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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2024
The central role of economic elites in shaping public policy in Latin America has become increasingly clear. Yet most of the recent literature on the subject focuses on democratic contexts. This paper analyses pension privatisation in Chile as a case study for improving our understanding of business–state interaction in authoritarian contexts. Globally, the 1981 pension reform carried out during the Pinochet dictatorship became an example for pension privatisation elsewhere. Analysis of the policy-making process, based on novel empirical material, shows that from 1973 financial groups accumulated growing power which enabled them to first (a) defeat their opponents within the economic elite, (b) overpower their rivals within the state and, finally, (c) force Pinochet into passing pension privatisation legislation. Our results stress the need to include the study of different actors’ power resources – along with ideological issues and the regime structure – in attempts to understand the outcome of policy processes in authoritarian contexts.
El papel central de las élites económicas en la configuración de las políticas públicas en América Latina es cada vez más claro. Sin embargo, la mayor parte de la literatura reciente sobre el tema se centra en contextos democráticos. Este artículo analiza la privatización de las pensiones en Chile como un estudio de caso para ampliar nuestra comprensión de la interacción entre empresarios y Estado en contextos autoritarios. Globalmente, la reforma de las pensiones de 1981 llevada a cabo durante la dictadura de Pinochet se convirtió en un ejemplo de privatización de las pensiones en varios países del mundo. El análisis del proceso de formulación de esta política, basado en material empírico novedoso, muestra que desde 1973 los grupos financieros acumularon un poder creciente que les permitió primero (a) derrotar a sus oponentes al interior de la élite económica, (b) dominar a sus rivales dentro del Estado y, finalmente, (c) obligar a Pinochet a aprobar la privatización de las pensiones. Nuestros hallazgos enfatizan la necesidad de incluir el estudio de los recursos de poder de diferentes actores – junto con aspectos ideológicos y la estructura del régimen – para comprender el resultado de los procesos políticos en contextos autoritarios.
O papel central das elites econômicas na definição das políticas públicas na América Latina tornou-se cada vez mais claro. No entanto, a maior parte da literatura recente sobre o assunto centra-se em contextos democráticos. Este artigo analisa a privatização das pensões no Chile como um estudo de caso para melhorar a nossa compreensão da interação entre empresas e Estado em contextos autoritários. Globalmente, a reforma das pensões de 1981, levada a cabo durante a ditadura de Pinochet, tornou-se um exemplo de privatização das pensões em vários países do mundo. A análise do processo de elaboração desta política, com base em material empírico novo, mostra que desde 1973 os grupos financeiros acumularam um poder crescente que lhes permitiu primeiro (a) derrotar os seus oponentes dentro da elite econômica, (b) dominar os seus rivais dentro do Estado, e, finalmente, (c) forçar Pinochet a aprovar a privatização das pensões. Os nossos resultados sublinham a necessidade de incluir o estudo dos recursos de poder dos diferentes atores – juntamente com aspectos ideológicos e a estrutura do regime – para compreender o resultado dos processos políticos em contextos autoritários.
1 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 398-A’, 14 Oct. 1980, Actas Secretas de la Junta de Gobierno, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (hereafter ASJG), p. 3. Online at https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/34262/1/acta398_1980_A.pdf (all URLs last accessed 4 July 2024).
2 Ibid., p. 9.
3 In contrast to defined-contribution pension systems based on individual capitalisation accounts managed by for-profit providers, pay-as-you-go systems are state-managed, defined-benefit pension schemes funded by contributions from current workers to pay retirees’ pensions.
4 Huneeus, Carlos, The Pinochet Regime (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Silva, Eduardo, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996)Google Scholar; Foxley, Alejandro, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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7 See for example: Schiappacasse, Ignacio, ‘Business Power in Post-Authoritarian Chile: Explaining Regulatory Continuity in the Pension System, 1990–1994’, Revista Española de Sociología, 29: 3 (2020), pp. 503–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Broockman, David, ‘The “Problem of Preferences”: Medicare and Business Support for the Welfare State’, Studies in American Political Development, 26: 2 (2012), pp. 83–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schiappacasse, Ignacio, ‘Continuidad del sistema de AFP en democracia: el rol del poder de la elite económica’, Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política, 12: 1 (2021), pp. 104–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bril-Mascarenhas, Tomás and Maillet, Antoine, ‘How to Build and Wield Business Power: The Political Economy of Pension Regulation in Chile, 1990–2018’, Latin American Politics and Society, 61: 1 (2019), pp. 101–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 Orenstein, Mitchell A., Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brooks, Sarah M., ‘Globalization and Pension Reform in Latin America’, Latin American Politics and Society, 49: 4 (2007), pp. 31–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 David Collier, ‘Overview of the Bureaucratic–Authoritarian Model’, in David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 19–32; David Collier, ‘Introduction’, in Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, pp. 3–16.
