We develop a positive theory of the hedging behavior of value-maximizing corporations. We treat hedging by corporations simply as one part of the firm's financing decisions. We examine (1) taxes, (2) contracting costs, and (3) the impact of hedging policy on the firm's investment decisions as explanations of the observed wide diversity of hedging practices among large, widely-held corporations. Our theory provides answers to the questions: (1) why some firms hedge and others do not; (2) why firms hedge some risks but not others; and (3) why some firms hedge their accounting risk exposure while others hedge their economic value.

We propose a simple model of equilibrium asset pricing in which there are differences in the amounts of information available for developing inferences about the returns parameters of alternative securities. In contrast with earlier work, we show that parameter uncertainty, or estimation risk, can have an effect upon market equilibrium. Under reasonable conditions, securities for which there is relatively little information are shown to have relatively higher systematic risk when that risk is properly measured, ceteris paribus. The initially very limited model is shown to be robust with respect to relaxation of a number of its principal assumptions. We provide theoretical support for the empirical examination of at least three proxies for relative information: period of listing, number of security returns observations available, and divergence of analyst opinion.

The parameters of the return process of a firm are determined by two elements—the natural event structure, i.e., the process by which nature affects the value of the firm, and the information structure, i.e., the process by which information about these events is collected and disseminated to investors. Simple measures of three dimensions of the information structure—the frequency and accuracy of, and the bias in information releases, are derived from the moments of the return distribution.

The unique characteristics of options enable investors to create nonnormal portfolio return distributions that cannot be replicated with other assets. This analysis explores the power of various investment selection criteria to identify efficient portfolios from investment strategies involving call options and treasury bills, stocks, and covered option writing. The preference structure for strategies incorporating options is compared to traditional stock-fixed income investments, and the importance of options to investor utility maximization is illustrated. This study reveals that rules of stochastic dominance that place few restrictions on investor preference functions and asset return distribution are appropriate criteria by which to rank portfolios containing options and other assets.

This paper addresses both how best to incorporate forecasts of future excess market returns into a market-timing strategy and what additional return to expect as a consequence. In contrast to the work of Jensen [8] and Grant ([4], [5], and [6]), the results specifically consider and measure the attractiveness to a risk-averse investor of the positively skewed distribution of portfolio returns expected from a market-timed portfolio. The usual mean and variance characterization of a risky portfolio is not sufficient in the case of a markettimed portfolio, and a simple utility model is employed to measure the incremental value of a market-timing strategy. The results are given as a function of the relative volatility of the market, the quality of available forecasts, and the risk attitude of the investor.

This research develops and tests a model for the prediction of tender offer outcomes. Variables that increase the supply of “obtainable shares” (such as increased bid premiums or the payment of solicitation fees) are shown to increase the probability of success. Increased ownership of target firm shares by the bidder also increases the probability of success. Variables that impede the tendering of shares (such as target management opposition or a competing bid) decrease the probability of success. Tests of the model utilizing both linear and logistic analysis support the theoretical constructs and help resolve the paradoxical findings of previous research.

Equilibrium in the market for real assets requires that the price of those assets be bid up to reflect the tax shields they can offer to levered firms. Thus, there must be an equality between the market values of real assets and the values of optimally levered firms. The standard measure of the advantage to leverage compares the values of levered and unlevered assets, and can be misleading and difficult to interpret. We show that a meaningful measure of the advantage to debt is the extra rate of return, net of a market premium for bankruptcy risk, earned by a levered firm relative to an otherwise-identical unlevered firm. We construct an option valuation model to calculate such a measure and present extensive simulation results. We use this model to compute optimal debt maturities, show how this approach can be used for capital budgeting, and discuss its implications for the comparison of bankruptcy costs versus tax shields.

Errors in variables due to nonsynchronous trading and benchmark error are significant problems for capital market research. This paper develops the use of direct and reverse regression to bound true coefficient estimates when the data exhibit error structures arising from these two sources both separately and jointly. The approach appears to have broad applicability for capital markets research. As an example, the paper reexamines the small-firm effect to show that it cannot be attributed to nonsynchronous trading or benchmark error in the estimated variance of the market portfolio. This result is shown to hold even when the tax-selling effect is controlled for by excluding January returns.

Common stock portfolios of large, heavily traded firms exhibit daily first-order serial correlation in excess of what would be expected, given the individual security coefficients. Further, this correlation rises as the number of securities in the portfolio increases. The direct implication of this finding is that nonsynchronous trading is not the only cause of correlation in daily market indices. Related implications are also discussed.