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Methodological question-begging about the causes of complex social traits
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2023
Abstract
Burt formulates her critique at a general level of abstraction that highlights the methodological deficiencies of sociogenomics without also calling attention to precisely the same deficiencies in the social science model she seeks to defend against its encroachments. What might have been a methodological bulwark against the excesses of sociogenomics is instead a one-sided critique that merely renews its charter.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
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Related commentaries (24)
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Author response
Polygenic scores for social science: Clarification, consensus, and controversy