10 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979).
11 E.g. Juan J. Linz, ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes’, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 5: Government Institutions and Processes (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 175–411; Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
12 Ben Ross Schneider, ‘Elusive Synergy: Business–Government Relations and Development’, Comparative Politics, 31: 1 (1998), pp. 101–22.
13 Andrés Velasco, ‘The State and Economic Policy: Chile 1952–92’, in Barry P. Bosworth, Rudiger Dornbusch and Raúl Labán (eds.), The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), pp. 379–411.
14 Jeffry A. Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
15 Castiglioni, ‘The Politics of Retrenchment’; Castiglioni, The Politics of Social Policy Change.
16 The so-called ‘Chicago Boys’ were a group of Chilean economists, the majority of whom obtained their undergraduate degrees in economics at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and subsequently achieved their graduate degrees at the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago, under the instruction of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. Borzutzky, ‘Chilean Politics and Social Security Policies’; Borzutzky, Vital Connections; Borzutzky, ‘You Win Some, You Lose Some’; Raúl L. Madrid, Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Castiglioni, ‘Explaining Uneven Social Policy Expansion’.
17 Silva, The State and Capital in Chile.
18 Tasha Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America: Business Power and Tax Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Tasha Fairfield and Candelaria Garay, ‘Redistribution under the Right in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Organized Actors in Policymaking’, Comparative Political Studies, 50: 14 (2017), pp. 1871–1906; Tomás Bril-Mascarenhas and Aldo Madariaga, ‘Business Power and the Minimal State: The Defeat of Industrial Policy in Chile’, Journal of Development Studies, 55: 6 (2019), pp. 1047–66; Schiappacasse, ‘Business Power in Post-Authoritarian Chile’; Bril-Mascarenhas and Maillet, ‘How to Build and Wield Business Power’.
19 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, ‘Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State’, Politics and Society, 30: 2 (2002), pp. 277–325.
20 Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
21 Fred Block, ‘The Ruling Class does not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State’, Socialist Revolution, 7: 3 (May–June 1977), pp. 6–28; Lindblom, Politics and Markets.
22 Tasha Fairfield, ‘Structural Power in Comparative Political Economy: Perspectives from Policy Formulation in Latin America’, Business and Politics, 17: 3 (2015), pp. 411–41.
23 Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996).
24 Marek Naczyk, ‘Agents of Privatization? Business Groups and the Rise of Pension Funds in Continental Europe’, Socio-Economic Review, 11: 3 (2013), pp. 441–69; Marek Naczyk, ‘Creating French-Style Pension Funds: Business, Labour and the Battle over Patient Capital’, Journal of European Social Policy, 26: 3 (2016), pp. 205–18.
25 For a complete and detailed study of businesses’ sources of power and their observable implications in democratic contexts see Fairfield, Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America, pp. 27–52.
26 Winters, Power in Motion; Pepper D. Culpepper, ‘Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era’, Business and Politics, 17: 3 (2015), pp. 391–409.
27 Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), ‘El Ladrillo’: bases de la política económica del gobierno militar chileno, ed. by Sergio de Castro and Juan Carlos Méndez (Santiago: CEP, 1992). See also Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1988); Silva, The State and Capital in Chile.
28 Silva, The State and Capital in Chile.
29 Jeff Frieden, ‘Classes, Sectors, and Foreign Debt in Latin America’, Comparative Politics, 21: 1 (1988), pp. 1–20.
30 Eduardo Silva, ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Business–State Nexus in Chile's Economic Transformation, 1975–1994’, Comparative Politics, 28: 3 (1996), pp. 299–320; Silva, The State and Capital in Chile.
31 Pilar Vergara, Auge y caída del neoliberalismo en Chile: un estudio sobre la evolución ideológica del régimen militar (Santiago: FLACSO, 1984).
