This chapter considers the third great turning point in the development of hermeneutics in Western culture. The first hermeneutics was a hermeneutics of consent. This was developed in early Christianity and by Augustine. The second turning point was in the modern Enlightenment with its classic expression by Spinoza. This is the hermeneutics of suspicion. The third turning point was inaugurated by Barth and Heidegger. Gadamer provides its fundamental book, Truth and Method. This hermeneutics may be called integral hermeneutics, which incorporates the first two turning points. This chapter considers the hermeneutics of Heidegger in its relation to Aristotle. This is followed by a consideration of Gadamer’s hermeneutics with a focus on the central role of phronesis, which shows the relevance of Aristotle. Conversation is also central to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. The chapter finally shows the relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to Christian theology.

The difference between the idea of the Rechtsstaat and that of the rule of law is more than a variation on a theme. Theorists and practitioners of law’s rule would do well not to equate – for analytical as well as practical reasons – the Anglo-American way of law with what Leonard Krieger called “the German idea of freedom.”2 And yet they have and will – to the detriment, I argue in this chapter, of understanding and prescription.

State punishment, understood as hard treatment or the restriction of the liberty of the individual, has been central to modern debates about the rule of law. As a form of “dramatically coercive and burdensome” state action against the individual, punishment raises distinctive issues about the relationship between a state and its citizens, and as such requires particular justification.1 These questions of justification are typically seen as questions of who may be punished, and for what, the identification of legitimate and illegitimate forms of punishment, and indeed of the processes that must consequently be respected by the state if it is to impose justified punishment.2 It can therefore be seen that these questions are important not only in terms of justifying actual inflictions of punishment on particular individuals, but also in terms of legitimizing the institution of punishment more broadly.

Hermeneutics, critical theory, and deconstruction designate three intellectual orientations that have dominated debates in continental philosophy. All three exhibit the “linguistic turn.” The debate between Habermas and Gadamer brought Gadamer to prominence. Important for both is the Aristotelian distinction between the practical and the technical. Gadamer is more negatively critical of the Enlightenment than is Habermas. Both are concerned with the instrumentalization of reason in modernity. Yet Gadamer sees Habermas as too utopian. Habermas sees Gadamer as insensitive to the way dialogue is distorted by social forces and political power. This chapter concludes with a consideration of Gadamer in relation to Derrida and deconstruction. Both were profoundly influenced by Heidegger. Yet Gadamer emphasizes continuity, while Derrida emphasizes rupture and break. Gadamer shows us the achievement of understanding, while Derrida is preoccupied with the ways we misunderstand. Derrida and Gadamer serve as correctives of the other, just as Habermas and Gadamer serve as correctives of the other.

The rule of law is a central theme of Montesquieu’s major work, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), and in many respects it forms the conceptual core of his political theory. For Montesquieu, the rule of law means that the use of political power is subject to the formal constraint of standing rules that are codified in the positive laws of the land. It means that no one is above the law and that the actions of the state must conform in a consistent way to publicly known standards. The rule of law is the single most important factor, as Montesquieu sees it, in establishing moderation in government and therefore in protecting political liberty.

This chapter provides a biography of Gadamer and includes an overview of the philosophical work that Gadamer produced. It provides an account of his youth and education, his early career in Nazi Germany, and his career after World War II. He was named Rektor of Leipzig University in East Germany but gave up the position and came to West Germany, first to Frankfurt and then to Heidelberg. In 1960 he published Truth and Method, which slowly became recognized world-wide. He retired in 1968 and was very productive throughout his old age.

This chapter addresses whether Gadamerߣs hermeneutics should be considered a kind of relativism or a sort of realism. In this consideration Gadamerߣs treatment of the concept of truth is also presented. This chapter argues that Gadamerߣs hermeneutics is on one side of the hermeneutical fork–the side of realism, as opposed to relativism. Gadamerߣs hermeneutics is considered in relation to the work of John McDowell. For Gadamer, our freedom and our knowledge are always situated and limited, but that does not undo Gadamerߣs commitment to realism and truth.

We live in an age of measurement and quantification which has produced cross-national indicators of concepts like gender equality, war and peace, and gross national happiness, to name just a few.1 The rule of law (RoL) is no exception and recent years have seen a proliferation of indicators that are the subject of a nascent literature.2 The literature points out that indicators inherently reduce complex social phenomena to simple measures with a corresponding loss of information but an increase in tractability.

This chapter will analyse the discourse in France on the relatively new French expression État de droit.1 After an unsuccessful first rise in its use at the beginning of the twentieth century (1907–1930s), the term has since 1977 progressively informed the language of French constitutional law scholars and even penetrated the language of specialists of other legal disciplines, politicians, journalists, and, to some extent, of ordinary citizens.

theory of art in the conventional sense. He does not provide a systematic account of art, nor does he provide criteria for aesthetic judgment. He is concerned rather with the role art plays in forming our culture and its meaning in our individual and communal lives. This chapter situates Gadamer’s views in the context of the history of philosophy–the ancient Greek view of art and the modern views of art, especially the view of Kant. For Gadamer, art is an event of understanding. The concepts of play and the game are important to his account. This chapter considers the temporal, the dialogical, and the communal aspects of art for Gadamer. It considers arts claim to truth. And finally, it shows how Gadamer thinks that art has an important transformative potential.

We live at a time of sobering realism – indeed pessimism – regarding rule of law building after conflict. There are many reasons for this. The inherent difficulty of the endeavor itself is one fundamental factor. Although each country emerging from violent conflict is unique in its history, leadership, culture, and possibilities for progress, they often also face many common challenges. Governing institutions may be discredited, law enforcement and judiciaries may be distrusted, civilians may be recoiling from egregious injury, social divisions may run deep, infrastructure may be devastated, economic opportunities may be limited, and confidence in the very idea of the rule of law may be at an all-time low.

Thomas Hobbes is the founder of the rule by law tradition in modern Western thought. It argues that there is no more to law than what the holder of supreme legislative power chooses to enact, whatever its content. Hobbes founds it in opposition to the conception of the rule of law exemplified in the writings of Sir Edward Coke according to which the common law, as interpreted by judges, contains fundamental legal and moral principles which condition the content of enacted or statute law. Coke and others in this rule by law tradition thus consider the rule of law to be a moral good.

Theorists often begin with the elements or features of the rule of law, frequently distinguishing formal and substantive versions.1 Instead, I explore two other senses. The first sense is that the rule of law exists in a society when government officials and the populace are generally bound by and abide law. Framing the analysis in terms of a society subject to law enables a more expansive view of functions of the rule of law. The second sense construes “the rule of law” as an ideal and as rhetoric, asking what functions are served when people invoke it.

The World Justice Project publishes a “Rule of Law” Index. For 2016 the nations with the highest scores were Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Germany outranked Singapore, which in turn outranked the United States. Russia and Ecuador were tied at the relatively low 45th position, but both were above Bolivia (104) and Venezuela, which came in dead last. The Index attempts to measure compliance with what its sponsors identify as “universal principles of the rule of law.” These are that “[t]he government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under the law,” that “laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just, are applied evenly, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property,” that “[t]he process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient,” and that “[j]ustice is delivered by competent, ethical and independent representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.”1 Some of these universal principles replicate in other terms Lon Fuller’s famous list of elements of the rule of law; others go beyond Fuller’s minimum requirements.

That a concept in common use, such as the rule of law, may be called essentially contested is not a criticism of that concept. Quite the contrary: “essentially contested” is a theoretical designation that draws attention to the way in which arguments about the meaning of a given concept contribute to our understanding and evaluation of the systems, practices, and actions to which the concept is applied.