Research on platform power indicates a preference alignment between consumers and platforms against regulation. However, recent scandals have changed public opinion toward platforms and undermined their structural coalition with consumers. I argue that amid the techlash, platforms need to actively mobilize the public and face an uphill battle in doing so. Based on the outside lobbying literature, I expect that platforms’ success in reframing the debate and signaling public discontent to policymakers depends on the perceptibility of the target audience (the bonding surface) and the characteristics of competing interest groups. I test my expectations by analyzing platform outside lobbying against the 2019 European Copyright Directive. I combine process-tracing and time-series analysis with textual data. A comparison between the German and French debates revealed that platform outside lobbying failed because negative media reporting, public opinion, and a creative economy dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in France provided a favorable bonding surface for the frames of pro-copyright groups. Pro-copyright groups could credibly criticize platforms’ exploitative practices and demand fair artist remuneration, while platforms’ frames did not stick. This study demonstrates that claims of structural platform power are exaggerated and that careful attention needs to be paid to lobbying dynamics.

In the last few years, legitimacy has proven to be a fundamental power resource for the business class. Building on the idea of “discursive power,” investigations have demonstrated that when the business class successfully shapes public discourses and public opinion, its power increases. With this article, we contribute to this research by showing that businesses’ success in building discursive power, as expressed in individual trust in private companies, is limited by individual- and macro-level factors associated with class inequality, class politics, and power. Using data from 15 Latin American countries (2005–2015), we show that in the period studied, the propensity to trust private companies was significantly lower among those in underprivileged class positions (e.g., working-class people or the informal self-employed) and among those who identify with the political left and have less confidence in political institutions. At the macro level, trust in companies was lower in countries ruled by the left or in countries where inequality rose or where citizens’ trust in political institutions improved. At the end of this article, we identify three patterns of business legitimacy in Latin America and show how our results contribute to the recent research on trust, class, and power.

Business power is thought to increase over time when private actors are involved in the provision of public goods and services. This paper argues that this is partially true—and that in certain circumstances, state actors can even swiftly regain control of sectors previously ceded to private interests. When the latter fulfill some public functions on behalf or as delegates of the state, policymakers face ever greater pressures to sustain a relationship flawed by principal-agent problems—allowing business actors to derive appreciable political benefits. However, these conditions do not hold true after deregulation—when state actors retreat from a sector and attempt to direct the newly created market through licensing, norms, and standard setting. We demonstrate that deregulation sets the stage for a more competitive environment, making it harder for private interests to cooperate. This, in turn, can allow policymakers to enhance regulatory capacities and seize opportunities to highlight the shortcomings of private provision. After establishing this argument theoretically, we illustrate its implications through the comparative historical analysis of the health insurance sector in two European countries—Belgium and France. Despite their initial similarities, they experience contrasting developments regarding the welfare state’s dependency on private insurers for the provision of crucial collective goods.

The article aims to analyse how the business power of actors in the Argentine automotive industry influenced the foreign trade policies relevant to the sector between 2002 and 2015. The research methods employed combine documentary sources, interviews with key informants and descriptive statistics. The overall findings show how automakers achieved considerable power in the first stage of the period, obtaining clear benefits in terms of foreign trade policy. However, macroeconomic and political changes in Argentina after 2008 had a negative impact on their business power, leading to their enjoying a reduced number of trade policy concessions.

In 2021 the ruling party in Poland proposed a reform to reverse the regressivity of the Polish tax system. Although the number of potential beneficiaries significantly exceeded the number of sufferers, the media coverage of the reform was strongly negative. This pushed the government to introduce reform adjustments, all of which benefited the high-income self-employed, increasing the cost of the reform and reducing its redistributive effect. To explain this, we analyze articles on the reform published in the three most opinion-forming newspapers. We demonstrate that the negative media coverage stemmed from successful incorporation of business narratives in the public debate by the business lobbying associations. It was supported by the weakness of workers’ organizations and a low level of citizens’ trust in government.