32 See further below and Eduardo Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring: Chile, 1973–88’, World Politics, 45: 4 (1993), pp. 526–59.
33 Mónica González, La conjura: los mil y un días del golpe (Santiago: UDP/Catalonia, 2012).
34 Vergara, Auge y caída del neoliberalismo en Chile; Verónica Valdivia, El golpe después del golpe: Leigh vs. Pinochet. Chile 1960–1980 (Santiago: LOM, 2003).
35 Philip J. O'Brien and Jacqueline Roddick, The Pinochet Decade (London: Latin American Bureau, 1983); Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet.
36 Valdés, Pinochet's Economists; Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet.
37 Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions’.
38 Philip O'Brien, ‘The New Leviathan: The Chicago School and the Chilean Regime 1973–80’, IDS Bulletin, 13: 1 (1981), pp. 38–50; ‘Reportaje: Los Chicago Boys’, Qué Pasa, 29 May 1975, pp. 32–7; Víctor Herrero, Agustín Edwards Eastman: una biografía desclasificada del dueño de El Mercurio (Santiago: Debate, 2014).
39 Fernando Dahse, El poder de los grandes grupos económicos nacionales (Santiago: FLACSO, 1983); Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions’. Subsequently, the BHC conglomerate became known as the Vial conglomerate, named after its main shareholder Javier Vial.
40 Castiglioni, The Politics of Social Policy Change; Borzutzky, Vital Connections.
41 Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet.
42 Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime.
43 CEP, ‘El Ladrillo’, p. 130.
44 Valdivia, El golpe después del golpe; Vergara, Auge y caída del neoliberalismo en Chile.
45 O'Brien, ‘The New Leviathan’.
46 Guillermo Campero, ‘Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime’, in Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksić (eds.), The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982–1990 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), pp. 128–60; Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
47 Ministerio del Trabajo, Anteproyecto del estatuto fundamental de principios y bases del sistema de seguridad social (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria y Ministerio del Trabajo, 1975).
48 Carlos Huneeus, ‘Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The “ODEPLAN Boys” and the “Gremialists” in Pinochet's Chile’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 32: 2 (2000), pp. 461–501.
49 Ministerio del Trabajo, Anteproyecto.
50 Borzutzky, ‘Chilean Politics and Social Security Policies’.
51 Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Conversando con Roberto Kelly V.: recuerdos de una vida (Santiago: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2005); Patricia Arancibia Clavel, Chile: un milagro. Roberto Kelly, un padre fundador (Santiago: Self-published, 2013).
52 Kast's report is lost, but it is referred to by Patricia Arancibia Clavel and Francisco Balart Páez, Sergio de Castro: el arquitecto del modelo económico chileno (Santiago: Editorial Biblioteca Americana, 2007), pp. 323–4 and Heraldo Muñoz, The Dictador's Shadow: Life under Augusto Pinochet – A Political Memoir (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 80. See also Ignacio Schiappacasse and Carlos Tromben, ‘Más allá de José Piñera: los verdaderos padres del actual sistema de pensiones chileno’, Interferencia (Santiago), 8 Aug. 2020, https://interferencia.cl/articulos/mas-alla-de-jose-pinera-los-verdaderos-padres-del-actual-sistema-de-pensiones-chileno.
53 Miguel Kast, ‘La previsión y el mercado del trabajo’; ‘El sector previsional como inversionista institucional en el mercado de capitales’, in H. Burdiles (ed.), El pensamiento de Miguel Kast en perspectiva (Santiago: Fundación Miguel Kast, 2006 [1976]), pp. 138–41; 95–105; authors’ interview with minister who served the dictatorship during the 1970s, 11 Oct. 2017.
54 Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet.
55 Gonzalo Vial, Pinochet: la biografía, vol. 1 (Santiago: El Mercurio-Aguilar, 2002), p. 274.
56 ‘Previsión II: razones para el debate’, Hoy, 22 Oct. 1980, pp. 31–2.
57 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 163-A’, 23 Oct. 1974, ASJG, p. 40.
58 ‘Anteproyecto: de la previsión a la seguridad social’, Ercilla, 19 Nov. 1975, pp. 13–17; Emilio Filippi, ‘Análisis: inquietudes frente al cambio’, Ercilla, 26 Nov. 1975, p. 11; Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 215-A’, 22 July 1975, ASJG; Ministerio del Trabajo, Anteproyecto.
