The axiom of dependent choice ($\mathsf {DC}$) and the axiom of countable choice (${\mathsf {AC}}_\omega $) are two weak forms of the axiom of choice that can be stated for a specific set: $\mathsf {DC} ( X )$ asserts that any total binary relation on X has an infinite chain, while ${\mathsf {AC}}_\omega ( X )$ asserts that any countable collection of nonempty subsets of X has a choice function. It is well-known that $\mathsf {DC} \Rightarrow {\mathsf {AC}}_\omega $. We study for which sets and under which hypotheses $\mathsf {DC} ( X ) \Rightarrow {\mathsf {AC}}_\omega ( X )$, and then we show it is consistent with $\mathsf {ZF}$ that there is a set $A \subseteq \mathbb {R}$ for which $\mathsf {DC} ( A )$ holds, but ${\mathsf {AC}}_\omega ( A )$ fails.

A partition is finitary if all its members are finite. For a set A, $\mathscr {B}(A)$ denotes the set of all finitary partitions of A. It is shown consistent with $\mathsf {ZF}$ (without the axiom of choice) that there exist an infinite set A and a surjection from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$. On the other hand, we prove in $\mathsf {ZF}$ some theorems concerning $\mathscr {B}(A)$ for infinite sets A, among which are the following:

1. (1) If there is a finitary partition of A without singleton blocks, then there are no surjections from A onto $\mathscr {B}(A)$ and no finite-to-one functions from $\mathscr {B}(A)$ to A.

2. (2) For all $n\in \omega $, $|A^n|<|\mathscr {B}(A)|$.

3. (3) $|\mathscr {B}(A)|\neq |\mathrm {seq}(A)|$, where $\mathrm {seq}(A)$ is the set of all finite sequences of elements of A.

We construct a Borel maximal cofinitary group.

It is consistent relative to an inaccessible cardinal that ZF+DC holds, and the hypergraph of isosceles triangles on $\mathbb {R}^2$ has countable chromatic number while the hypergraph of isosceles triangles on $\mathbb {R}^3$ has uncountable chromatic number.

We study the possible structures which can be carried by sets which have no countable subset, but which fail to be ‘surjectively Dedekind finite’, in two possible senses, that there is surjection to $\omega $, or alternatively, that there is a surjection to a proper superset.

Erdős [7] proved that the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is equivalent to the existence of an uncountable family $\mathcal {F}$ of (real or complex) analytic functions, such that $\big \{ f(x) \ : \ f \in \mathcal {F} \big \}$ is countable for every x. We strengthen Erdős’ result by proving that CH is equivalent to the existence of what we call sparse analytic systems of functions. We use such systems to construct, assuming CH, an equivalence relation $\sim $ on $\mathbb {R}$ such that any ‘analytic-anonymous’ attempt to predict the map $x \mapsto [x]_\sim $ must fail almost everywhere. This provides a consistently negative answer to a question of Bajpai-Velleman [2].

Strong Turing Determinacy, or ${\mathrm {sTD}}$, is the statement that for every set A of reals, if $\forall x\exists y\geq _T x (y\in A)$, then there is a pointed set $P\subseteq A$. We prove the following consequences of Turing Determinacy (${\mathrm {TD}}$) and ${\mathrm {sTD}}$ over ${\mathrm {ZF}}$—the Zermelo–Fraenkel axiomatic set theory without the Axiom of Choice:

1. (1) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {TD}}$ implies $\mathrm {wDC}_{\mathbb {R}}$—a weaker version of $\mathrm {DC}_{\mathbb {R}}$.

2. (2) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that every set of reals is measurable and has Baire property.

3. (3) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that every uncountable set of reals has a perfect subset.

4. (4) ${\mathrm {ZF}}+{\mathrm {sTD}}$ implies that for every set of reals A and every $\epsilon>0$:

   1. (a) There is a closed set $F\subseteq A$ such that $\mathrm {Dim_H}(F)\geq \mathrm {Dim_H}(A)-\epsilon $, where $\mathrm {Dim_H}$ is the Hausdorff dimension.

   2. (b) There is a closed set $F\subseteq A$ such that $\mathrm {Dim_P}(F)\geq \mathrm {Dim_P}(A)-\epsilon $, where $\mathrm {Dim_P}$ is the packing dimension.

Improving and clarifying a construction of Horowitz and Shelah, we show how to construct (in $\mathsf {ZF}$, i.e., without using the Axiom of Choice) maximal cofinitary groups. Among the groups we construct, one is definable by a formula in second-order arithmetic with only a few natural number quantifiers.

In the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice, a forcing notion is “$\kappa $-distributive” if and only if it is “$\kappa $-sequential.” We show that without the Axiom of Choice, this equivalence fails, even if we include a weak form of the Axiom of Choice, the Principle of Dependent Choice for $\kappa $. Still, the equivalence may still hold along with very strong failures of the Axiom of Choice, assuming the consistency of large cardinal axioms. We also prove that although a $\kappa $-distributive forcing notion may violate Dependent Choice, it must preserve the Axiom of Choice for families of size $\kappa $. On the other hand, a $\kappa $-sequential can violate the Axiom of Choice for countable families. We also provide a condition of “quasiproperness” which is sufficient for the preservation of Dependent Choice, and is also necessary if the forcing notion is sequential.

Hardin and Taylor proved that any function on the reals—even a nowhere continuous one—can be correctly predicted, based solely on its past behavior, at almost every point in time. They showed that one could even arrange for the predictors to be robust with respect to simple time shifts, and asked whether they could be robust with respect to other, more complicated time distortions. This question was partially answered by Bajpai and Velleman, who provided upper and lower frontiers (in the subgroup lattice of $\mathrm{Homeo}^+(\mathbb {R})$) on how robust a predictor can possibly be. We improve both frontiers, some of which reduce ultimately to consequences of Hölder’s Theorem (that every Archimedean group is abelian).