The marketisation of European home care has given rise to significant private for-profit providers growth. However, little research has focused directly on commercial companies to examine the mechanisms through which they emerge, grow and shape long-term care policy – this is this paper’s task. Drawing on the literature on business power, the recent concept of “institutional business power” is introduced, defined as the power flowing from the entrenched position of business actors in the provision of public social services. The paper identifies the mechanisms through which private providers have grown and assesses the extent of their institutional power by examining their influence on policy and the support they obtain from relevant home care stakeholders. The limits of providers’ institutional power are also discussed. The paper relies on semi-structured interviews with representatives of public, private and non-profit home care providers.

Recent decades have witnessed increased public concern about vehicle emissions and growing frustration with political inaction and business preferences for the status quo. This article provides historical perspective on such regulatory dynamics by analyzing the Swiss and the Swedish cases of vehicle emission governance in the1970s-1980s. Relying on archival documents detailing the policy process in both countries as well as on international regulatory arenas, the analysis focuses on political solutions for reducing the toxicity of vehicle emissions. It uncovers the influence of national as well as international business groups and the existence of the tension between various national ministries, arising from conflicting environmental and trade-related goals. Is also highlights the importance of different institutional settings in creating the expertise to explain the political outcomes. While the Swiss corporatist system gave a great deal of power to a variety of interest groups at each stage of the political process, the Swedish government invested significant resources in the creation of independent expertise and enjoyed a relative autonomy, despite the importance of the Swedish car industry. The analysis also assesses the importance of the Swiss–Swedish collaboration in overcoming certain obstacles and their contribution to the implementation of stricter regulations in Europe that ultimately occurred at the margins of the European Economic Community.

This article develops a micro-level theoretical perspective of business influence in international negotiations. By drawing on organizational institutional theory, the article proposes that site-specific institutionalized norms can structure the nature and extent of business power. The article illustrates the value of this perspective through an illustrative case study of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through interviews and participant observation of on-site dynamics during negotiations on environmental shipping regulation. The article shows how, in the case of the IMO, specific institutionalized norms and beliefs structure private actors’ possible influence and their claims to authority. In particular, strongly held beliefs about the nature of political deliberation in the IMO both constrain and enable business interests, sometimes overriding the general structural power of the shipping industry. This research implies that future scholarship of business power and lobbying should be attentive to specific institutionalized ideas structuring business actors’ range of legitimate activities, in particular in international institutions where individual negotiation sites can develop idiosyncratic norms and beliefs about the legitimacy of private actor participation.

The global financial crisis of 2008, its following bank bailouts, and associated corporate impunity sparked a renewed interest in the concept of the structural power of business and the question of “who rules?” in capitalist societies. This new wave of scholarship mitigated some of the problems of the original, theory-driven discussions from the 1970s and 1980s. But despite significant advancements in the empirical identification of business power, we lack a unified framework for studying its working mechanisms. So-called hybrid approaches, drawing on instrumental and structural power for their analyses, display high potential for such a unified and easily applicable framework. We build on this hybrid tradition and propose a novel model that integrates instrumental and structural power analysis into a basic framework. With this, we recalibrate the often rigid division between instrumental and structural power forms and emphasize the role of perceptions as key for understanding the dynamics of business power over time. We illustrate this parsimonious framework by an analysis of the plans of the Dutch government to abolish a dividend tax in 2018 that would have benefited a number of large multinationals but collapsed before implementation.

It has long been overlooked that factions of finance such as banks and insurers can have opposing policy interests. This paper is concerned with the preferences and strategies of private financial actors in the context of private prefunded pensions. To capture the “tug of war” among these actors, this paper identifies their different financial business models (insurance- and investment-orientation), political roles (financial incumbents and challengers), and levels at which infighting may occur (political and product-market level). For the German case, it shows that product-market competition among financial incumbents and challengers over retirement savings products only turned into competition politics during the 1990s, when shifting political winds provided an opening to insert path-shaping instruments in line with the program of finance capitalism. Financial actors’ preferences are not a derivative of economic or functional incentives, but socially embedded in that they are crucially shaped by interactions with their competitors and the political environment. The analysis disentangles the complex web of competition, cooperation, and ownership among factions of finance and discerns their genuine preferences from those strategically adjusted to context. This sheds doubt on functionalist explanations of (pension) financialization and enhances our understanding of how financial actors form and pursue their preferences.

