The Swiss financial centre, as it developed during the twentieth century, has for a long time been presented and perceived as a singularly stable and solid environment escaping crises and restructuring. This view, promoted by the dominant actors – private banks, cantonal banks and large commercial banks – presenting their own development, in a teleological vision, as success stories, is strongly challenged by more recent research developments. Our article deals with the evolution of banking demography in Switzerland between 1850 and 2000 and examines the exits of banking institutions from the statistics, identifying six periods of crisis and restructuring. The article proposes a new statistical series that makes it possible to scrutinise with a high level of granularity the banks that fail or are taken over, in particular by observing their category of bank and, for the period 1934–99, their size. It uses historical banking demography as a gateway to understand more broadly the phases of transformation of the financial centre. In doing so, this contribution questions the gap between the existence of significant phases of banking instability, their low importance in collective memory, and the perception of the Swiss banking sector as a model of stability. It also helps to refine our understanding of the evolution of the Swiss financial centre in general.

The Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), a state-controlled holding company, was founded in 1933. Its original mission was to prevent the collapse of Italy's largest universal banks by taking over their huge industrial shareholdings. As a consequence, the historiography traditionally associates it with the concept of ‘entrepreneurial state’. This article aims to challenge this interpretation by focusing on the ideas and actions of three prominent figures: Alberto Beneduce, the IRI's first chairman; Donato Menichella, Beneduce's right-hand man who became governor of the Bank of Italy after World War II; and Pasquale Saraceno, a technocrat who spent his entire career as one of the IRI's top managers. Beneduce and Menichella regarded the IRI as a financial intermediary open to private shareholders. To Saraceno, by contrast, the IRI was an expression of a Catholic ideology that entrusted to the state the mission of promoting the industrialization of the south. This view, which aimed at reducing regional inequalities in order to complete the country's political unification, prevailed only in the second half of the 1950s. By trying to blend profit maximization with political and social goals, this strategy sowed the seeds of the IRI's decline and eventual demise.

Policymakers need to know if the structure of competition and the degree of banking market concentration change the incidence of financial crises. Previous studies have not always come to clear conclusions. We use a new dataset of 19 countries where we include capital adequacy and house price growth as factors affecting crisis incidence, and we find a positive role for bank concentration in reducing incidence. In addition, we look at New Industrial Economics indicators of market structure and find that increased market power also reduces crisis incidence. We conclude that attempts to increase competition in banking, although welcome for welfare reasons, should be accompanied by increases in capital standards.

This article explains the problem of adjustment to the challenges of globalization in terms of the logic underpinning four distinct policy constraints, or trilemmas, and their interrelationship, and in particular the disturbances that arise from capital flows. The analysis of a policy trilemma was developed first as a diagnosis of exchange rate problems (the incompatibility of free capital flows with monetary policy autonomy and a fixed exchange rate regime); but the approach can be extended. The second trilemma we describe is the incompatibility between financial stability, capital mobility and national policy choice over exchange rates. The third example extends the analysis to politics, and looks at the strains in reconciling democratic politics with monetary autonomy and capital movements. Finally, we examine the security aspect and look at the interactions of democracy with capital flows and international order. The trilemmas, in short, depict the way that domestic monetary, financial, economic and political systems are interconnected with the international order, or the impossible policy choices at the heart of globalization. Frequently, the trilemmas conjure up countervailing anti-globalization tendencies and trends.

By the start of the twentieth century, the two organizational forms most used by Dutch banks to raise capital through the dispersal of their ownership were the cooperative association and the public company. Share ownership in cooperatives was typically restricted to customers, while companies permitted outside investors. Neither organizational form dictated specific shareholder liability arrangements. New specialist banks targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) combined these two organizational forms and flexible liability rules to create hybrid forms. I find those that took the public company form were more likely to suffer distress during the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. Liability arrangements for shareholders, by contrast, had a negligible impact on these banks’ resilience.