59 ‘Estatuto fundamental de principios y bases del sistema de seguridad social’, El Mercurio, 8 Nov. 1975, pp. 1, 34; Borzutzky, ‘Chilean Politics and Social Security Policies’; Ministerio del Trabajo, Anteproyecto; ‘Anteproyecto: de la previsión a la seguridad social’.
60 The report has been lost. However, it is mentioned in ‘Entrevista a Alfonso Serrano’, Ercilla, 1 Dec. 1976, p. 23.
61 The gremialista movement was a conservative, right-wing political movement born in the Pontificia Universidad Católica during the late 1960s. It is the predecessor of the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), the political party that has defended the dictatorship's legacy since 1990. The gremialista movement was closely allied with the Chicago Boys during the dictatorship. Kast constituted the main bridge between these two elite groups: he had joined the gremialista movement during his undergraduate years at the Universidad Católica and was also a former postgraduate student of the University of Chicago. See Huneeus, ‘Technocrats and Politicians’. See also Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Óscar Sepúlveda, La historia oculta del régimen militar (Santiago: La Época, 1988), p. 85; Sergio Fernández, Mi lucha por la democracia (Santiago: Los Andes, 1994); authors’ interview with minister who served the dictatorship during the 1970s, 11 Oct. 2017.
62 Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet.
63 Silva, ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy’; Silva, The State and Capital in Chile; Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions’.
64 Fernando Dahse, El mapa de la extrema riqueza: los grupos económicos y el proceso de concentración de capitales (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1979).
65 The Partido Demócrata Cristiano (also known as Democracia Cristiana, DC) supported the coup against Allende, and some of its most prominent members initially participated in the dictatorship (see Figure 1). Later, however, this political party withdrew its support and ended its participation in the government in protest against the systematic human rights violations committed by the military regime. See Carlos Tromben and Ignacio Schiappacasse, Todo legal: Los grandes zarpazos de la elite financiera chilena (1973–2021) (Santiago: Editorial Planeta, 2022), pp. 28, 49–50.
66 He had originally taken over the Ministry of Finance in July 1974.
67 John R. Bawden, The Pinochet Generation: The Chilean Military in the Twentieth Century (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2016).
68 Alan Angell, ‘Chile since 1958’, in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 8: Latin America since 1930: Spanish South America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 311–82.
69 Karen Remmer, ‘Political Demobilization in Chile, 1973–1978’, Comparative Politics, 12: 3 (1980), pp. 275–301.
70 Valdivia, El golpe después del golpe.
71 Silva, The State and Capital in Chile.
72 O'Brien and Roddick, The Pinochet Decade.
73 Valdivia, El golpe después del golpe.
74 Silva, The State and Capital in Chile.
75 Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions’.
76 O'Brien and Roddick, The Pinochet Decade, p. 4.
77 Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
78 Castiglioni, The Politics of Social Policy Change; Karen L. Remmer, ‘State Change in Chile, 1973–1988’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 24: 3 (1989), pp. 5–29.
79 Guillermo Campero, Los gremios empresariales en el período 1970–1983: comportamiento sociopolítico y orientaciones ideológicas (Santiago: Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, 1984); Karen L. Remmer, ‘Public Policy and Regime Consolidation: The First Five Years of the Chilean Junta’, The Journal of Developing Areas, 13: 4 (1979), pp. 441–61.
80 Secretaría de Legislación, Historia de la ley: decreto de ley 3.500, 2 vols. (Santiago: Junta de Gobierno, 1980). As these volumes are not easily accessible, we provide them as Supplementary Materials to this article.
81 Authors’ interview with advisor at ODEPLAN 1979–80, 24 May 2017.
82 Foxley, Latin American Experiments; Alejandro Foxley, ‘The Neoconservative Economic Experiment in Chile’, in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 13–49.
83 Conversely, over the same period the state went from controlling 23.4 per cent of the external credit in 1978 to just 6.3 per cent in 1981. Dahse, Mapa de la extrema riqueza, pp. 154–6; Dahse, El poder de los grandes grupos económicos, p. 54.
84 Dahse, El poder de los grandes grupos económicos, p. 50.
85 Silva, The State and Capital in Chile, pp. 97–102.
86 Herrero, Agustín Edwards Eastman. Besides El Mercurio, the Edwards group controlled (and still controls) the evening newspaper La Segunda, and the more popular Las Últimas Noticias.
