domestic constitutional principles. In this context, it is well established that a deportation will violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) if it constitutes a disproportionate interference with family and/or private life in the host country.