This article reinterprets the origin and evolution of the Basel Accords. We argue that the Basel I paradigm was very different from the regulatory approaches that had been applied successfully in most European countries since the Second World War. Banking systems relied on a multitude of tools including entry restrictions, liquidity rules, reserve requirements, deposit rate ceilings, lending and investment restrictions, combined with hands-on supervision and discretional interventions. By focusing exclusively on capital adequacy and credit risk, Basel I shifted attention in a very different and somewhat unexpected direction. The Basel regulations are often understood as a reaction to the bank failures of the 1970s and 1980s, but in fact their capital adequacy rules would not have prevented these failures. Indeed, even today, several of these risks are still not addressed by Basel updates, suggesting that the original and current proposals have a rather different raison d’être, placating political constituencies and banking interests.

This paper examines the social policy consequences of systemic banking crises or financial crises in 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries between 1990 and 2010. It takes a rationalist approach to political economy to analyse the effect of these crises on aggregate social policy spending and on four distinct social welfare policy programmes – education, health, housing, and social security – benefits of which vary across social groups. The results indicate that banking crises have a statistically strong negative effect on aggregate social expenditure, but the impact is not uniform across the four programmes. While social security spending increases during the course of crises, health and education expenditures decrease in the same period. The results reinforce the view that distributional conflicts overshadow governments’ response and the burden of crises is unevenly shared in a heterogeneous society. These findings are robust to alternative specifications.

Five years after the financial crisis, the global economy remains unbalanced and many of the advanced countries are still struggling to return to robust, sustainable growth. Taking a historical perspective, I argue that this predicament reflects a failure to adjust to profound changes in the economic landscape, which have given rise to the (re-)emergence of major financial booms and busts. The economic developments that really matter now take much longer to unfold – economic time has slowed down relative to calendar time – and yet the planning horizons of economic agents have shortened. The key problems arise from the cumulative effects of past decisions on stocks, and yet these effects are treated as short-term flow issues. The risk is that instability will become entrenched in the system. Policy needs to adjust.

Savings banks were created as a means to encourage the newly created working class to save for the uncertainties of urban industrial life. This article explores the success of the Savings Bank of Glasgow, and pays particular attention to the response of savers to the financial and commercial crises of 1847 and 1857. The crisis of 1847 was shallower but longer lasting in Glasgow, while that of 1857 was greatly exacerbated by local conditions in the short term, but of little long-term importance to savers. It suggests that, in both crises, some elements of contagion may have been present but that those who panicked in 1857 were systematically different from those who did not.

Financial crises are not unique to current financial systems. Are crises alike? Have they become more frequent, longer lasting and more severe since the 20th century? What does history tell us? The objective of this paper is to study the financial crises that have occurred in Spain over the last 150 years. We consider different types of crises (banking, currency and stock market crises), together with all their possible combinations, estimate their frequency by period and measure their length and depth. The main conclusion we obtain is that Spanish crises have been more frequent than in the rest of the world and have been more severe and more complex since 1973, as the 2007 crisis is confirming.

Low levels of bank capital and liquidity in combination with ongoing crises in other countries are shown to increase the probability of banking crises in OECD countries. Hence global coordination of regulatory reform is vital for reducing crisis risks.

This paper examines the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks in banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive banking system embedded in an overlapping-generations model subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully incorporate macroeconomic risks into their pricing of loans, a banking system may enter bankruptcy with probability one. A major cause for this default is that risk premia of a competitive banking system may become too small if the capital base is low.

A rapidly growing empirical literature is studying the causes and consequences of bank fragility in contemporary economies. The paper reviews the two basic methodologies adopted in cross-country empirical studies, the signals approach and the multivariate probability model, and their application to study the determinants of banking crises. The use of these models to provide early warnings for crises is also reviewed, as are studies of the economic effects of banking crises and of the policies to forestall them. The paper concludes by identifying directions for future research.