87 Human Rights Watch, The Limits of Tolerance: Freedom of Expression and the Public Debate in Chile (New York and London: Human Rights Watch, 1998). Until then, Ercilla had been a popular and influential magazine which opposed Pinochet's dictatorship.
88 For example: José Piñera, ‘A paso ligero’, Ercilla, 21 Dec. 1977, p. 20; ‘Ahora o nunca’, Ercilla, 29 March 1978, p. 25; Miguel Kast, ‘El empleo: un derecho por adquirir’, Ercilla, 26 April 1978, p. 16.
89 ‘Entrevista al general Nicanor Díaz Estrada’, in Sergio Marras (ed.), Confesiones: entrevistas con Sergio Marras (Santiago: Ornitorrinco, 1988), pp. 95–119.
90 Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime, pp. 88, 198; Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Sergio de Castro, p. 306.
91 Campero, ‘Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime’; Florencia Varas, Gustavo Leigh: el general disidente (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1979), p. 34.
92 Authors’ interview with advisor to the Minister of the Economy 1974–9, 31 May 2017; interview with Member #1 of the Technical Committee of the 1980 Pension Reform, 4 July 2017.
93 Ignacio Bazán and Francisco Artaza, ‘Regreso al origen de las AFP’, La Tercera, 31 July 2016, Sección Reportajes, pp. 10–12.
94 Arancibia Clavel and Balart Páez, Sergio de Castro, pp. 324–5.
95 Authors’ interview with Member #2 of the Technical Committee of the 1980 Pension Reform, 30 May 2017.
96 Secretaría de Legislación, Historia de la ley.
97 ‘El año de la previsión’, Hoy, 7 May 1980, p. 10.
98 Ibid.
99 Dirección de Presupuestos, El antiguo sistema previsional: cómo era y a dónde iba (Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1980).
100 Secretaría de Legislación, Historia de la ley, vol 1.
101 José Piñera, El cascabel al gato: la batalla por la Reforma Previsional (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1991).
102 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 398-A’, p. 175 and ‘Acta No. 399-A’, 24 Oct. 1980, ASJG, p. 41. Online at https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/34704/1/acta399_1980_A.pdf.
103 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 398-A’, p. 3.
104 Ibid. ‘Cajas’ is a reference to the ‘cajas previsionales’, the 32 pension funds – in bankruptcy, according to the Chicago Boys – that made up the old pay-as-you-go system.
105 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 398-A’, p. 45.
106 Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime, p. 349.
107 Ibid.
108 ‘Temas económicos: la futura marcha de la economía’, El Mercurio, 13 Sept. 1980, p. A3.
109 The Plan Laboral comprised eight laws passed between 1978 and 1979. See Vallejos, Rolando Álvarez, ‘El Plan Laboral y la negociación colectiva: ¿origen de un nuevo sindicalismo en Chile? 1979–1985’, Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana ‘Dr. Emilio Ravignani’, 3: 35/36 (2011–12), pp. 92–115.Google Scholar
110 ‘La semana política’, El Mercurio, 28 Sept. 1980, p. A3.
111 See Fairfield, ‘Structural Power in Comparative Political Economy’.
112 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 398-A’, p. 97.
113 Ibid., p. 110.
114 Ibid., pp. 35–7, 47, 77, 94.
115 Secretaría de la Junta, ‘Acta No. 399-A’, p. 22.
116 José Pablo Arellano, Políticas sociales y desarrollo: Chile 1924–1984 (Santiago: CIEPLAN, 1985).
117 Alberto Arenas, ‘El sistema de pensiones en Chile: principales resultados y desafíos pendientes’, in Encuentro latinoamericano y caribeño sobre las personas de edad: seminario técnico (Santiago: CEPAL, 2000), pp. 465–502.
118 ‘Previsión: ya viene la reforma’, Hoy, 22 Oct. 1980, pp. 30–2; ‘Previsión: en la puerta del horno’, Hoy, 5 Nov. 1980, pp. 19–20. Among the names registered were ‘Trust de Previsión Privada’ and ‘Corporación Previsional de Profesionales de Chile’.
119 Arellano, Políticas sociales y desarrollo.
120 ‘Las once de la “competencia”’, Análisis, June 1981, pp. 10–12.