Recent years have seen a revival of debates about the role of business and the sources of business power in postindustrial political economies. Scholarly accounts commonly distinguish between structural sources of business power, connected to its privileged position in capitalist economies, and instrumental sources, related to direct forms of lobbying by business actors. The authors argue that this distinction overlooks an important third source of business power, which they conceptualize as institutional business power. Institutional business power results when state actors delegate public functions to private business actors. Over time, through policy feedback and lock-in effects, institutional business power contributes to an asymmetrical dependence of the state on the continued commitment of private business actors. This article elaborates the theoretical argument behind this claim, providing empirical examples of growing institutional business power in education in Germany, Sweden, and the United States.

After the subprime financial crisis, the countries who were worst affected set about reforming legacy financial regulations. Given multiple similarities in the way they experienced the crisis and the similar complexions of their post-crisis economies and politics, the contrast between the UK and the Netherlands' approaches to breaking up their largest banks presents a puzzle for prevailing theories in the politics of financial regulation. Both countries explored a range of reform options using similar expert committees, but while UK policymakers determined that commercial and investment operations should be ring-fenced in the largest British banks, the Dutch reform program centered on the banks’ own recommendations to change banking culture from the bottom up by developing a code of conduct and banker's oath. The paper traces this divergence to two related effects produced by the countries’ contrasting majoritarian and consensus party systems: power sharing and coalition formation. Under conditions of high issue salience, both worked to encourage British policymakers to prioritize reform, while in the Netherlands each factor reduced party political responsiveness and de-emphasized alternatives to the banks’ own reform prescriptions. The paper ultimately suggests that institutional democratic variables are worthy of greater recognition among scholars of business power and financial regulation.

What explains the remarkable resilience of pension regulation in postauthoritarian Chile, even after decades of majoritarian voter discontent and growing international and domestic criticism of Pinochet’s pioneering private capitalization system? This puzzling outcome can be understood only by looking at the combined effect of the pension industry’s long-term power-building investments and its short-term political actions to outmaneuver state and societal challengers. Engaging new theoretical developments in political economy and historical institutionalism, this study examines the long-term process by which the previously nonexistent Chilean pension industry expanded and leveraged its power during key episodes of open contestation. The analysis of pension regulation in Chile between the 1980s and the 2010s illustrates the importance of placing business power in time, motivating new rounds of theory building in the quest to address the perennial question of how business gets what it wants in the political arena.

Following formal economic liberalisation in 1991, business, in particular big business, has gained increasing access to and influence over policy decision-making in India. Industry has been an outspoken critic of national labour laws and has lobbied extensively for greater labour market flexibility. While business has not been successful in influencing “official” labour reform at the national level, it was able to influence labour policy within the National Manufacturing Policy 2011, which curtailed labour protections and implemented “hire and fire” policies. Utilising qualitative data from 40 face-to-face interviews with policy stakeholders in New Delhi, India, this paper aims to explore how business was able to influence labour reform within this policy as well as underscore the wider social welfare implications that may follow. It will be argued that the ability of business to dictate labour reform, while strong, is somewhat variable as competing factors serve to constrain business influence. Furthermore, the extent to which labour laws are hindering manufacturing investment is widely debatable. Nevertheless, curtailment of labour protections, as afforded in this policy, will have a widespread and damaging impact on workers. While the policy promises to empower rural youth, provide gainful employment, and enable growth to become more sustainable and inclusive for its citizens, it is questionable whether these goals can be achieved alongside the curtailment of labour protections.