We write $\mathcal {S}_n(A)$ for the set of permutations of a set A with n non-fixed points and $\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)$ for the set of one-to-one sequences of elements of A with length n where n is a natural number greater than $1$. With the Axiom of Choice, $|\mathcal {S}_n(A)|$ and $|\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)|$ are equal for all infinite sets A. Among our results, we show, in ZF, that $|\mathcal {S}_n(A)|\leq |\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)|$ for any infinite set A if ${\mathrm {AC}}_{\leq n}$ is assumed and this assumption cannot be removed. In the other direction, we show that $|\mathrm {{seq}}^{1-1}_n(A)|\leq |\mathcal {S}_{n+1}(A)|$ for any infinite set A and the subscript $n+1$ cannot be reduced to n. Moreover, we also show that “$|\mathcal {S}_n(A)|\leq |\mathcal {S}_{n+1}(A)|$ for any infinite set A” is not provable in ZF.

There seems to be a view that intuitionists not only take the Axiom of Choice (AC) to be true, but also believe it a consequence of their fundamental posits. Widespread or not, this view is largely mistaken. This article offers a brief, yet comprehensive, overview of the status of AC in various intuitionistic and constructivist systems. The survey makes it clear that the Axiom of Choice fails to be a theorem in most contexts and is even outright false in some important contexts. Of the systems surveyed, only intensional type theory renders AC a theorem, but the extent of AC in that theory does not include, for instance, real analysis. Only a small amount of extensionality is required in order for the obvious proof an intuitionist might offer for AC to break down.

One prominent criticism of the abstractionist program is the so-called Bad Company objection. The complaint is that abstraction principles cannot in general be a legitimate way to introduce mathematical theories, since some of them are inconsistent. The most notorious example, of course, is Frege’s Basic Law V. A common response to the objection suggests that an abstraction principle can be used to legitimately introduce a mathematical theory precisely when it is stable: when it can be made true on all sufficiently large domains. In this paper, we raise a worry for this response to the Bad Company objection. We argue, perhaps surprisingly, that it requires very strong assumptions about the range of the second-order quantifiers; assumptions that the abstractionist should reject.

It is proved in $\mathsf {ZF}$ (without the axiom of choice) that, for all infinite sets M, there are no surjections from $\omega \times M$ onto $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathscr {P}}}(M)$.

We study the notion of non-trivial elementary embeddings under the assumption that V satisfies ZFC without Power Set but with the Collection Scheme. We show that no such embedding can exist under the additional assumption that it is cofinal and either is a set or that the scheme of Dependent Choices of arbitrary length holds. We then study failures of instances of Collection in symmetric submodels of class forcings.

Matthias Schröder has asked the question whether there is a weakest discontinuous problem in the topological version of the Weihrauch lattice. Such a problem can be considered as the weakest unsolvable problem. We introduce the discontinuity problem, and we show that it is reducible exactly to the effectively discontinuous problems, defined in a suitable way. However, in which sense this answers Schröder’s question sensitively depends on the axiomatic framework that is chosen, and it is a positive answer if we work in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with dependent choice and the axiom of determinacy $\mathsf {AD}$. On the other hand, using the full axiom of choice, one can construct problems which are discontinuous, but not effectively so. Hence, the exact situation at the bottom of the Weihrauch lattice sensitively depends on the axiomatic setting that we choose. We prove our result using a variant of Wadge games for mathematical problems. While the existence of a winning strategy for Player II characterizes continuity of the problem (as already shown by Nobrega and Pauly), the existence of a winning strategy for Player I characterizes effective discontinuity of the problem. By Weihrauch determinacy we understand the condition that every problem is either continuous or effectively discontinuous. This notion of determinacy is a fairly strong notion, as it is not only implied by the axiom of determinacy $\mathsf {AD}$, but it also implies Wadge determinacy. We close with a brief discussion of generalized notions of productivity.

In this paper, we use algebra-valued models to study cardinal numbers in a class of non-classical set theories. The algebra-valued models of these non-classical set theories validate the Axiom of Choice, if the ground model validates it. Though the models are non-classical, the foundations of cardinal numbers in these models are similar to those in classical set theory. For example, we show that mathematical induction, Cantor’s theorem, and the Schröder–Bernstein theorem hold in these models. We also study a few basic properties of cardinal arithmetic. In addition, the generalized continuum hypothesis is proved to be independent of these non-classical set theories.

In set theory without the Axiom of Choice ( $\mathsf {AC}$ ), we investigate the open problem of the deductive strength of statements which concern the existence of almost disjoint and maximal almost disjoint (MAD) families of infinite-dimensional subspaces of a given infinite-dimensional vector space, as well as the extension of almost disjoint families in infinite-dimensional vector spaces to MAD families.

We present a Zermelo–Fraenkel ( $\textbf {ZF}$ ) consistency result regarding bi-orderability of groups. A classical consequence of the ultrafilter lemma is that a group is bi-orderable if and only if it is locally bi-orderable. We show that there exists a model of $\textbf {ZF}$ plus dependent choice in which there is a group which is locally free (ergo locally bi-orderable) and not bi-orderable, and the group can be given a total order. The model also includes a torsion-free abelian group which is not bi-orderable but can be given a total order.

For every $n\in \omega \setminus \{0,1\}$ we introduce the following weak choice principle:

Moreover, we consider the following choice principle:

We will discuss the relations between these two choice principles and their relations to other well-known weak choice principles. Moreover, we will discuss what happens when we replace $\mathcal {F}$ by a linearly ordered or a well-ordered family.