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The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Abstract

We develop a positive theory of the hedging behavior of value-maximizing corporations. We treat hedging by corporations simply as one part of the firm's financing decisions. We examine (1) taxes, (2) contracting costs, and (3) the impact of hedging policy on the firm's investment decisions as explanations of the observed wide diversity of hedging practices among large, widely-held corporations. Our theory provides answers to the questions: (1) why some firms hedge and others do not; (2) why firms hedge some risks but not others; and (3) why some firms hedge their accounting risk exposure while others hedge their economic value.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1985

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